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Abstract
This research investigates some aspects of the structure of European sovereign bond sec-
ondary market. Eruopean government bonds are standard financial instruments, traded in
highly transparent markets. A good functioning of these markets provides an essential sup-
portive environment for the primary market, by which Sovereign entities issue their bonds
among investors. During the last decade, many factors have potentially affected the bond
market’s structure: the US and UK financial crisis, the European sovereign crisis, the defla-
tion and the non-standard monetary policies of ECB and other central banks, new regulatory
frameworks for financial markets and banks (e.g., MIFID II and MIFIR).
Looking at the period of the European debt crisis, the pricing in financial markets of
sovereign credit risk has been a central topic for empirical research. In the first chapter, we
study the links between credit default swaps (CDS) and bond spreads, the differences in the
set of relevant determinants, the price discovery of sovereign credit risk and the impact of
the entry into force of the European ban on naked CDS, approved by European authorities
to contrast speculative activity against national public debts.
Secondly, we focus on the Italian case. The wholesale secondary market of its securi-
ties is MTS. We provide an extensive study on the evolution of the microstructural liquidity
conditions over the last decade. In order to investigate different dimensions of the market
liquidity (quoting, trading and resiliency), we propose an analysis on several liquidity mea-
sures. The large set of measures on a unique dataset provides a complete view of the market
structure, market makers’ behavior and price takers’ preferences. This analysis clearly high-
lights trends, causes and timing of structural variations in market liquidity in the last decade.
Lastly, since MTS Italy is the secondary market that operates under the specialist sys-
tem, the last chapter investigates some peculiar aspects of the incentives that probably af-
fect specialists’ behavior. Differently from other markets, the Italian Treasury monitors the
performance of specialists on MTS, in order to push them to provide high level of liquid-
ity. Monitoring rules represent a sort of soft regulation applied on Italian government bond
market. We investigate whether these rules and the correspondent public ranking system
effectively affect market makers in their quoting decisions and, consequently, the liquidity
conditions of order books. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the very first studies
to statistically assess the impact of this regime on specialists’ quoting preferences.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
European sovereign debt securities are standard financial instruments, traded in highly
transparent markets. A good functioning of these markets provides an essential supportive
environment for the primary market, by which the Sovereign entities issue their bonds among
investors.
European governments, to achieve the minimization of national borrowing cost, have
faced the challenges of sustainable development in sovereign bond markets’ structure and
regulatory innovations. The current dissertation touches some of these aspects with an em-
pirical perspective.
During the last decade, many factors have potentially affected the bond market’s struc-
ture: the US and UK financial crisis, the European sovereign crisis, the deflation and the
non-standard monetary policies of ECB and other central banks, new regulatory frameworks
for financial markets and intermediaries (e.g., MIFID II and MIFIR).
During the sovereign debt crisis, credit default swaps (CDS) played a central role in
the pricing of sovereign credit risk. CDS are contracts whereby one party guarantees to a
bond holder the repayment of principal if the issuer of the bond (the reference entity) incurs
in a specified credit event (e.g., it does not reimburse the capital). In exchange for such
protection, the CDS buyer ensures a constant payment over time, the CDS spread. Thus
CDS are equivalent of insurance contracts, exchangeable in financial markets.
This instrument was also suitable for speculative transactions. This term is used to indi-
cate a trading strategy employed to realize in the short run a gain generated by strong changes
in the value of the products purchased or sold. CDS was also used to amplify investors’ bets
on the sovereign credit risk pricing. In order to limit the use of this instrument for specula-
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tive purposes, on 26 March 2012 the European Commission has approved a regulation that
bans the opportunity to buy CDS if the investor does not really own a position exposed to the
credit risk of a particular reference entity (naked CDS). In this way, they have tried to limit
the use of CDS at a mere use for hedging or insurance purposes. This legislation became
effective from 1 November 2012. The aim of the second chapter is to investigate the link
between the credit risk priced in the sovereign bond and in the CDS markets. In more detail,
we study how the set of relevant drivers of these two instruments and the price discovery
mechanism of sovereign credit risk have been affected by the introduction of the European
ban on naked CDS.
The third and fourth chapters focus on the Italian case. Italy has the second largest public
debt among European countries. The wholesale trading market of its securities is MTS. It
was introduced in 1988 by the Italian Treasury and it was the first electronic market for
government bonds in Europe. Currently, it is the electronic platform with the highest trading
market share of Italian government bonds. As mentioned above, the good functioning of this
market guarantees a lower liquidity premium, demanded by investors on Italian government
bonds, and facilitates allocation in the primary market. A large number of studies on the
liquidity conditions on MTS domestic platform are conducted recently (Girardi and Impenna
(2013), Pelizzon et al. (2014), Cafiso (2015), Pelizzon et al. (2016), Scheneider et al.
(2016), Corradin and Maddaloni (2017)). In the third chapter we provide an extensive study
on the evolution of the liquidity microstructure conditions over the last decade. In order
to investigate different dimensions of the market liquidity (quoting, trading and resiliency),
we propose an analysis on 45 liquidity measures. We select some of these measures among
those described in Coluzzi et al. (2008) and we put forward some new measures. The
large set of measures on a unique dataset provides a complete view of the market structure,
market makers’ behavior and price takers’ preferences. This analysis clearly highlights the
main trends and the timing of structural variations in market liquidity during the last decade.
Lastly, since MTS Italy is the a secondary market that operates under the specialist sys-
tem, the fourth chapter investigates some peculiar features of the incentives that probably
affect specialists’ quoting decisions. Differently from other markets, the Italian Treasury
monitors the performance of specialists, in order to incentivize them to provide high level of
liquidity. Monitoring rules represent a sort of soft regulation applied on Italian government
bond market. We investigate whether these rules and the correspondent public ranking sys-
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tem, through its explicit and implicit incentives, effectively affects market makers in their
quoting decisions and, consequently, the liquidity conditions of order books. To the best of
our knowledge, this is one of the very first studies to statistically assess the impact of this
regime on specialists’ quoting preferences.
The empirical analysis, based on diff-in-diff approach, employs the changes in moni-
toring rules between 2015 and 2016. These have decreased the minimum size that has to
be quoted by specialists on BTPs with residual maturity longer than 10 years from 5mm to
2mm. Results clearly identify the decisive role of monitoring and public ranking regimes
in specialists’ quoting behavior. A combination of a positive effect on tightness of bid-ask
spreads and no negative depletion of quoted depth in the order book is found, globally lead-
ing to better liquidity conditions. These results are reconciled with traditional microstructure
models taking into account the positive effects of a public ranking system. Furthermore,
this analysis definitely highlights a heterogeneous impact among market makers, suggesting
these operators are differently exposed to the potential benefits of a ranking system. These
results provide important implications for policy makers in the design of financial markets
and suggest that traditional microstructure models and empirical studies can be enhanced by
taking into account incentives provided by the ranking regime, when it exists.
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Chapter 2
Government Bond-SCDS links in the
Eurozone (2008-2015)
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, the debt sustainability of advanced countries has become one of the main
concern in financial markets. Creditworthiness deterioration has been related to the dynamic
of governments’ budget deficits, the rising debt burdens, the increasing political uncertainty
and the decline in financial markets stability. Therefore, hedging activity on sovereign credit
risk has become a critical component for market participants. Among different strategies
in portfolio management, CDS was undoubtedly used by market operators to manage their
exposures to sovereign credit risk. CDS are contracts whereby one party guarantees to a bond
holder the principal repayment as well as the interest payments in case the issuer of the bond
(the reference entity) defaults or experiences another credit event. Against such protection,
the CDS buyer ensures a constant payment over time, the CDS spread. Apparently, this swap
is very similar to a credit insurance contract. As Duffie (1999) pointed out, from a theoretical
no-arbitrage condition, CDS spread should be replicated by a portfolio that is long on the
bond and short on an appropriate risk-free rate. In perfect market conditions, the portfolio
return, composed by a government bond and a loan at risk-free rate, should be the only extra-
yield that the investor requires in facing the credit risk of bond issuer: CDS Spreadt=Bond
Yieldt-Risk free ratet , that is CDS Spreadt=Bond Spreadt . However, this instrument could be
also used for speculative transactions (Barclays (2010), Che and Rajiv (2010)), amplifying
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investors bets on sovereign credit risk.
In order to limit the use of this instrument for speculative purposes, on 26 March 2012 the
European Commission (henceforth EC) has approved a regulation that bans the possibility to
buy CDS if the investor does not really own a position exposed to credit risk of the reference
entity (naked CDS). In this way, EC has limited the trading on CDS at a mere use for hedging
or insurance purposes. This legislation has become effective from 1 November 2012.
The aim of this work is to investigate the interconnections between bond spread and CDS
spread in a wide sample of Eurozone countries. In particular, the study, considering a very
long period, that runs from the Lehman default in September 2008 to the end of June 2015,
firstly analyzes the relevant determinants of the two assets, highlighting differences between
peripheral and core countries and investigating the evolution of the differences between the
two drivers’ sets over the period 2008-2015. Secondly, we investigate whether the cointegra-
tion condition and the leading role in the pricing mechanism of sovereign credit risk, played
alternatively by the cash or the derivative market, actively modify the set of key drivers of
the bond or CDS. Lastly, this paper tries to verify whether the EU restriction has effectively
affected the links and the equilibrium between bond and CDS. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous research assesses the impact of European ban on naked CDS. In this paper, we
explain in more detail this reform and we study the evolution of the price discovery mech-
anism of sovereign credit risk and the variations in the set of relevant drivers of these two
assets through both static and dynamic models. These two steps are two sides of the same
coin: the European ban could have affected the leading role in the pricing of credit risk and,
consequently, the relevant drivers in determining the sovereign cost of financing. The main
contributions of this paper are to analyze a very long period (2008-2015), to offer a new
view on the links and on the long-run equilibrium between CDS and bond markets using
both static and dynamic models and to investigate the impact of European ban on naked
CDS.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the previous literature on
CDS and cash bond markets relations. Then, Section 3 discusses methodology, data and
the main results of the study of relevant determinants of sovereign credit risk. Section 4
investigates the pricing mechanism of sovereign credit risk. Section 5, addresses a panel
var analysis on the determinants of the CDS and bond spread in order to test the dynamic
relation between the two assets. Section 6 discusses the introduction of the European ban
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on naked CDS and on bonds’ short selling and verifies the impact of the entry into force on
the price discovery mechanism and on the set of relevant variables. Concluding remarks are
offered in Section 7.
2.2 Related literature
In recent years, literature on the links between bonds and CDS has greatly expanded,
since CDS have grown in efficiency, in trading volume and in information contribution on
credit risk. As mentioned above, from a no-arbitrage condition, CDS and bond markets
should be in equilibrium: CDS spread should be equal to the difference between the bond
yield and a correspondent risk free rate (Duffie (1999)). In the short term, this relation can
be expected to have deviations, while - from economic theory - it should not be expected
to have substantial differences in the medium or in the long term. Many researchers have
investigated this aspect and they conclude that equilibrium condition is not always respected.
Wide literature about the relation between corporate CDS and bond yield exists. We refer to
Zhu (2006), Ammer and Cai (2007), Blanco et al. (2005) for the corporate case.
Focusing on the sovereign European case, some common features can be found. Clear
evidences of no-cointegration before September 2008 are highlighted. Conversely, since
autumn 2008 signs of cointegration can be traced. Fontana and Scheicher (2010), using the
framework proposed by Johansen (1988, 1995) on a sample of ten EU countries (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain),
find no-cointegration if the period 2006-2008 is considered. After 2008, the cointegration
equilibrium is respected for all the units in the sample, with a confidence level greater for
the peripherals (especially Italy and Spain). Similar findings on post-Lehman crisis period
are found in Carboni (2011) and in Alper et al. (2013). However, Carboni shows that it is
necessary to include the spread Euribor-Eurepo to restore cointegration among the markets,
which appear misaligned after the Lehman default. Palladini and Portes (2011), considering
a six countries sample (Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Austria), demonstrate
that theoretical value [1,−1] of the cointegrating vector is rejected, highlighting a strong
short run misalignment from equilibrium condition. Delatte et al. (2012) highlight that CDS
and bond spreads are not linked by a linear relationship. Arce et al. (2013) find persistent
deviations between both spreads during the crisis but not before.
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Given the analysis on the equilibrium conditions, it might be interesting to understand
in which market the price is formed when new information is received. There are several
ways to estimate in which market price discovery occurs. The choice to use some metrics
as opposed to others depends on the level of market cointegration. Fontana and Scheicher
(2010), using VEC model and the corresponding Gonzalo-Granger measure, show clear evi-
dence of CDS supremacy in price discovery process since the outbreak of financial crisis. In
addition, this supremacy is stronger during periods of stress and turbulence for government
yields of weak economies: during financial turmoil, the CDS market led with more force
the cash market, being able to cause in the latter strong destabilizing conditions. The same
conclusions can be found in Palladini and Portes (2011), in Carboni (2011), in Delatta et al.
(2012) and in Alper et al. (2013). IMF (2013) carried out the analysis with Hasbrouck statis-
tic estimated from a panel VEC model. They find a leading role of the derivative product
during the hardest part of the crisis.
As mentioned above, the further question is about the determinants of CDS and bond
prices, to test whether the two sets of relevant drivers are systematically different. About
this issue, the literature is wide. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) provide a complete review of
existing studies about drivers of sovereign CDS (henceforth SCDS). Synthetically, according
to Subrahmanyam, three main categories of determinants can be identified: structural ones
(risk-free rate, public debt and idiosyncratic volatility of assets), those related to liquidity
conditions and those that approximate the conditions in international financial markets (i.e.,
market volatility and the degree of risk aversion by investors).
With respect to bond yields, focusing on the European case, D’Agostino and Ehrmann
(2014) and Matei (2013) provide a general review of studies on the relevant drivers of gov-
ernment bond spreads. The results reveal that fiscal fundamentals (mainly public debt and
GDP growth rate) as well as international risks, liquidity risk and the risk of the crisis’ trans-
mission among Eurozone member States are likely to put substantial upward pressures on
sovereign bond yields.
This literature is only a starting point for our analysis. As a matter of fact, the aim
of this paper is to investigate the relevant differences between the drivers set of bond and
CDS prices and whether these differences have varied over the period 2008-2015. On this
subject, only few papers exist. Fontana and Scheicher (2016) reproduce a panel analysis on
CDS and bond spreads, with weekly data between June 2006 and June 2010. They find that
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bond spreads are driven more than CDS by country-specific factors (e.g., Debt/GDP) and
that before the crisis, market prices were less linked to fundamental determinants (wake up
call phenomenon). The wake up call and the mis-pricing of the sovereign default risk in the
pre-crisis period are also pointed out in Cipollini et al. (2015). Two years before, Alper et
al. (2013) analyze data in the period 2008-2010 on CDS and RAS (Related Asset Swap on
government bonds). Proposing a division of drivers between global&financial and Country-
specific fiscal factors, they find CDS spreads are more responsive to new information on the
fiscal side. This is particularly evident if the same analysis is performed splitting the sample
between core and weak economies. Lastly, they argue that CDS market provides better
signals on credit risk during periods of stress. IMF in its Global Financial Stability Report
of the April 2013, using standard panel regression on 33 countries during 2008-2012, states
the derivative and the cash markets reflect economic fundamentals and other relevant market
factors in a similar fashion. As Arce et al. (2013) and Fontana and Scheicher (2016), they
perform a panel analysis on the determinants of the basis between CDS and bond spreads.
2.3 The determinants of sovereign credit risk
The first step of the analysis investigates the relevant drivers on bond and CDS spreads.
It will be studied through a panel regression model, as previous research of ECB and IMF
did (D’Agostino and Erhmann (2014), Fontana and Scheicher (2016), IMF Global Financial
Stability Report (April 2013), Alper et al. (2013)). The variables used in the model are
chosen among those suggested by economic theory and literature. This analysis investigates
whether the credit risk pricing in the two markets (cash and derivatives) is driven by the
same set of country-specific and macroeconomic variables. Lastly, as other studies have
investigated (e.g., Fontana and Scheicher (2016), Alper et al. (2013), we study the set of
relevant drivers of the basis. It is defined as the difference between CDS spread and bond
spread and this part of study verifies which variables lead the pricing differences between
the two assets.
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2.3.1 Methodology and data
The analysis of determinants is carried out through a standard panel regression model
with individual and time fixed effects, using monthly level data on ten European countries
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain).
In appendix .1.4 we show the results of Hausman test for the correct specification in using
unit fixed effects and the outcome of the tests to verify the required time fixed effects dum-
mies. From our sample, we exclude countries whose activity was limited in the primary
and secondary cash markets. For this reason, we do not consider Luxembourg, Malta and
Cyprus. In the case of Greece and Slovenia, the reasons are quite different. We collect data
for Greece until May 2010, when the Prime Minister Papandreou asked the EU partners to
activate the fiscal support mechanism. Because of this, the activity in the Greek government
bond market became rarefied and it does not permit us to consider Greece within the sample.
However, if we consider Greece until May 2010, the results of the econometric analysis are
not substantial affected. In the case of Slovenia, the market data are available starting from
2012. For this reason we include it only in the final part of the sample and we verify that it
does not influence our conclusions.
The sample period runs from 15 September 2008 to 30 June 2015. We choose the
Lehman default as starting point of our analysis because previous literature has pointed out
a structural variation in the level of cointegration between the two assets after the autumn
2008. Credit risk should be priced both in the government bond market and in the deriva-
tive SCDS market. Under efficient conditions, a new information on the creditworthiness
of an issuer should affect the bond prices and the corresponding cost of protection. How-
ever, markets are not fully efficient and, as a result, there is a disequilibrium between cash
and derivative assets. These imbalances result in partial misaligned movements in the two
markets, offering arbitrage opportunities. Recalling that CDS Spreadt = Bond Spreadt from
economic theory, this condition has been repeatedly studied in the literature and the persis-
tence of disequilibrium between the two markets has been pointed out. In this part of the
analysis, we study whether the two assets are linked to different sets of relevant variables.
In our analysis, the bond spread is obtained by subtracting to the ten-year bond yield
the Euro ten-year swap rate, as a proxy of participants’ preferred measure of the risk-free
rate with the same maturity. This choice, used in other studies in the literature (Alper et al.
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(2013), Fontana and Scheicher (2010)), makes the use of the German Bund yield unneces-
sary as a proxy for risk-free rate. It provides two advantages. First, it allows to use Germany
as a unit in the sample. The second benefit is that the spread obtained for each country is not
directly distorted by the dynamic of the German data. The 5y CDS spread is expressed in ba-
sis points, as percentage on the notional value protected. A price increase should represent
deterioration in the reference entity creditworthiness. For all countries, the two variables
are positively correlated. The first tensions appeared after the Lehman default. Then, up to
2010, the level has decreased. However, the strongest widening occurred from the beginning
of 2010, when the dramatic conditions of Greek public budget manifested itself. Following
the summer 2012, a normalization period, in which spreads and volatility return to lower
levels, started. Lastly, as explained above, the basis is defined as the difference between
CDS spread and bond spread.
The basic panel model is represented by the following specifications:
Bond Spreadit =a0+β1Bond Liqit +β2Euribor3mt +β3Global Aversion Riskt+
+β4Eqindex SXXPit +β5EVZt +β6VsPartyt +β7Debt GDPit+
+β8GDP Growthit +β9Inflation Expectations+
+β10CDS net am dynamic+β11Specialness+αi+dt + εit
CDS Spreadit =a0+β1CDS Liqit +β2Euribor3mt +β3Global Aversion Riskt+
+β4Eqindex SXXPit +β5EVZt +β6VsPartyt +β7Debt GDPit+
+β8GDP Growthit +β9Inflation Expectations+
+β10CDS net am dynamic+αi+dt +µit
Basisit =a0+β1Euribor3mt +β2Global Aversion Riskt+
+β3Eqindex SXXPit +β4EVZt +β5VsPartyt +β6Debt GDPit+
+β7GDP Growthit +β8Inflation Expectations+
+β9CDS net am dynamic+β10Specialness+αi+dt +νit
(2.1)
The use of monthly averages and interpolations rather than closing prices of each month
avoids some distortions and provides less volatile and biased data. Appendix .1.3 shows
details on data manipulation, descriptive statistics of time series and the output of the test on
the stationarity conditions.
11
As robustness check, in order to verify whether coefficients are different across more
homogeneous countries, we split the sample between core and peripherals (Italy, Spain,
Portugal and Ireland).
The explanatory variables that have been used in the panel models are the following: liq-
uidity measure of the asset (bond or CDS), Euribor 3 months, a global risk aversion indicator,
idiosyncratic volatility, EVZ, counterparty risk proxy, debt level, GDP growth, European in-
flation expectations, CDS net amount to gross amount ratio. Only in the bond specification,
it is also considered a proxy about the specialness in the repo market1 of securities of each
issuer, a key determinant pointed out in Fontana and Scheicher (2016). These variables can
be divided into country-specific factors and variables common to the countries in the sample.
In the bond and CDS specifications, the liquidity measure has been calculated as the
difference of the bid-ask prices in percentage on the mid-price. The idiosyncratic volatility
is measured as the difference of the realized volatility on monthly based of the national
main stock index (FTSE MIB - Italy, IBEX - Spain, DAX - Germany, CAC - France, PSI20
- Portugal, AEX - The Netherlands, ATX - Austria, BEL20 - Belgium, HEX - Finland,
ISEQ - Ireland) and the volatility of the European SXXP. The first fiscal variable is the
debt outstanding (the national debt/Gdp ratio); the second fiscal variable is the Gdp growth
QoQ. The latter could explain some aspects that are not caught by the Debt/GDP variable.
These aspects concern the debt sustainability and they help to have a forward looking on the
country fiscal condition.
Regarding liquidity measures two distinct trends can be seen: a) with regards to bond
spreads, liquidity strains can be identified after 2010, in particular in peripherals case (stud-
ied in Pelizzon et al. (2016) and in Badaoui et al. (2016)); b) in the CDS case, many coun-
tries show a U-shape pace during the whole period, with highest level of liquidity during the
period 2011-2012.
DTCC (Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation) provides the CDS net amount, de-
fined as the maximum possible net funds transfers between net sellers of protection and net
buyers that could be required upon the occurrence of a credit event relating to a particular
reference entity. As the definition suggests, net amount allows to know the size of the ef-
1A repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities. For
the party selling the security and agreeing to repurchase it in the future, is a repo. For the party on the other
end of the transaction, it is a reverse repurchase agreement. Repo market allows investors to implicitly finance
its buying and market makers to short-sell the bond in the cash market.
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fective protection which floats on the market, that is the size of the exchange of protection
from the seller to the buyer if a credit event occurs. In our model, we use the net to gross
amount ratio to understand whether the variation in the effective open positions in credit
risk hedging plays a role in bond and CDS pricing. Lastly, specialness in the repo markets
is defined as the difference between each country Repo Funds Rate (RFR) and the European
repo rate. These data are provided by NEX Data and are calculated from trades, executed on
either the BrokerTec or the MTS electronic platforms, that use sovereign government bonds
as collateral. NEX provides data about RFR Euro, RFR Germany, RFR France, RFR Italy,
RFR Spain, RFR Netherlands and RFR Belgium. So far, the country-specific variables have
been explained.
The second set of variables is composed by the common factors across countries. These
are representative of macroeconomic and international phenomena that the previous litera-
ture has found to be influential on bond and CDS spreads.
Euribor 3-month is the short-term risk-free rate. During this period, the rate has de-
creased from a level of about 3% from current zero level, reflecting the monetary policy in
Eurozone.
The global risk aversion is constructed as the difference between the VIX index and the
same measure of volatility on the Euostoxx Index. In this way, this variable should replicate
the net level of non-EU risk aversion.
The EVZ variable (Euro Currency Volatility Index) is an index on the expectations of the
exchange rate e/$. It is produced by the CBOE and it is constructed in a very similar way to
the VIX. EVZ measures the market expectations of 30-day volatility of thee/$ exchange rate
by applying the VIX methodology to options on the Currency Shares Euro Trust. A priori,
we expect to have an effect in CDS specification because the derivative product provides
USD protection on a EUR capital.
The inflation expectations are measured by the 5-year/5-year swap rate, the benchmark
market expectations as explained in Schulz and Stapf (2014).
The counterparty risk is approximated through a synthetic index. It has been constructed
as the average of the CDS spreads written on twelve major investment banks (Bank of Amer-
ica, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, Deutsche Bank,
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Nomura and UBS). They represent the group
of investment banks that act as market makers on the government bonds issued by the coun-
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tries in the sample. Also in this case, one should expect a greater effect in the derivative
specification since CDS is more exposed to counterparty risk, being a derivative contract.
2.3.2 Results
Regression results are summarized in Table 2.1. In appendix .1.4, the test on the auto-
correlation of residuals is presented. The outcome of these tests rejects the null hypothesis
of presence of a unit root. Starting from the bond specification, it is positively influenced
by bid-ask spread, the idiosyncratic volatility, the counterparty risk proxy and the cds net
volume dynamic. The fiscal dynamic, represented by GDP growth, negatively affects the
dependent variable: better economic conditions reduces sovereign financing cost. Also the
uncertainty on e/$ exchange rate plays a role, with negative sign. As pointed out in Fontana
and Scheicher (2016), the specialness in the repo market affects negatively the bond spread.
Higher the specialness, lower the yield of the bond. Bond spread is not affected by the level
of debt/GDP ratio, the risk-free rate and other financial and macroeconomic factors.
Looking at the CDS specification, it is linked to international risk aversion and gdp
dynamic. Differently from bond specification, liquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, exchange
rate risk, counterparty risk proxy and cds net volume dynamic do not play any role in CDS
pricing. Lastly, adjusted R2 is quite different between the two regressions. The explained
variance in the bond specification is 0.746, that is higher than in the CDS case (0.475).
A first important evidence of the basic model is that the sets of explanatory drivers of the
two spreads are different and these seem to be complementary. Excluding gdp growth, each
relevant driver in bond specification loses its causal effect in the cds model and vice-versa.
From this part of analysis, one can conclude bond spread seems to be more informative and
stronger linked to fiscal, credit risk and macro-financial variables.
Looking at the basis specification, we find it is positively related to Euribor 3m and
exchange rate risk. As expected, since the protection of CDS is in $ , uncertainty in the
exchange rate determines higher CDS premia versus a more stable euro-denominated gov-
ernment bond. Conversely, higher international risk aversion and a worsening of debt-to-gdp
ratio affect negatively the basis. A negative impact on these variables causes a higher repric-
ing in bond spread leading to a widening of the basis.
Subsequently, the same analysis is developed separately for core and peripheral coun-
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(1)
Bond CDS Basis
Bond CDS Basis
Peripheral Core Peripheral Core Peripheral Core
Liquidity 1.129*** 0.078 1.002*** 0.249 -0.091 -0.003
(0.066) (0.055) (0.031) (0.161) (0.219) (0.012)
Euribor 3m 0.318 0.259 0.152* 0.455 -0.007 0.778** 0.156 0.171 0.141
(0.173) (0.204) (0.068) (0.307) (0.081) (0.153) (0.228) (0.101) (0.097)
International risk aversion -0.04 -0.358** -0.120*** -0.157 0.023 -0.52 -0.017 0.154 0.124
(0.049) (0.137) (0.024) (0.070) (0.024) (0.241) (0.016) (0.492) (0.553)
Idiosyncratic vol 0.042** 0.017 -0.001 0.059* 0.008 0.014 0.02
(0.014) (0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008) (0.032) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
Evz -0.191*** -0.037 0.036* -0.217** -0.058** 0.029 -0.066 0.021 0.047
(0.038) (0.060) (0.020) (0.044) (0.015) (0.094) (0.061) (0.032) (0.049)
Counterparty risk proxy 0.537** 0.52 0.091 1.075* 0.346*** 0.916 0.671*** 0.011 0.004
(0.225) (0.313) (0.078) (0.448) (0.074) (0.484) (0.122) (0.028) (0.003)
Debtp Gdp 0.003 0.021 -0.012*** -0.023 -0.005 0.015 0.008 -0.005 -0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.015) (0.028) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007)
Gdp growth -0.215** -0.501* -0.025 -0.165* -0.005 -0.353 -0.004 -0.037 -0.006
(0.070) (0.260) (0.020) (0.069) (0.038) (0.407) (0.060) (0.023) (0.043)
Inflation expectations -0.026 0.162 -0.082 -0.238 0.048 0.101 -0.171 -0.716* -0.015
(0.150) (0.185) (0.069) (0.121) (0.049) (0.301) (0.097) (0.291) (0.323)
Cds net volume dynamic 4.800* 0.917 -0.015 -1.721 -0.118 -6.907 1.224 0.560 0.092
(2.598) (4.860) (0.1.007) (4.050) (1.048) (8.886) (2.004) (2.080) (0.062)
Repo -4.313*** 0.098 -0.165 -1.374 0.416 0.030
(0.649) (0.366) (1.506) (1.311) (0.901) (0.621)
Constant 0.025 -3.828* 0.648 3.803** 0.443 -2.81 0.04 -1.953 -1.739
(1.288) (2.010) (0.361) (1.057) (1.369) (5.269) (1.454) (1.486) (1.259)
Observations 800 800 800 320 480 320 480 320 480
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.475 0.724 0.851 0.291 0.692 0.681 0.620 0.781
Table 2.1: Panel regression results. The table presents the results from panel regression
with time and individual fixed effects defined in the model 2.1. Under each coefficient, ro-
bust standard errors to heteroskedasticity and within-panel correlation in the idiosyncratic
error term are reported. The basic model is estimated on the entire period. The peripheral
sample is composed by Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Germany, France, The Nether-
lands, Belgium, Austria and Finland are considered as core countries.
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tries. It reveals some important differences between the two subsamples. Peripheral bond
spread has as significant drivers the liquidity measure (positive sign), the counterparty risk
proxy (positive sign), the e/$ uncertainty (negative sign), the gdp growth (negative sign)
and the idiosyncratic volatility (positive sign). Conversely, in core sample only the coun-
terparty risk measure and the exchange rate risk affect the bond price levels. About the
stronger effect of counterparty risk proxy in the peripherals’ subsample, one possible ex-
planation could be the existence of steadier interconnections between the default risk of the
main financial institutions and the stability conditions of weak European countries. Also in
the CDS specifications there are some important differences in the set of relevant drivers.
Euribor 3m is a relevant factor only in peripherals sample, whereas the counterparty risk
leads only CDS pricing. We do not find any relevant relation between basis and the set
of explanatory variables. Only in the peripheral specification, we find a negative relation
between inflation expectations and basis. As expected, higher inflation leads to a stronger
repricing (higher yield) of the fundamental value of the fixed income product with respect
the CDS, that should be a pure credit risk product. It is possible to conclude that bond spread
in the peripheral countries specification is the dependent variable with the high links with
the selected explanatory variables.
To summarize, this econometric analysis has allowed to verify that: a) the drivers sets of
CDS and bond spread are strongly different, in particular if the analysis is divided into unit
subsamples; b) bond spreads are more linked to country specific and fiscal variables of our
estimation model; c) Peripherals’ bonds show the high links with our selected explanatory
variables; d) as in previous literature, flight to liquidity and flight to quality phenomena have
been found.
2.4 The price discovery of sovereign credit risk
In this section we study the price discovery mechanism of sovereign credit risk. After
studying the differences in the set of relevant drivers, we analyze which asset leads the
price action of credit spread. In this section, we propose a similar path of previous studies
(Palladini (2012), Carboni (2011), Fontana and Scheicher (2010), Alper et al. (2013)). We
separately analyze the relation between the two assets for each sovereign entity, in order to
verify whether in the Eurozone countries a heterogeneity exists in the leading role of CDS
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or bond spread.
2.4.1 Methodology and data
For our analysis, we collect weekly data from Bloomberg®on the ten European countries
of the sample. We prefer to use weekly observations in order to limit problems of non-
normality and heteroschedasticity of data. Firstly, the stationarity condition of the time series
will be analyzed. After this preliminary step, the level of cointegration of the two markets
will be studied. Lastly, the measures, that suggest the market in which the price discovery
process takes place, will be examined: these measures are different if the two markets are
cointegrated or if they are not.
Firstly, we study the stationarity condition of the two variables. As proposed by Elliot,
Rothenberg and Stock (1996), a modified version of the Dickey-Fuller test has been used.
After the integration analysis, the cointegration test has been conducted. The economic
theory suggests that the bond and CDS spreads, combined in a linear combination (zt =
CDS Spreadt −Bond Spreadt ), produce a stationary process. Formally, the variables yt in
a process of K-dimension are cointegrated of order (d,b), shortly yt ∼ CI(d,b), if all yt
components are I(d) and a linear combination zt := β ′yt , with β = (β1, . . . ,βK)′ 6= 0 such
that zt is I(d−b), exists. A process consisting of cointegrated variables is called cointegrated
process. These processes were introduced by C. Granger (1981) and Engle e Granger (1987).
To carry out the cointegration analysis there are several strategies. The method suggested by
Johansen (1988, 1995) has been used. This test is essentially a multivariate Dickey-Fuller
test that determines the number of cointegration equation by calculating the likelihood ratio
statistics for each added cointegration equation in a sequence of nested models.
Finally, the price discovery process analysis has been developed. Two different paths
have been followed depending on whether the two markets reveal or not cointegration evi-
dences. In the case of no cointegration, the Granger causality test (Granger (1969), Granger
(1981)) has been used to investigate the price discovery process. Formally, defining a com-
mon VAR model yt = A(L)yt−1+B(L)xt−1+ ε1t and xt =C(L)yt−1+D(L)xt−1+ ε2t (with
A(L),B(L),C(L) and D(L) are matrix polynomials in the lag operator L), the variable x
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causes in the sense of Granger the variable y iff:
X GC Y↔ E(yt |yt−1,yt−2, . . . ,xt−1,xt−2, . . . ) 6= E(yt |yt−1,yt−2, . . . ,)
.
Otherwise, the Gonzalo-Granger statistic has been applied. Define a bivariate Vector
Error Correction Model (VECM):
∆CDSt = λ1(Zt−1)+∑
p
j=1α1 j∆CDSt− j +∑
q
j=1β1 j∆Bond Spreadt− j + ε1t
∆Bond Spreadt = λ2(Zt−1)+∑
p
j=1α2 j∆CDSt− j +∑
q
j=1β2 j∆Bond Spreadt− j + ε2t
Zt =CDSt−1−α0−α1Bond Spreadt−1
(2.2)
Price discovery process is driven by the CDS product if λ2 is significant. In contrast, the
bond spread leads if λ1 is significant. If both λ1 and λ2 are significant, then both markets
contribute to price discovery. However, the supremacy of one market or the other one can
be measured by the ratio that Gonzalo and Granger suggested: GG = λ2λ2−λ1 . Values close
to one or greater signal that the derivative market leads. Values close to zero or negative
indicate the supremacy of the cash market.
Following the above-mentioned procedure, the analysis is carried out separately for each
country.
2.4.2 Results
As mentioned above, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test in the GLS version has been used
to test the stationarity conditions of the series. The output confirms the non-stationarity of
the series in levels. Conversely, performing the same analysis on the differentiated time
series, it is possible to conclude that these series are stationary (more details on the test
are shown in Appendix .2.1). Then, we proceed with the cointegration analysis of the two
markets. It is carried out through the Johansen procedure. In Table 2.2, the cointegration
analysis for each country is summarized.
Table 2.2 shows the trace statistic of Johansen test, depending on the specification used.
In the last column the logic output is reported. The final output is determined following
these steps: I) starting from model 1, trace statistic in the first column is compared with
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Country Model 1 Model 2 Cointegration
rank=0 rank=1 rank=0 rank=1
Italy 24.25 5.98 24.16 5.98 Y
Spain 21.55 5.80 21.30 5.78 Y
Germany 29.27 4.97 29.07 483 Y
France 21.66 2.75 21.49 2.75 Y
Portugal 21.26 2.03 21.09 2.03 Y
The Netherlands 24.03 6.62 23.89 6.52 Y
Austria 24.03 5.89 23.98 5.89 Y
Belgium 16.65 2.43 16.63 2.43 N
Finland 22.18 5.75 22.09 5.75 Y
Ireland 11.63 1.41 11.59 1.40 N
Table 2.2: Cointegration analysis. This table presents the trace statistic of Johansen test
on two different specifications of an ECM. It could be represented as: ∆yt = α(βyt−1+µ+
ρt)+∑p−1i=1 Γi∆yt−i+ γ+ τt + εt , where µ and ρt are the constant term and the trend in the
cointegrating vector, γ and τt are the constant term and the trend in ECM. Posing restrictions
on these terms, it is possible to define different specifications. In particular, Model 1 has the
following restrictions: ρ = 0,τ = 0 and γ = 0. Model 2 has the following restriction: ρ = 0
and τ = 0 . For each model, the first column provides the statistic with the null hypothesis of
no cointegration (that is the cointegrating vector has rank equal zero). The second column
shows the statistic with the null hypothesis of cointegration (that is the cointegrating vector
has rank equal one). For model 1, the 10% critical values are for rank=0 17,85, for rank=1
7,52. For model 2, the 10% critical values are 13,33 for rank=0 and 2,69 for rank=1.
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the corresponding critical value. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the two markets are not
cointegrated. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the analysis continues with the step no.2; II)
looking at the model 2, the trace statistic of no cointegration hypothesis is compared with
the corresponding critical value. Also in this case, if the null hypothesis is accepted, the
two markets are not cointegrated. If it is rejected, the hypothesis testing continues with the
step no.3; III) back to the model 1, the trace statistic in the second column is compared with
the critical value. If the null hypothesis is accepted, then the two markets are cointegrated.
Otherwise the analysis continues with the next step; IV) the value of the second column
of the second model is compared with its critical value, if the H0 is accepted, then the two
markets are cointegrated. If it is rejected, then we conclude that the two variables have to
be stationary and a VAR model in levels should be estimated in order to analyze the price
discovery process.
From the output analysis, the main results could be summarized as follow. First, accord-
ing to the the theoretical predictions, we have found that the majority of the countries in the
sample have the two markets cointegrated. During the entire period considered, only Bel-
gium and Ireland show a different condition betwe CDS and bond spread. However, it could
suggest that there were some differences between core and peripheral countries since the
evidence that the two markets move together is more evident in the weak countries group.
Country Coint.
Test Price Discovery
OutputH0: Bond does H0: CDS does
not lead (p value) not lead (p value)
Italy Y 0.476 0.001 CDS
Spain Y 0.247 0.001 CDS
Germany Y 0.001 0.004 Bond and CDS
France Y 0.216 0.001 CDS
Portugal Y 0.905 0.001 CDS
The Netherlands Y 0.005 0.001 Bond and CDS
Austria Y 0.513 0.001 CDS
Belgium N 0.002 0.001 Bond and CDS
Finland Y 0.114 0.001 CDS
Ireland N 0.001 0.002 Bond and CDS
Table 2.3: Price discovery outcome. The table presents the p-values of two null hypotheses:
I) bond spread does not lead price discovery (the first column); II) CDS spread does not lead
price discovery (the second column). The test is performed separately for each country in the
sample and in three different subperiods (I period: September 2008 - May 2010. II period:
June 2010 - October 2012. III period: November 2012 - June 2015).
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About price discovery analysis, presented in Table 2.3, other important results emerge.
CDS has a leading role in creditworthiness price discovery for the whole group of countries.
For some countries CDS leads alone the pricing mechanism (Italy, Spain, France, Portugal,
Austria and Finland) whereas there are not countries on which the credit risk pricing is
uniquely led by the bond spread. Also from this analysis, some signs of a difference between
core and peripherals countries seems to exist, with a more relevant role of CDS in the latter
group of sovereign entities.
2.5 Panel var analysis
2.5.1 Methodology and data
To examine more accurately the relation between CDS and bond spread, taking into ac-
count the potential dynamic interdependencies, we estimate a panel VAR model. For a wide
review of panel var models in the macro and financial research fields we refer to Canova
and Ciccarelli (2013). Although it is known that when analyzing the transmission of shocks
across the financial markets of different countries, static interdependencies are probably suf-
ficient if data are monthly (Canova and Ciccarelli 2013), we decide to estimate a panel
var model since these models are unique in their ability to model dynamic interdependen-
cies, cross sectional heterogeneities and account for evolving pattern of transmission. We
consider a two-variables panel VAR with country-specific fixed effects represented by the
following system of linear equations:
Yi,t = A1Yi,t−1+ ...+ApYi,t−p+BXi,t−1+µi+ εi,t (2.3)
where Yi,t is the vector of dependent variables (CDS and bond spread), Xi,t is the vector of
those exogenous covariates employed in the model 2.1, µi and εi,t are vectors of country fixed
effects and idiosyncratic errors respectively. The estimation is based on GMM for dynamic
panels with unit fixed effects. All variables are in level and data frequency is monthly. The
lag length is set to one based on the usual information criteria.
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2.5.2 Results
Table 2.4 presents the estimation of the panel var model of equation 2.3. In appendix
.3 the analysis of the stability condition of the estimates are reported. First, we find similar
results of those got in the static specification. The liquidity risk affects significantly both
the bond and the CDS spread. The bond spread is significantly and positively related to
the idiosyncratic volatility, the counterparty risk and the dynamic of net exposure on CDS.
Differently from the static model, we find a wider set of relevant drivers in the CDS spec-
ification. In these panel var estimations, in addition to the liquidity risk, also the risk free
short term and the idiosyncratic volatility positively affect the credit premium priced by the
derivative asset.
In order to evaluate the role of the lagged variables in the estimated model, we discuss our
main results in the form of impulse response functions. Figure 6 shows the two combinations
of IRFs to evaluate the cross impact of shocks between bond and CDS spread (the four
combinations of IRF of the estimated model are presented in Appendix). Bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals are based on 500 replications.
Figure 2.1: Impulse Response Fuction - Panel Var
A shock of 1% in the bond spread immediately increases the level of credit risk pricing
in the CDS of more than 0.15 basis points. The impact of this shock is found to be persistent
up to 6 lags. On the contrary, a shock in the CDS spread does not affect the pricing of
bond spread, nor immediately nor in the lagged periods. As explained above, this analysis
covers the whole period considered. Up to here, we do not verify whether unstable relations
exist between CDS and bond spread. For this reason, in next sections we study whether a
variation in these relations has appeared after the entry into force of the ban on naked CDS.
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Bond Spread Cds Spread
Bond spread (L1) 0.918*** 0.125
(0.068) (0.079)
CDS Spread (L1) 0.057 0.768***
(0.063) (0.085)
Liquidity 0.071*** 0.158*
(0.005) (0.085)
Euribor 3m 0.049 0.483***
(0.135) (0.215)
International risk aversion 0.003 0.008
(0.007) (0.009)
Idiosyncratic vol 0.007** 0.011**
(0.003) (0.005)
Evz 0.044 0.039
(0.035) (0.056)
Counterparty risk proxy 0.188* 0.069
(0.107) (0.161)
Debt Gdp 0.003 -0.021
(0.008) (0.013)
Gdp growth -0.030 0.092
(0.046) (0.070)
Inflation expectations 0.030 -0.231*
(0.079) (0.129)
Cds net volume dynamic 1.036** 0.104
(0.414) (0.685)
Repo -1.022* -1.050
(0.607) 0.818
Observations 780
Adjusted R2 0.803
Table 2.4: Panel Var model. The table presents the results from panel var regression defined
in equation 2.3. Under each coefficient, robust standard errors are reported.
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2.6 The role of European regulation on naked CDS and on
short selling restrictions
In this section, we investigate whether the European ban on naked CDS and short selling
restriction on sovereign debt’s securities, that entered into force in November 2012, has
played any role in affecting the relation between the cash and the derivative markets. Firstly,
we briefly describe the timeline, the setup and the main characteristics of the law. Then, we
replicate the analysis of the previous sections splitting the time period into two subsamples
defined by the entry into force of the new regulation.
2.6.1 The ban: the timeline and the setup
During the European sovereign debt crisis, policy makers were concerned about some
trading strategies, carried out by investors, that were destabilizing the bond markets. EC
wanted to regulate the bonds short selling2, without having at the time of placement, the
certainty of availability of the securities at maturity and the contracts with naked CDS posi-
tions3. These strategies were used by those who wanted to have a short position on bonds
for a simple choice of investment or, worse, those who wanted to push the market in that
direction to profit from it.
The debate, which had been developed during 2010-2012 period, had been turned on
whether to restrict the practices described above. The central issue was whether the costs of
a ban outweigh the benefits, in particular if the restriction can lead to a collapse of liquidity
in the derivative market. The costs arise because in the market would remain buyers of CDS
for hedging purposes and sellers of protection. However, the latter, not being able to buy
2Short selling is the sale, carried out in respect to one or more third-parties, of securities not owned directly
by the seller. The short seller, not being in possession of the bond, must borrow it from a broker and, within
a certain deadline, he buys back to return it. Usually, interests shall be paid annually to the broker in relation
to the duration of the short sale. Short seller benefits if the stock price has a bearish trend. In fact, if after the
sale of the asset at the price P1, the price drops to P2 (< P1), the bearish, being able to buy back the asset at a
price P2 to return it to the broker, has a gain equal to the difference between P1 and P2 and the interest paid.
For the short seller, this is the direct effect, but there is another indirect effect for him. In fact, the signal that is
sent to the market through a massive sale of a security could represent a negative expectation on asset price. If
other investors decide to follow the bearish strategy, it can lead to a downward spiral that amplifies the negative
trend of the securities. Therefore, the importance of limiting the contagion effect on government bonds is a
determinant aspect to restore stability in the markets.
3The purchase of CDS by a buyer that is not actually exposed to the credit risk of the corresponding
reference entity. This type of contract is called naked CDS in the sense that it is devoid of the real need to
cover an effective credit risk exposure of the protection buyer.
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naked CDS to cover the risk assumed, would not be able to remain in the CDS market and
to continue to offer the sale of the contract. So, there would have been the need to provide
exemptions to the ban, for example for market makers. In addition, this would have caused a
problem in the proxy-hedging activities for investors. Conversely, the benefits were related
to the conditions of the global financial markets. In particular, the Eurozone would have
benefited from a more stable cash market, leader in the price discovery process of credit
quality and less subject to the derivative market fluctuations.
The discussions about the introduction of this ban started in the spring of 2010, when
Greek crisis started and CDS prices, written on Hellenic Republic, reached unprecedented
levels. The timeline of the events, until the entry into force of the ban, is the following: on
June 15th 2010, for the first time, the EU Parliament calls for a permanent ban on naked
SCDS; on September 15th 2010, the EU Commission tables a draft Regulation on the trans-
parency in short selling and SCDS buying4; on December 7th 2010, the European Council
starts to discuss the draft regulation5; on May 17th 2011, The European Council agrees to
ban temporary uncovered short selling of bonds and on naked CDS buying; on 15th Novem-
ber 2011, the European Parliament adopts the draft regulation during a Plenary session; on
14th March 2012, the European Parliament and the European Council approve the final ver-
sion of the Regulation6 on naked CDS and bonds short selling.
The regulation is composed by nine chapters and 48 articles. The third chapter contains
the gist of the trading activities restrictions: Art. 13 explains the ban on uncovered short
sales in sovereign debt and Art. 14 on uncovered sovereign CDS. In the case of bond’s short
selling restriction, the regulation, that is applied to debt issued by all 30 EEA Countries, in-
cluding their agencies and their regional, local, and municipal governments, allows a person,
that short sells a sovereign security, to do it if: he has borrowed the securities, he has entered
into an agreement to borrow the securities, he has an arrangement with a third party under
which the latter has confirmed that the security has been located and has taken measures so
that the person has a reasonable expectation that settlement can be effected when due. Thus,
the EU Authorities require that the investor, that short sales, has a reasonable expectation
4Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-10-1126 en.htm?locale=en .
5There was not unanimous consensus on the regulation effectiveness and importance. Moreover, the com-
petences, distributed among European Institutions, were under discussion.
6Regulation (UE) n. 236/20120 of the European Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain
aspects of credit default swaps.
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to own the availability of security to maturity. Moreover, according to the norm, there is
the possibility to suspend these constraints if liquidity conditions reach a certain minimum
threshold, below which the costs on market efficiency would be excessive.
The naked SCDS ban, that is applied to all market participants, including those outside
the EEA, allows the investors to buy protection referencing EEA sovereign debt only if they
hold the issuer’s debt or if they have exposures that are “meaningfully” correlated with the
sovereign reference entity. Also in this case, there is the possibility for the authorities to
suspend this restriction in limited and renewable time windows. To meet the “correlation”
exemption, the hedged exposure must be referred to an entity in the same Country, and the
amount of protection bought must be proportional to the delta-adjusted size of the exposure.
As IMF (2013, p. 16) has explained, the correlation criteria can be satisfied by a quantitative
or qualitative test or by an analytic proof (e.g., by showing that the exposure is to an entity
whose fortunes are significantly dependent on the relevant sovereign). The quantitative test
is satisfied if the adjusted Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the value of the expo-
sure and the referenced sovereign debt over the previous 12 months is at least 70%. The
exemptions are collected in the two articles 16 and 17. Transactions that do not meet these
constraints are permitted only if they are related to market-making activities and primary-
dealer operations. This choice is due, as in the case of suspensions, to prevent a dramatic fall
in the liquidity conditions of the cash and derivative products. As explained in the previous
paragraph, a decision to prevent market makers from operating freely on the CDS market,
would provoke strong inefficiencies on derivative products, raising their price and decreasing
liquidity. The result would have been a static market, very inefficient.
In next paragraphs, results from the empirical analysis are shown.
2.6.2 The ban’s effect on the determinants
The analysis is carried out through two modified versions of the standard panel regression
models defined in equation 2.1. In the first version, we add an additive dummy Dit to the
basic models. The dummy Dit assumes value 1 for observations after November 2012, the
entry into force of the new legislation.
Yit = a0+λ1(Dit)+
11
∑
j=1
β jXit +αi+dt + εit (2.4)
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In the second modified version, we employ the dummy in a multiplicative way in order
to estimate the contribution in determining the impact of the new regulation on each driver
in the sovereign credit risk pricing:
Yit = a0+
11
∑
j=1
β jXit +
11
∑
j=1
γ j(DitXit)+αi+dt + εit (2.5)
As in the previous section, we estimate models on the three dependent variables: bond
spread, CDS spread and basis. Regression results are shown in Table 2.5. Starting from the
first modified model, important results derive from the estimated coefficients of the dummy
variable on the three specifications. As one could expect, the entry into force of the ban
has influenced negatively the CDS premia and positively the bond spread: the ban, ceteris
paribus, has limited the speculative activity of buyers of naked-CDS (a lower buying activity
causes a reduction of the credit risk price) and probably has moved this activity on the
cash market, that causes higher bond spreads. These results are in line with predictions
of Capponi and Larsson (2013). In their model, they find the ban should only exclude the
market moderately pessimistic investors and it induces the most pessimistic to implement
their strategy on the short side of the bond market. Lastly, the combination of these effects
determines a negative impact on the basis.
Looking at the results of the second model, in the case of the bond specification, the
introduction of the ban strengths the link with microstructure liquidity, brings out the neg-
ative relation with risk-free rate and the positive effect with inflation expectations (in line
with the expected relation for an asset typically used by investors for carry trades7) and re-
inforces the link with the fiscal dynamic, that seems not to be priced in period of financial
and sovereign debt crises. At the same time, the most important result from the CDS spec-
ification is the strong and positive relation that has emerged with the CDS net volume after
November 2012. The higher the net open positions on CDS, the higher premium an investor
pays in order to hedge its sovereign credit exposure. This relation did not exist in the previ-
ous period, indicating that the ban on naked CDS helps to link the net demand of protection,
without the speculative component, with the correspondent price. The results from the basis
specification confirm those got from the previous section and it represents the combination
7A trading strategy that involves borrowing at a low interest rate and investing in an asset that provides a
higher rate of return. Typically, the borrowing cost is linked to risk-free rate and to inflation expectations.
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(2) (3)
Bond CDS Basis
Bond CDS Basis
Ban=0 Ban=1 Ban=0 Ban=1 Ban=0 Ban=1
Liquidity 1.129*** 0.078 1.036*** 0.538** 0.031 -0.080
(0.066) (0.055) (0.082) (0.182) (0.032) (0.059)
Euribor 3m 0.357 1.084* 0.426*** -0.149 -1.336** 0.709** -2.741* 0.274*** -0.226
(0.243) (0.516) (0.114) (0.115) (0.475) (0.307) (1.391) (0.056) (0.255)
International risk aversion -0.089*** -0.105* -0.030** 0.015 -0.021 -0.187* 0.188* -0.0887*** 0.0839***
(0.024) (0.047) (0.010) (0.024) (0.033) (0.091) (0.097) (0.023) (0.022)
Idiosyncratic vol 0.042** 0.017 -0.001 0.042** 0.009 0.032** -0.003 0.003 -0.011
(0.014) (0.021) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.050) (0.006) (0.007)
Evz -0.194** -0.399* -0.085*** 0.035 -0.101 -0.015 0.012 0.027** 0.004
(0.063) (0.182) (0.024) (0.031) (0.061) (0.017) (0.040) (0.009) (0.010)
Counterparty risk proxy 0.675** 0.912** 0.208*** -0.313* 0.927** 0.234 0.135 0.135* -0.232
(0.265) (0.403) (0.050) (0.141) (0.313) (0.249) (0.564) (0.069) (0.170)
Debtp Gdp 0.003 0.021 -0.012*** 0.017 0.000 0.048* -0.023 -0.007*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.022) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003)
Gdp growth -0.215** -0.501* -0.025 -0.086 -0.363*** -0.155 -0.356 0.048** 0.041
(0.070) (0.260) (0.020) (0.095) (0.078) (0.230) (0.239) (0.018) (0.038)
Inflation expectations 0.265* -0.574** -0.359*** -0.313 0.794* -0.167 0.437 -0.119 0.079
(0.142) (0.206) (0.050) (0.235) (0.364) (0.275) (0.350) (0.071) (0.059)
Cds net volume dynamic 4.800* 0.917 -0.015 0.610 6.481 -4.299 27.910** -0.539 4.534
(2.598) (4.860) (1.007) (2.209) (7.949) (4.242) (10.310) (0.693) (2.839)
Repo -4.313*** 0.098 -4.738*** -0.933 0.153 -3.474***
(0.649) (0.366) (0.772) (3.677) (0.265) (0.797)
Dummy Ban 1.050** -1.055** -0.463***
(0.353) (0.419) (0.109)
Constant -1.577 3.399** 3.246*** 0.220 -2.806 -2.781 -0.392 0.493 0.334
(0.981) (1.324) (0.462) (1.084) (1.668) (2.158) (2.594) (0.510) (0.697)
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.475 0.724 0.759 0.550 0.653
Table 2.5: The role of European restrictions on naked-CDS and bonds’ short-selling.
The table presents the results from panel regression defined in models 2.4 and 2.5, where
the dummy variable assumes value 1 for observations after November 2012. Under each
coefficient, robust standard errors to heteroskedasticity and within-panel correlation in the
idiosyncratic error term are reported. The dependent variables are bond spread, CDS spread
and the basis.
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of the results got from bond and CDS specifications.
2.6.3 The price discovery of sovereign credit risk
The second part of the analysis concerns the study of the evolution during these years of
the cointegration of the two markets and the contribution in the price discovery process of
credit risk. Developing an analysis separately for each country and splitting the time span
in several periods, different results could be found among units. Differently from previ-
ous studies (Palladini (2012), Carboni (2011), Fontana and Scheicher (2010), Alper et al.
(2013)) in this section we split our very long period in three different sub-periods in order to
investigate whether the European ban has affected in some ways the links between the two
assets.
We follow the procedure described in section 2.4. The three periods are defined as: a)
the financial crisis post Lehman default from September 2008 to May 2010, b) the European
sovereign debt crisis before introduction of the EU ban from June 2010 to October 2012, c)
the normalization period from November 2012 to June 2015.
The first step of the analysis is the study of cointegration of the two markets (the pre-
liminary check on the stationarity condition are shown in Appendix .2.1). It is carried out
through the Johansen procedure. In Table 2.6, the cointegration analysis for each country is
summarized.
Table 2.6 shows the trace statistic of Johansen test, depending on the specification used.
In the last column the logic output is reported. The final output is determined following the
steps described in section 2.4.2.
From the output analysis, the main results in the three different periods could be summa-
rized as follow. In the first period, according to the main findings in the previous literature,
we have found that the majority of peripheral countries (italy, Spain and Portugal) and some
core countries (the Netherlands, Finland and Austria) had the two markets cointegrated. In
the Germany, France and Belgium cases we accept the null hypothesis of no-cointegration.
However, it could suggest that there were some differences between core and peripheral
countries since the evidence that the two markets move together is more evident in the weak
countries group. In the second period, the cointegration condition was lost. Only Germany
and Finland show the two markets in the long-run equilibrium. Other countries have not
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Country Period Model 1 Model 2 Cointegration
rank=0 rank=1 rank=0 rank=1
I 19.76 6.68 17.42 6.64 Y
Italy II 14.86 3.04 14.04 2.76 N
III 9.53 3.22 7.01 2.72 N
I 19.2 1.18 15.59 0.11 Y
Spain II 9.24 3.83 8.08 2.79 N
III 11.84 3.99 7.82 3.45 N
I 16.83 3.74 15.38 3.72 N
Germany II 28.13 2.55 28.05 2.54 Y
III 8.64 1.12 8.07 0.55 N
I 14.57 1.68 12.17 1.35 N
France II 11.39 1.1 11.19 1.06 N
III 9.89 2.48 8.79 1.39 N
I 18.01 1.3 14.15 0.47 Y
Portugal II 7.07 1.42 5.66 1.31 N
III 17.69 6.06 14.28 4.21 Y
I 18.38 3.33 17.93 3.33 Y
The Netherlands II 16.7 1.88 16.68 1.87 N
III 8.85 1.17 7.84 0.26 N
I 23.75 5.74 23.35 5.56 Y
Austria II 15.58 1.25 15.43 1.11 N
III 10.11 3.32 9.83 3.07 N
I 14.82 1.97 12.61 0.39 N
Belgium II 14.48 1.77 10.39 0.77 N
III 6.13 2.42 4.49 1.62 N
I 20.14 3.86 20.77 4.71 Y
Finland II 18.03 2.13 18.00 2.10 Y
III 8.64 2.45 6.37 1.72 N
I 18.97 8.39 17.60 8.16 N
Ireland II 10.83 4.34 10.69 4.33 N
III 18.50 7.15 13.55 3.16 N
Table 2.6: Cointegration analysis. This table presents the trace statistic of Johansen test
on two different specifications of an ECM. It could be represented as: ∆yt = α(βyt−1+µ+
ρt)+∑p−1i=1 Γi∆yt−i+ γ+ τt + εt , where µ and ρt are the constant term and the trend in the
cointegrating vector, γ and τt are the constant term and the trend in ECM. Posing restrictions
on these terms, it is possible to define different specifications. In particular, Model 1 has the
following restrictions: ρ = 0,τ = 0 and γ = 0. Model 2 has the following restriction: ρ = 0
and τ = 0 . For each model, the first column provides the statistic with the null hypothesis of
no cointegration (that is the cointegrating vector has rank equal zero). The second column
shows the statistic with the null hypothesis of cointegration (that is the cointegrating vector
has rank equal one). For model 1, the 10% critical values are for rank=0 17,85, for rank=1
7,52. For model 2, the 10% critical values are 13,33 for rank=0 and 2,69 for rank=1.
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cointegration evidences. In particular, in the peripherals case, the long-run equilibrium does
not hold clearly, signaling that an unstable relation exists between the two markets. In the
last period considered, excepting Portugal, the whole sample continues to show signs of no
cointegration. The entry into force of the EU ban seems not to affect the long-run equilib-
rium condition between the two markets.
Country Period Coint.
Test Price Discovery
OutputH0: Bond does H0: CDS does
not lead (p value) not lead (p value)
Italy
I Yes 0.147 0.001 CDS
II No 0.384 0.007 CDS
III No 0.001 0.489 Bond
Spain
I Yes 0.217 0.001 CDS
II No 0.001 0.489 Bond
III No 0.001 0.263 Bond
Germany
I No 0.018 0.096 Bond and CDS
II Yes 0.001 0.081 Bond
III No 0.021 0.839 Bond
France
I No 0.023 0.208 Bond
II No 0.001 0.001 Bond and CDS
III No 0.013 0.318 Bond
Portugal
I Yes 0.099 0.001 CDS
II No 0.006 0.001 Bond and CDS
III Yes 0.271 0.108 Bond and CDS
The Netherlands
I Yes 0.020 0.001 CDS
II No 0.006 0.024 Bond and CDS
III No 0.048 0.086 Bond
Austria
I Yes 0.952 0.001 CDS
II No 0.024 0.043 Bond and CDS
III No 0.255 0.689 -
Belgium
I No 0.006 0.001 Bond and CDS
II No 0.008 0.043 Bond and CDS
III No 0.409 0.180 -
Finland
I Yes 0.137 0.001 CDS
II Yes 0.893 0.001 CDS
III No 0.422 0.959 -
Ireland
I No 0.062 0.001 Bond and CDS
II No 0.001 0.199 Bond
III No 0.004 0.021 Bond and CDS
Table 2.7: Price discovery outcome. The table presents the p-values of two null hypotheses:
I) bond spread does not lead price discovery (the first column); II) CDS spread does not lead
price discovery (the second column). The test is performed separately for each country in the
sample and in three different subperiods (I period: September 2008 - May 2010. II period:
June 2010 - October 2012. III period: November 2012 - June 2015).
About price discovery analysis, presented in Table 2.7, other important results emerge.
During periods I and II, CDS had a leading role in creditworthiness price discovery. In
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the first period, the null hypothesis of CDS no role is rejected in nine countries. In the
second period, CDS contributes in the credit risk pricing in seven countries. Conversely,
the contribution of bond spread seems to be limited. During the hardest part of sovereign
debt crisis (second period), only in Spain, Ireland and Germany, the cash market led price
discovery without CDS interference. Looking at the third period, after the introduction of
the European ban, in the whole sample the cash became the leading instrument in signaling
the reference entity credit risk while CDS lose (except in Portugal and Ireland cases) its
relevant role.
To summarize, it is possible to conclude that there have been three phenomena during
the entire time span considered: I) before the spring 2010, during the international financial
crisis, the peripherals CDS market assumed a leading role in the credit risk pricing; II) during
European debt crisis, CDS market contributed significantly in the price discovery; III) after
2012, the government bond supremacy has been reestablished.
2.6.4 Panel var analysis
Lastly, we conclude the analysis verifying whether any relevant differences exist in the
dynamic panel var estimations if these are computed on two period subsamples: before and
post entry into force of the ban on naked CDS.
The results of regressions of the pre-ban period are quite different to those obtained
from the specification based on the entire period of section 2.5 and from those of the post-
ban’s entry into force. The pre-ban period shows the same relation and magnitude between
the counterparty risk and repo specialness with the government bond spread. However,
differently from other models, the pre-ban estimates also highlight a strong relation between
the risk of default of global investment banks and CDS spread. This relation, as economic
theory would suggest, is stronger than that with the cash spread (-0.433 vs -0.240). A second
important difference is related to the significance of the uncertainty about the currency. Also
in this case the impact is higher for the pricing of credit risk through CDS spread since this
asset is idiosyncratically exposed to the currency volatility. Looking at the estimates of the
post-entry into force ban, these highlight weaker links between the selected drivers set and
our endogenous variables, in particular in the case of CDS specification. It is interesting to
note the negative and significant relation that appears in this period between the cash spread
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and the international risk aversion. It means that, after the entry into force of the ban on
short selling, the whole sector of European government bonds are employed by investors as
a risk-less asset.
Figure 2.2 shows the cross IRFs between bond and CDS spread estimated separately in
the two sub-periods. Firstly, the results got from this analysis is very similar to those got in
the section 2.5. As a matter of fact, we find that in both sub-periods, only the bond spread
determine a relevant lagged impact on the CDS variable. In this sense the entry into force
of the ban seems to not affect the relation between CDS and bond spread. Secondly, the
sub-periods analysis highlights a stronger impact of bond spread on CDS before November
2012. In the first period, a shock of 1% in the cash spread immediately increases the level of
the CDS spread of almost 0.50 basis points and this impact becomes statistically neglectable
after the third period. In the second period the relation is weaker: the impact is near 0.15
basis points meanwhile, as in the first period, it persists up to the third lag.
Pre naked CDS ban Post naked CDS ban
Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Fuction - Panel Var. Pre and post Ban
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Before naked CDS Ban (Post naked CDS Ban)
Bond Spread Cds Spread Bond Spread Cds Spread
Bond spread (L1) 0.968*** 0.244 1.009*** 0.754
0.155 0.222 0.376 1.119
CDS Spread (L1) 0.063 0.876*** -0.159 0.033
0.074 0.092 0.425 1.276
Liquidity 0.015 0.078 0.106 0.069
0.163 0.235 0.188 0.168
Euribor 3m -0.137 -0.077 -0.422 1.106
0.165 0.278 1.056 3.380
International risk aversion 0.028 0.021 -0.022** -0.011
0.040 0.064 0.009 0.025
Idiosyncratic vol 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.016
0.006 0.009 0.017 0.051
Evz 0.062* 0.098* -0.008 0.042
0.032 0.053 0.039 0.109
Counterparty risk proxy -0.240*** -0.433*** 0.141 0.792
0.082 0.117 0.399 1.315
Debt Gdp 0.005 0.009 -0.001 -0.012
0.012 0.019 0.010 0.030
Gdp growth -0.062 -0.102 0.036 0.269
0.088 0.141 0.148 0.460
Inflation expectations 0.096 0.144 0.122 0.135
0.195 0.313 0.078 0.253
Cds net volume dynamic -1.651 -2.689 -0.507 -0.345
2.250 3.523 1.875 0.578
Repo -1.186** -1.398 -1.422* -1.034
0.596 1.218 0.741 6.277
Observations 470 300
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.846
Table 2.8: Panel Var model. The table presents the results from panel var regression defined
in equation 2.3. Under each coefficient, robust standard errors are reported.
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2.7 Concluding remarks
This research has studied some aspects of CDS and government bond, on which an
econometric analysis has been proposed in order to analyze the relations and the pricing
equilibrium between the two markets in a sample of Eurozone countries. The results are
partly consistent with the previous literature, but they also contribute to highlight some new
features on the relation between these two assets.
We show that the relevant drivers’ sets in defining CDS and bond prices are partially
different and they seem to be complementary. This difference is also clear if the core and
peripheral countries are analyzed separately. According to previous literature, phenomena
of flight to liquidity and flight to quality have been observed in the results of our models.
These results are confirmed by the estimates of a dynamic panel model.
With regards to price discovery process, in last years strong heterogeneity among Euro-
zone countries exists. Until 2012 in Italy, Spain and Portugal, credit risk pricing seems to
take place in the derivative market. Conversely, during the 2010-2012 period in Germany
and France cases the bond market had the leading role. This result is crucial for the Euro-
pean economic policy. As a matter of fact, if the bond market is driven by the CDS, which is
driven by factors not exclusively related to the creditworthiness conditions of the sovereign
reference entity, then CDS price dynamic could affect the sovereign financing costs and this
is not bearable for weak countries.
The European legislative intervention, which has prohibited the naked CDS purchase
and bond’s short selling, has helped restore a more stable relationship between CDS and
government bonds. In the peripherals countries, it is clear that the bond market returned to
be the lead market during and after the spring of 2012. In that period, the Eurozone has
been politically and economically eventful. In particular, on 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi
established that the ECB was ready to guarantee as lender of last resort the Eurozone and,
on 6 September 2012, the ECB approved the rules for the purchases on the secondary market
of government bonds with a maximum maturity of three years (OMT plan). Moreover, on
9 march 2012, Greece announced that its debt restructuring plan was accepted by the large
majority of bondholders. The ISDA Committee declared a triggering credit event occurred,
but due to technical features in settlement auction, CDS instrument did not fully protect the
face value of the originals bonds. Certainly, also these facts affected market participants’
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confidence in using CDS instrument, limiting its signaling power in sovereign credit risk.
The study suggests that the new EU regulation was a critical aspect to understand what
happened during 2012. The summer 2011 was characterized by equally strong pressures
on peripherals bonds spreads, but at that time, the bond market suffered from the leading
role of the CDS spreads and not vice versa. Thus, the EU regulation has helped reduce the
destabilizing role of the CDS, probably shifting part of the investors’ activity from CDS to
bond and determining a negative impact on the basis.
Now, the question is whether the market participants have come up with another port-
folio and trading strategies to hedge sovereign credit risk. One of these strategies involves
the use of futures written on government bonds. Trading volume of futures on 10y Italian
btps, that has been introduced in the market since 2009, has grown a lot in recent years. An
investor, who desires to hedge its risk on Italy, could short a futures. But there is a risk for
Italy: among peripheral countries, only the Italian futures, and correspondent options, are
traded on the market. For this reason, this instrument may reflect the economic fundamentals
of other weak countries, biasing the judgment and the pricing of the Italian fiscal conditions.
However, from October 2015, the futures on Spanish bonos have been introduced, limiting
this distortion effect. Because of that, futures market is probably the new market on which
research works and regulators will have to focus their attention (Pelizzon et al., 2014), how-
ever taking care of the strong differences with CDS market (i.e., high level of transparency,
different regulatory environment), in order to avoid the destabilization of the European bond
market.
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Chapter 3
An analysis of long-term evolution of the
Italian government bond wholesale
secondary market liquidity
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the evolution of the market liquidity in the Italian platform of
MTS markets. The aim of this part of the thesis is to provide a basic description of the in-
stitutional features of MTS market (the secondary wholesale platform of Italian government
bonds) and a wide analysis of the evolution of the microstructure liquidity conditions of this
electronic trading platform. The analysis does not investigate any causal effect of the liquid-
ity conditions with other financial variable, but it is just a wide introduction for the topic of
the next chapter.
MTS was introduced in 1988 by the Italian Treasury and it was the first electronic market
for government bonds in Europe. In 1997 it was privatized and it began expansion across
other public debt issuers. In 1998 MTS became a Regulated market owned by the private
sector. However, according to several second tier regulations (e.g., Ministry decrees), the set
of rules according to which the Italian platform for wholesale trading in government bonds
works is laid down by the Italian Treasury, while the supervision is under the control of Bank
of Italy and Consob.
Currently MTS Italy is the domestic trading platform of Italian government bonds of
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MTS markets. It is defined as a wholesale secondary market, implying only banks and
institutional intermediaries may be admitted as dealers and participate on their own account
(or on behalf of institutional investors but as a direct counterpart). As the other MTS markets,
the Italian platform is a quote-driven electronic order book market. It means that participants
are divided into two groups, namely: market makers and market takers. The role of market
makers is to provide liquidity continuously, quoting two proposals (bid and ask prices) that
are aggregated in the order book for each bond. The other participants, acting as price taker,
can buy and sell a certain amount of a bond, hitting the proposals with a market order.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the microstructure liquidity is one of the key drivers
that affects sovereign bond yield. Solid market structure reduces the liquidity risk for market
participants, leading to lower bond yields. The Italian case offers a good case-study to
investigate the evolution in the last decade of the liquidity conditions on one of the most
important and largest European government bond market. During these years, many factors
have potentially affected the market’s microstructure: the US and UK financial crises, the
European sovereign debt crisis, the deflation and the non-standard monetary policies of ECB
and other central banks, new regulatory frameworks for financial markets and banks (e.g.,
MIFID II). Investigating the evolution of different measures of market liquidity may help to
understand which factors have played a relevant role in affecting the market structure and
market makers’ resiliency.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the
dataset and the methodology. Then, empirical results are shown. Lastly, comprehensive
comments on the evolution of liquidity conditions are presented.
3.2 Methodology and data
This section provides some technical notes about methodology and data employed in
the analysis. In order to investigate different dimensions of the market liquidity (quoting,
trading, market makers’ resiliency), we propose an analysis on six liquidity measures that are
commonly used by academics and practitioners. The analysis has been conducted on several
other liquidity measures, but we have selected those more informative. In appendix .4.2 the
analysis on the whole set of measures is presented. For an interesting review of liquidity
measures on MTS for the Italian government bonds see Coluzzi et al. (2008). In their
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paper, they also discuss the link between each measure with the theoretical market structure
model. In order to link our sample of liquidity measures with the theoretical framework,
in paragraph 3.2.1 we introduce each measure with a discussion about its contribution in
rapresenting some specific features of the microstructural liquidity. However, the large set
of measures on a unique dataset provides a complete view of the market structure, market
makers’ preferences and price takers’ behaviors.
Our dataset covers both trading and quoting activity on MTS Italy in the period that runs
from February 1, 2006 to April 30, 2017. For the trading side, it covers all the transactions
on the MTS platform of each trading day on the BTP 10 year benchmark. The informations
available for each deal include the sign, the time, the price and the traded quantity. About the
quoting activity, the dataset contains all the snapshots between 9.00am and 5.00pm at a five-
minute frequency of the quoting book of the BTP 10 year benchmark. In our analysis, the
benchmark contract corresponds with the BTP on-the-run1 from the settlement date of the
second auction (in order to consider only bonds with a large enough outstanding volume).
Before computing liquidity measures, a filter to the quoting dataset has been applied in
order to exclude outliers and stub quotes2. For each snapshot and for each market side (bid
and ask) the first step is to exclude quotes far more than 200 tick prices from the best price.
Secondly, the Thompson’s Tau method is applied on quotes on an hourly basis, in order to
aggregate a larger number of observations (quotes of twelve snapshots) and to improve test
precision. Stub quotes cover the 0.08% of the dataset.
As mentioned above, six liquidity measures are computed. The measures employed in
the analysis of the quoting activity describe the evolution of different dimensions of mar-
ket liquidity, namely: tightness that measures how far transaction prices diverge from mid-
market prices; depth that is the quantity available for trade on each side of the book; breadth
that indicates how wide the order book is. These measures are computed for each snapshot
of the sample and then are aggregated on a daily basis. Appendix .4.1 shows the details
of data manipulation in order to get daily time-series. Looking at the trading, the analysis
investigates the investors’ activity through measures on traded volumes and on block trades,
defined as trades that has the original order greater than a threshold (in this case, 15mm).
Lastly, resiliency provides a measure of how much prices move in response to a trade. In
1It is the most recently issued BTP of a particular maturity. The opposite is off-the-run, which refers to a
bond that has been issued before the most recent issue and are still outstanding.
2Order placed well off the range where the fair market price is likely to lie.
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order to investigate this dimension, we employ measures on the price impact of block trades.
For trading and resiliency measures, the daily series are computed (see appendix .4.1 for
details about data manipulation).
In order to analyze the evolution of the market microstructure, the Bai and Perron test
(Bai and Perron 1998, 2003) is employed on each liquidity measure. This test allows us
to verify whether and when a structural change occurred on the time series. The underlying
assumption of this test is that the level of liquidity fluctuates around a stable mean in absence
of structural changes. If a structural change shifts the long-run mean towards a different
level, this test detects the dates when the changes occur. The advantage of this test is that it
does not require a priori knowledge of the number and the timing of the breaks.
In next section, the results of test applied to the six liquidity measures are presented. For
each measure, the name, the definition, the graphical outcome and the identified breaks are
shown. Each graph shows the liquidity measure (blue line) and the output of Bai and Perron
test (red line): the horizontal segment is the estimated mean for each sub-period, jumps of
red line identify structural breaks. The break dates are estimated by the Bai and Perron
approach with 5 percent significance level and are also shown in each table.
The test is applied on the entire sample and on three different sub-periods: Jan 2006 - Apr
2010, the US and UK financial crises; May 2010 - Dec 2012, the European sovereign debt
crisis; Jan 2012 - Apr 2017, the normalization period. In each figure, four dates are high-
lighted through vertical green lines: September 15th, 2008, the Lehman default; April 27th,
2010, Standard & Poor’s downgrades Greek bonds to junk bonds; July 26th, 2012, whatever
it takes Draghi’s speech; March 9th, 2015, ECB’s public sector purchase programme starts.
The results got from the empirical analysis are shown in section 3.3. In the last section,
comprehensive comments are presented.
3.2.1 Liquidity measures of a pure specialist limit order book.
As said before, MTS is a wholesale inter-dealer market, implying that individuals cannot
access to it. Market participants can be distinguished into two categories: market makers (or
specialists) and market takers. For each bond, the former quote continuously and immedi-
ately executable two proposals: the bid price (and quantity) on which market takers may sell
a certain amount of bond and the ask price (and quantity) on which market participants may
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buy the bond. The quoting book of each bond is the aggregation of the proposals of each
specialist. Figure 3.1 shows how the aggregation works. The first figure shows the quoting
book with the proposals of a single market maker: a bid proposal of 5 millions (mm) at 99.90
and an ask proposal of 8mm at 100.10. Since these are the unique proposals in the book,
these are the best prices available for the investors.The second figure shows the quoting book
when a new market maker adds her proposals. In this example, she decides to show a bid
and ask quotes of 5mm at 99.90 and 100.11, respectively. Lastly, the proposals of the third
market maker (bid quote of 5mm at 99.95 and ask quote of 5mm at 100.15) modify the best
bid prices since, from the market taker’s perspective, it is better to sell at 99.95 than 99.90.
When a market participant sends a market order, this is executed according to price priority
and time priority. These features of the platform make MTS a limit order book market, under
the specialists system.
One market maker Two market makers Three market makers
Figure 3.1: An example of a quoting book. The first figure shows the quoting book with
the proposals of a single market maker. The second and the third figures show how the
aggregation of proposals of multiple market makers works.
These three examples of a quoting book show different conditions of microstructure liq-
uidity. The first book, with the proposals of just one market maker, has a bid-ask spread of
20 price ticks. It means that investors have to pay 10 price ticks, with respect the theoretical
mid fair price, in order to execute an order of a limited quantity (5mm or 8mm). Instead,
it is quite intuitive that the quoting book with three active market makers shows better mi-
crostructure conditions: the best bid-ask spread is reduced to 15 price ticks, the tradable
quantities for the final investors are 15mm on the bid side and 18mm on the ask side.
On MTS, during the period of this analysis the number of market makers really active in
their quoting activity is close to twenty (Mormando, 2017), this means that the study of the
structure of quoting book of MTS is closely linked to the quoting choices of this restricted
group of market operators.
Each market maker sets her proposal defining the two prices (Pb and Pa) and the corre-
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spondent quantities (Qb and Qa). Their quoting decisions is the result of an optimization
problem. Their proposals (the combination of Pb, Pa, Qb and Qa) should compensate market
makers for their immediacy of transaction and for other costs that they implicitly and ex-
plicitly face: operation costs, participation costs, transaction costs, asymmetric information,
imperfect competition, inventory control costs, funding constraints and search. Vayanos and
Wang (2012) provide an exhaustive survey on theoretical work and empirical literature on
these imperfections. Among implicit costs, the existing literature extensively studies asym-
metric information costs (Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle
(1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Admati and Pflederer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan
(1990)) and inventory control costs (Garman (1976), Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson
(1980), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983)) . Asymmetric information costs arise when some in-
vestors are better informed about the true value of the asset. If market makers are not able
to distinguish these investors, they set their proposals taking into account the risk of deal-
ing with a better informed investor. The inventory control costs arises when imbalances of
buying and selling flows increase. Market maker, setting their quotes, should consider the
risk in holding inventory that may deviate from their desired position and causing losses if
prices move against. If they already own a significant long (or short) position, they set the
bid and ask prices and quantities in order to facilitate the turnover of the position. Lastly,
quoted prices and quantities are used as substitutes by market makers: a narrow bid-ask
spread induces small depth quotes whereas large depth quotes induce a wide bid-ask spread.
In next section we propose the structural breaks analysis of a restricted group of liquidity
measures. The six liquidity measures, we present, are: volume-weighted bid-ask spread,
ratio between the bid (ask) quoted depth on the three best bid (ask prices) and the total
quoted quantity, standard deviation of bid (ask) prices, slope of bid (ask) proposals, daily
total volume traded, the price impact of a selling (buying) trade of 15mm on the volume
weighted bid (ask) prices after 15 minutes the deal is executed.
Each of these measures has a strict link with the microstructure models. The volume-
weighted bid-ask spread is a synthetic measure of the global bid-ask spread of the quoting
book on which twenty operators contemporaneously quote. It measures how wide the bid
ask spread is set by operators in order to compensate the risks that they face in the market
making activity. The ratio of the quoted quantities on the three best prices and the total depth
is a simple measure of the amount of available depth for investors to deal on the bond and
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measures the concentration of market makers’ quotes in the top level of the book. The higher
is the ratio, the higher is the homogeneity among specialists in quoting their proposals in the
top prices. The standard deviation of the prices is a measure of dispersion and heterogeneity
among market makers in valuating the fair price of the bond and in solving their quoting
optimization problem. If the standard deviation of prices is zero, it means that all the players
quote the same prices, indicating a full agreement about the fundamental value of the asset
and the correspondent risks. The slope is defined as the ratio between the absolute difference
between the best and the worst quotes (on the bid side) and the difference between total depth
and best size (on the bid side). Ginebri et al. (2008) explain this measure computes how far
from best price a dealer has to depart if he wants to trade 100mm. The smaller the slope, the
more liquid the market is. The daily total volume highlights the size of the trading activity
on the platform. Lastly, the price impact is a measure of resiliency of market makers. After
an investor sends a market order and fills the proposals on the book, market makers may
interpret the market order as an information about the value of the bond (if they believe the
filler is an informed trader). The quoting reaction (that is the price impact) highlights the
resiliency of market makers in keeping intact the levels of liquidity offered before the deal.
The lower the price impact, the higher is the resiliency of specialists and the microstructure
liquidity. In next section we present the results and comments of our analysis.
47
3.3 Structural Breaks
3.3.1 Volume weighted bid-ask spread (VWBA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Difference between volume weighted ask price and volume weighted bid
price.
Figure 3.2: Bai and Perron test - Volume weighted bid-ask spread (bps)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-14
I Per 5 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 May-09
II Per 4 Jul-11 Nov-11 Jan-12 Sep-12
III Per 8 Jul-13 Oct-14 May-15 Aug-15 Dec-15 Jul-16 Nov-16 Jan-17
Table 3.1: Bai and Perron test - Volume weighted bid-ask spread
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3.3.2 3 best bid quoted depth (V3B)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Sum of the volumes quoted on the three best bid prices.
Figure 3.3: Bai and Perron test - 3 best bid quoted depth (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Nov-06 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Jul-11 Mar-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 9 Jun-06 Nov-06 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Feb-09 Jun-09
II Per 6 Jul-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12
III Per 5 Mar-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15
Table 3.2: Bai and Perron test - 3 best bid quoted depth
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3.3.3 3 best ask quoted depth (V3A)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Sum of the volumes quoted on the three best ask prices.
Figure 3.4: Bai and Perron test - 3 best ask quoted depth (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Nov-06 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Apr-13 Oct-14
I Per 9 Nov-06 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Feb-09 Jun-09 Nov-09
II Per 4 Jun-10 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12
III Per 5 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15
Table 3.3: Bai and Perron test - 3 best ask quoted depth
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3.3.4 Standard deviation bid prices (SDB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Standard deviation of bid prices, weighted for correspondent quoted depth.
Figure 3.5: Bai and Perron test - Standard deviation bid prices
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 May-09 Apr-10 Dec-12 May-14 Oct-14 Jul-15
I Per 4 Jul-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 May-09
II Per 5 Jun-10 Apr-11 Jul-11 Feb-12 Oct-12
III Per 4 May-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Jul-15
Table 3.4: Bai and Perron test - Standard deviation bid prices
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3.3.5 Standard deviation ask prices (SDA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Standard deviation of ask prices, weighted for correspondent quoted depth.
Figure 3.6: Bai and Perron test - Standard deviation ask prices
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 May-09 Apr-10 Dec-12 Apr-14 Oct-14 Jul-15
I Per 6 Apr-07 Jul-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Aug-08 Apr-09
II Per 4 Jun-10 Jul-11 Feb-12 Oct-12
III Per 4 Apr-14 Oct-14 Jul-15 Jan-17
Table 3.5: Bai and Perron test - Standard deviation ask prices
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3.3.6 Slope bid (SLB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Slope is the ratio between the absolute difference between the best and the
worst quotes (on the bid side) and the difference between total depth and best size (on the
bid side).
Figure 3.7: Bai and Perron test - Slope bid
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12 Sep-12 Aug-13 Nov-14
I Per 4 Jul-07 Sep-08 Feb-09 Apr-08
II Per 6 Jun-10 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Sep-12
III Per 4 Aug-13 Feb-14 Oct-14 Nov-14
Table 3.6: Bai and Perron test - Slope bid
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3.3.7 Slope ask (SLA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Slope is the ratio between the absolute difference between the best and the
worst quotes (on the ask side) and the difference between total depth and best size (on the
ask side).
Figure 3.8: Bai and Perron test - Slope ask
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jun-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Sep-12 Apr-13 Jan-14 Nov-14
I Per 4 Sep-08 Nov-08 Feb-09 Apr-09
II Per 8 Jun-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Nov-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Sep-12
III Per 4 Apr-13 Jan-14 Oct-14 Nov-14
Table 3.7: Bai and Perron test - Slope ask
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3.3.8 Total traded volumes (VT)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total trading volumes.
Figure 3.9: Bai and Perron test - Total traded volumes (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 5 Mar-08 Jul-09 Aug-11 Nov-13 May-15
I Per 3 Apr-06 Feb-08 Jan-09
II Per 1 Aug-11
III Per 4 Nov-13 May-15 Oct-15 Nov-16
Table 3.8: Bai and Perron test - Total traded volumes
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3.3.9 Price impact on volume weighted bid (PIVWB)
Dimension: Resiliency.
Definition: Impact of selling trades greater of 15mm on the volume weighted bid prices
after 15 minutes the deal execution.
Figure 3.10: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on volume weighted bid (price ticks)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Mar-07 Dec-07 Aug-08 May-09 Mar-10 Jun-11 Mar-12 Dec-12 Sep-13
I Per 7 Aug-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Aug-08 Apr-09 Aug-09
II Per 9 Jul-10 Apr-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Jul-12 Sep-12
III Per 8 Jun-13 Feb-14 Jul-14 Mar-15 Aug-15 Dec-15 Apr-16 Oct-16
Table 3.9: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on volume weighted bid
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3.3.10 Price impact on volume weighted ask (PIVWA)
Dimension: Resiliency.
Definition: Impact of buying trades greater of 15mm on the volume weighted ask prices
after 15 minutes the deal execution.
Figure 3.11: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on volume weighted ask (price ticks)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Mar-07 Dec-07 Aug-08 May-09 Mar-10 Jul-11 Oct-12 Aug-13 Jan-15
I Per 7 Aug-06 Mar-07 Aug-07 Feb-08 Aug-08 Jul-09 Dec-09
II Per 9 Jul-10 Jan-11 May-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Jul-12 Sep-12
III Per 7 Aug-13 Jan-14 Jun-14 Dec-14 Aug-15 Feb-16 Oct-16
Table 3.10: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on volume weighted ask
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3.4 Concluding remarks
In this section we provide final comments about the analysis conducted on this large
set of liquidity measures (in appendix .4.2, the same analysis is performed on 35 liquidity
measures).
Number of US-UK EU peripheral Italian Global
Week measures Sign financial credit risk credit markets
with a break crisis - non IT risk volatility
July 23, 2007 18 - Yes No No No
February 25, 2008 21 - Yes No No No
September 08, 2008 13 - Yes No No No
September 15, 2008 24 - Yes No No No
July 20, 2009 12 + Yes No No No
April 12, 2010 14 - No Yes No No
July 04, 2011 20 - No No Yes No
January 02, 2012 14 - No No Yes No
September 10, 2012 18 - No Yes No No
October 13, 2014 25 - No No No Yes
August 31, 2015 13 - No No No Yes
Table 3.11: Summary of the weeks with the highest number of measures with a structural
break
Table 3.11 summarizes the weeks in correspondence of which structural breaks occurred
more frequently in the whole sample of measures, indicating the sign of the variation and
the link with the macroeconomic event that caused the switch in the liquidity regime. The
first important result is that the structural changes in the market microstructure are only par-
tially related to the Italian sovereign credit risk. Although structural breaks are found in
correspondence of July 2011 and January 2012, the other relevant dates that collect a high
number of breaks among several liquidity measures are not strictly related to Italian cred-
itworthiness. The first depletion of market liquidity occurred in 2007-2008 due to the UK
and US financial crisis. The recovery path was interrupted by the Greek and the subsequent
Eurozone sovereign debt crisisi. The positive trend of the last years has been hit by episodic
negative events, like the sell-off in the world fixed income market of October 2014. The fact
that several measures show that the high levels of liquidity eroded permanently and reached
its lowest historical levels during the spring 2008, after the outbreak of US financial crisis,
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makes clear that in the last decade the first and main reason of the erosion of market quality
has been the US and UK financial crisis.
Secondly, a strong asymmetry between structural changes in case of liquidity’s depletion
or liquidity’s strengthening exists. A decline in liquidity occurred through negative shock
depicted in strong and violent downside in the liquidity measures (e.g., during Lehman’s
default in September 2008). Conversely, positive evolution of liquidity conditions take place
through slow moving and gradual recovery (e.g., period post European debt crisis). For
this reason, Table 3.11 shows nine weeks in which a negative breaks occurred versus only
one week with a positive sign of the break. Negative events in financial markets are clearly
identifiable and this causes a concentration of negative breaks in several measures in days
close to the date of these events. On the other side, the slow moving recovery unlikely
identifies structural breaks close to single dates in several liquidity measures.
Lastly, since the analysis of each measure is conducted separately for the two sides of
the market (bid and ask), we note a strong homogeneity in the evolution of each pair of
measures. Graphically, each pair of measures moves in a very similar way. Analytically, a
large number of breaks is identified simultaneously both in the bid and ask sides. This result
confirm the idea that market makers act in a symmetric way in their quoting behaviors.
Looking in more detail the dynamic of each measure, we firstly analyze a rather standard
liquidity measure such as volume-weighted bid-ask spread. This is a measure more informa-
tive than the best bid-ask spread, since its implicit multidimensional nature combines prices
and the correspondent quantities. The Bai and Perron test detects the two strongest and
negative breaks during the US and UK financial turmoil (September 2008) and the European
sovereign debt crisis (July 2011). Although the measure reached its daily highest values dur-
ing summer 2011, the persistence of the negative liquidity depletion is very similar in these
two periods: in both cases, the Bai and Perron test detects a relevant positive restoration of
liquidity after seven months from the previous negative event.
Secondly, we consider a couple of measures, namely the ratios between the bid (ask)
quoted depth on the three best bid (ask) prices and the total quoted quantity. When the ratio
is near to one, it means that all market makers quote their proposals in the top prices of
the book. When this ratio decreases, it represents a liquidity depletion in the depth of the
quoting book in the top prices. Looking at the results, the two measures do not highlight any
significant difference between the two sides of the quoting book. Both measures show that
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the lowest average level of 35% is reached in correspondence of the Lehman default and it
remains stable until 2013. Differently from the previous measure, these ratios show clearly
that the liquidity in the top positions eroded permanently in march 2008. The recovery path
has started in march 2013. During these five years, breaks in the liquidity conditions show
up only when the analysis by sub-periods is carried on.
We then consider the standard deviation of bid (ask) prices, weighted for their corre-
spondent quoted quantities. These measures show how the dispersion of the quoted prices
has evolved during these years. Also in this case, no significant differences between the bid
and ask sides has emerged. From the analysis of these measures, it is clear the spillover
effect of the Greek bonds’ tensions on the Italian government bond market. As a matter
of fact, these measures reached the highest value in correspondence of the outbreak of the
Greek sovereign debt crisis, in spring 2010.
The measure that we present for the trading activity is the daily traded volumes. The
measure’ dynamic shows two permanent depletions of the liquidity: the first during the
financial turmoil of 2008, the second in correspondence of the Italian sovereign debt crisis.
Moving to multidimensional measures, the slope of the quoting book and the price im-
pact are analyzed. These measures have reached their highest value respectively during the
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and during the Italian debt crisis. Looking at the dynamic of the
slope, differently from other distressed periods (i.e., spring 2010, 2011-2012), the recovery
path after its negative jump during the 2008-2009 period has been longer (even longer if it
is compared with the other post-liquidity depletion periods). Lastly, the price impact is the
only measure of those in the sample that has reached the highest value (indicating a negative
evolution of market liquidity) during the Italian debt crisis with the strongest negative jump
in correspondence of June 2011.
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Chapter 4
Market-Making and Monitoring Rules on
the Italian Sovereign Bond Market
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, the debate about the restructuring of the regulatory framework of finan-
cial markets has increased significantly. In Europe, the structure and the design of Govern-
ment bond markets are one of the main concerns of regulators and policy makers. Studies,
linked to the European sovereign debt crisis, have clearly highlighted that market microstruc-
ture and liquidity risk are crucial components that affect sovereign borrowing cost, especially
during periods of distress and turbulence (D’Agostino and Ehrmann (2014)).
For sovereign issuers, a good functioning of the secondary market provides an essential
supportive environment for the primary market, by which the sovereign entities issue their
bonds among investors. A good design of secondary market implies a reduction of liquidity
risk and the correspondent premium demanded by investors, leading to lower bond yield and
sovereign debt cost.
In the European case, the government bonds secondary markets operate under the market
making system. Market participants are divided into two groups: market makers and market
takers. Market makers face quoting obligations: they quote continuously the bid price (on
which market takers can sell the bond) and the ask price (on which market takers can buy the
bond). Thus market makers offer market liquidity and they are subject to several regulations
on pre and post-transparency, on capital and organizational requirements.
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Looking at the Italian case, MTS Italy is the secondary wholesale market of the Italian
government bonds1. It is defined as a wholesale secondary market, implying only banks
and institutional intermediaries may be admitted as dealers. Among market makers on MTS
Italy, a group of selected dealers act as specialists of Italian public debt, facing, other than
quoting obligations on MTS, other duties in terms of activity in the primary and in the repo
markets. These operators benefit from some privileges, explicitly defined by the Specialists’
Decree of Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (henceforth MEF or Italian Treasury). In
order to verify the compliance on their duties and obligations, the Italian Treasury monitors
continuously their activity on primary and secondary markets. At the end of each year,
based on the overall evaluation, the MEF calculates the final ranking and publishes the first
five specialists. Monitoring rules and the public ranking regime are employed by the Italian
Treasury in order to push specialists to compete in the liquidity provision. These operators
are so subject to both market makers’ obligations and specialists’ duties defined by the MEF.
The contribution of the present study is threefold. First, it highlights that liquidity con-
ditions are affected by monitoring rules, not only due to their compulsory nature, but also
through the incentives linked to the correspondent ranking system. For instance, these incen-
tives could be related to higher reputation among financial investors. The analysis employs
the changes in monitoring criteria occurred between 2015 and 2016 on BTPs with residual
maturity longer than 10 years. These changes are suitable for this analysis since these affect
only a restricted number of BTPs, determining both temporal and units discontinuities that
are opportunely employed in the econometric analysis. The results suggest that empirical re-
search on MTS Italy2 should take into consideration whether changing in the ranking system
occurred during the period considered.
Second, this study suggests how traditional market microstructure models could handle
this new source of market externality. The basic idea is that specialists are exposed heteroge-
neously to the benefits of being in the top positions of the final ranking. Direct and explicit
benefits derived from higher probability to be selected by the Italian Treasury as lead man-
agers of syndicated issuances or as dealers in bilateral operations. Other implicit benefits
1MTS Italy is the most important electronic market for Italian government bonds since it has the highest
market share in terms of trading activity among electronic platforms (Consob - biannual bulletin June 2017).
2A large number of studies on the liquidity conditions on MTS domestic platforms are conducted recently
(Girardi and Impenna (2013), Pelizzon et al. (2014), Cafiso (2015), Pelizzon et al. (2016), Scheneider et al.
(2016), Corradin and Maddaloni (2017)).
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may be essentially related to the higher reputation among investors and these benefits vary
among specialists. The ranking signals the quality of execution services of these investment
banks: reaching the top positions, specialists signal their compliance in providing a good liq-
uidity service in government bonds, an asset class characterized by high competition and low
profitability, in order to increase fidelity of their clients for execution in other asset classes.
However, this heterogeneity could be related to several other reasons. Further research could
investigate why some banks are more exposed than others to potential benefits of ranking
regime.
Third, these results significantly contribute on the debate about the restructuring of mar-
kets design, highlighting that monitoring and ranking regimes may increase market compe-
tition, globally leading to better market quality.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the literature related to mar-
ket microstructure models, regulatory changes, the correspondent impact on market makers’
behavior and a review of studies on liquidity conditions in MTS markets. Then, Section
4.3 presents MTS Italy platform, the specialists’ evaluation criteria, the ranking system laid
down by the Italian Treasury and the first testable prediction. Sections 4.4 discuss method-
ologies, data and the main results of the econometric analyses on the first prediction. Section
4.5 formally assesses the second prediction about the heterogeneous response of different
market makers to the new market rules. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 present other robustness checks
of the basic analyses. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.8.
4.2 Related literature
Market microstructure models examine the process by which institutional market rules,
investors demands and traders’ heterogeneity interact and are translated into transactions and
price variations. Market makers play a crucial role in this process: they stand ready to buy
and sell a particular amount of an asset on a continuous basis at a publicly quoted price. If
vt is the public fair value of a risky asset at a some point in the time t, market makers set the
bid price bvt (< vt), on which investors are able to sell the asset, and the ask price avt (> vt),
on which investors can buy the asset. The bid-ask spread should compensate market makers
for their immediacy of transaction and for other costs that they implicitly and explicitly face:
operation costs, participation costs, transaction costs, asymmetric information, imperfect
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competition, inventory control costs, funding constraints and search. Vayanos and Wang
(2012) provide an exhaustive survey on theoretical work and empirical literature on these
imperfections. Among implicit costs, the existing literature extensively studies asymmetric
information costs and inventory control costs. Asymmetric information costs arise when
some investors are better informed about the true value of the asset. If market makers are not
able to distinguish these investors, they set bid and ask prices taking into account the risk of
dealing with a better informed investor.
Several studies have focused on those costs and proposed different models (information-
based models) that try to explain how asymmetric information on the real value of the asset
affects the bid-ask spread. Among these models, two different classes can be distinguished:
strategic models and sequential trading models. The common idea is that a trade reveals
something about the agent’s private information. Kyle (1985) proposed the first strategic
model. The basic idea of this model is that the better informed trader trades strategically
maximizing its trading profits before the information becomes common knowledge. This
model considers the existence of a single informed trader. Holden and Subrahamanyam
(1992) propose a similar multi-period auction model but characterized by multiple noncom-
petitive agents. In contrast with Kyle results, they find that even just two informed traders
cause an immediacy in private information incorporation in asset price. Some other basic
assumptions of the original Kyle’s framework have been relaxed in other papers: Admati and
Pflederer (1988) introduce endogenous patterns in buy and sell volumes that induce buyers
and sellers to trade in different periods mitigating the adverse selection problem, Foster and
Viswanathan (1990) argue that, since prices are an important source of information both
for informed and uninformed traders, also uninformed traders could act strategically in the
market.
The sequential trade models focus on the basic idea that, in a quote driven market with
heterogeneously informed traders, the bid-ask spread is linked to the probability structure of
the market participants. Among these model, Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) propose the first models in this direction. Looking at the basic assumptions,
the market maker is risk neutral and sets quotes in a competitive way (zero profit condition
is respected). Since the market maker losses on dealing with informed traders, she quotes
higher bid-ask spread. The adverse selection problem implies that there is an increasing and
positive effect of the fraction of informed traders on the bid-ask spreads. Easley and O’Hara
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(1987) incorporate in the model also the trade size and the different effect of a small or
large trade in signaling the quality of information. Better informed trader faces a trade-off.
In order to maximize their profits, they could trade a large size but in this way they send
a higher quality signal on the information. Based on these models, several studies discuss
when crashes in financial markets arise with the inability of the market maker in playing
its crucial role in stabilizing the market. Romer (1993) argues that crashes may arise when
traders are uncertain about the precision of information of other traders.
The second implicit cost that a market maker faces is the inventory-control cost. This
cost arises when imbalances of buying and selling flows increase. Market maker, setting
their bid-ask spread, should consider the risk in holding inventory that may deviate from
their desired position and causing losses if prices move against. If they already own a signif-
icant long (or short) position, they set the bid and ask prices in order to facilitate the turnover
of the position. Garman (1976) proposes a model in which he assumes that the market maker
has to face the Gambler’s Ruin problem since dealer capital is finite and the probability that
inventories become greater than the capital is equal 1 for some finite time T. As Madha-
van (2000) explains, this simple model well highlights the relation between market making
activity, inventories and dealer capital structure. Inadequate capitalization could cause an in-
crease in price volatility due to inventories control: if market maker already owns a relevant
position (suppose long), after an heavy selling flow, she could be reluctant in increasing her
long position, leading to a deterioration in the bid side of the market, a compression in the
ask side and an increase in market volatility. Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980),
Ho and Stoll (1981) propose a model of a monopolistic specialist that sets the markup on the
fair price of the asset depending on monopoly power, volatility and inventory control costs.
Ho and Stoll (1983) relax the assumption of monopolistic market maker and analyze the
equilibrium condition under multiple specialists in a competitive framework. In their paper,
authors conclude that market volatility is affected not only by uncertainty about the returns
on their inventories, but also by uncertainty about the arrival of transactions.
Differently from previous literature that limits the specialist’ choice to the bid and ask
prices in order to compensate several implicit and explicit costs, Kavajecz (1998) proposes
the first model in which a specialist chooses prices and depths jointly in order to maximize
her profits. He found that prices and depths are used as substitutes: a narrow bid-ask spread
induces small depth quotes whereas large depth quotes induce a wide bid-ask spread. These
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depths quotes are not, however, the familiar depth parameter discussed in the Kyle (1985)
paper, rather they are quantities that specialists post in real time that announce the number of
shares available at the posted price (Kavajecz, 1998). Kavajecz (1999) and Caglio and Kava-
jecz (2006) link the specialist’s choice of quoted depth and tightness of her bid-ask spread
in order to face the adverse selection risk. Specifically, they found that specialists decide
to reduce their exposure risk, reducing their quoted size, when they face an increase in the
amount of adverse selection or in price uncertainty. These works are the main references for
our study since it focuses on the opportunity for specialists, provided by the new monitoring
rules, to manage both prices and quantities in their quoting proposals.
The second strands of literature refers to the empirical analyses on the impact of changes
in quoting obligations on market makers’ behavior. Only few of these changes affect directly
the obligation on the minimum quantity set by market makers. McInish, Van Ness and Van
Ness (1998) have examined how the change in the Actual Size Rule (ASR) affected Nasdaq
market quality. They find a negative impact on the quoted depth and a positive effect on the
number of small quotes in the 10 days after the implementation of the new rule. Porter et al.
(2006) investigate the link between the ASR change and periods of market stress. They find
that ASR may significantly reduce market quality under times of financial distress. Chung
and Zhao (2006), employing both cross sectional and intertemporal analyses on Nasdaq
stocks, find that dealers post large depths when their quotes are at the inside3 and frequently
quote the minimum required depth when they are not at the inside, leading to a negative
intertemporal correlation between dealer spread and depth.
Other previous studies of the spread-depth interaction focus on specialist quotes on the
NYSE. However, our paper differs from these studies since the MTS setup is substantial dif-
ferent from equity markets. The main difference in the market structure is that in MTS, only
the group of market makers quotes simultaneously the whole group of Italian government
bonds, while in NYSE each stock has just one specialist that faces the quoting obligation and
acts competitively with limit orders of other investors. Gozluklu et al. (2015), employing a
dataset on Borsa Italiana, investigate how market quality has been affected by the reduction
of the minimum trade unit (MTU). They find a substantial improvement of liquidity driven
by the reduction in adverse selection and by the increase in retail trading. However, Go-
3Inside quote represents the best bid or ask prices of the quoting book. The inside quote is the prices at
which market order will be executed.
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zluklu setup and other previous studies on the reduction of MTU (e.g., Amihud et al., 1999)
differ from this paper since our focus is on quoting obligation and not on the opportunity to
increase liquidity with low entry barriers in stocks trading.
In addition, a wide literature exists on the effect of other regulatory changes in financial
markets. For instance, the effects of changing the minimum tick size draws considerable
attention. The tick size is the minimum price movement of a trading instrument. Harris
(1994) hypothesizes that a smaller tick size is likely to cause a reduction in the bid-ask spread
since to the removal of the artificial ceiling allows investors to place limit orders at prices
which were previously unavailable. Empirical studies, applied in different markets, confirm
these hypotheses (Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Chung and Chuwonganant (2004), Ahn
and al. (2007), Buti et al. (2013), Lepone and Wong (2017)). Other studies assess the impact
of ban on stub quoting that should narrow volume weighted bid-ask spread and reduce the
price impact leading to better liquidity conditions. Findings of Egginton and al. (2016)
are consistent with these hypotheses. These studies differ from our paper since the rule
changes concern different characteristics of the market design and because, as mentioned
above, other important structural differences exist between MTS and equity markets.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on MTS market, one of the most important
electronic trading platforms of European government bonds with a peculiar organizational
setup. As discussed above, this market differs substantially from equity markets. Cheung
at al. (2005) provide a first extensive description of the European bond market and inves-
tigate some aspects of the microstructure of MTS markets, as the link between Euro MTS
and domestic platforms. Coluzzi et al. (2008) analyze the microstructure liquidity evolu-
tion on MTS Italy employing a wide set of different liquidity measures. Later, Darbha and
Dufour (2013b) review the microstructure of Euro area government bond market, includ-
ing the high number of studies linked to the European sovereign bond crisis. Pelizzon et
al. (2016) study the evolution of liquidity measures during the Euro-zone crisis in the MTS
Italy, highlighting the links with sovereign risk and ECB’s intervention through LTRO and
OMT programs. Pelizzon et al. (2014) investigate the links between the cash (MTS) market
and the correspondent futures market (Eurex) in price discovery and in liquidity discovery
processes. Paiardini (2015) studies how economic news are incorporated in MTS markets.
Cafiso (2015) investigates the connections between primary and secondary markets, employ-
ing data on the Italian case. Scheneider et al. (2016), employing a dataset that runs from
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2011 to 2015, study the spillover effects of shocks in liquidity conditions among different
segments of BTPs.
MTS provides also a platform to execute repos on government bonds4. Since market
makers face order imbalances and manage scarcity risk, a good functioning of repo market
is crucial in order to guarantee high level of liquidity in the cash market. Corradin and
Maddaloni (2017) study how supply and demand shocks (e.g., ECB’s intervention) affect
the specialness of Italian government bonds.
4.3 Institutional details
4.3.1 MTS Italy market structure
MTS was introduced in 1988 by the Italian Treasury and it was the first electronic market
for government bonds in Europe. In 1997 it was privatized and it began expansion across
other public debt issuers. The main reason for the launch of MTS was to create a support-
ive environment for the big changes that were ongoing in the primary market, namely the
evolution in the placement technique of government bond from a system of firm sale to a
predetermined group of banks to an auction based system, where all market players can par-
ticipate and bid competitively for the amount of bonds announced by the issuer. In 1998
MTS has become a Regulated market owned by the private sector. However, according to
several second tier regulations (e.g., Ministry decrees), the set of rules according to which
the market for wholesale trading in government bonds works is laid down by the Italian
Treasury, while the supervision is under the control of Bank of Italy and Consob.
The Italian Treasury issued two main regulations in 1999 and 2009 that reaffirmed MTS
as a pure interdealer platform with market making obligations, high levels of transparency
both pre trade and post trade, even before MIFID 2 requirements. These decrees also set
down the rules for specialists. These measures, to create an efficient secondary market,
were adopted within the general framework of public debt management policy, aimed at
achieving a structural minimization of funding cost, increasing liquidity for government
bonds through an electronic system which makes transactions very easy to be executed,
providing a clear picture of market conditions for the market participants by means of a
4Miglietta et al. (2015) documents that the market share of MTS repo platform is close to 90% .
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continuous ”on screen” availability of bid-ask prices, helping the issuer in the placement of
specific bonds offered at auctions (Iacovoni, 2017).
Currently MTS Italy is the domestic trading platform of Italian government bonds of
MTS markets. It is defined as a wholesale secondary market, implying that only banks and
institutional intermediaries are admitted as dealers and participate on their own account (or
on behalf of institutional investors but as a direct counterpart).
As the other MTS markets, the Italian platform is a quote-driven electronic order book
market. Participants are divided into two groups: market makers and market takers. As
discussed above, the role of market makers is to provide liquidity continuously, quoting
two proposals (bid and ask prices) that are aggregated in the order book for each bond.
Other participants, acting as price taker, can buy and sell a certain amount of a bond, hitting
the proposals with a market order. Other important features of MTS markets are that the
proposals are anonymous (the counterpart is revealed only if at least one of the two dealers
settles bilaterally) and market makers are not forced to show the maximum quantity they are
willing to trade. Market maker could show only a partial amount of its proposal, maintaining
the priority for the entire size of the proposals (both disclosed and undisclosed quantities)5.
However the undisclosed size has to be at least equal to the minimum lot size (2mm), defined
by MTS market rules.
4.3.2 Evaluation criteria of Specialists in Italian Government bonds
In 1994, the Italian Treasury introduced a new category of operators: specialists. Origi-
nally, this group was composed by selected primary dealers operating in MTS Italy. The aim
was to enhancing the demand at auctions, the liquidity conditions in the secondary markets
and assisting the Treasury with advice on debt management policy issue (IMF Guidelines
for Public Debt Management, 2001). From 1994, the list of specialists has been modified
several times: when a new specialist arrives (e.g., Barclays in September 2004, Nomura and
HSBC in January 2005) or an old one decides to limit her participation in Italian sovereign
bonds activity (e.g., UBS in July 2018). Note that specialists are necessarily market makers
in MTS Italy, the contrary is not always true. However, as the next sections will show, the
5Buti and Rindi (2013) find that operators have a strong incentive to choose a quantity very closed to the
minimum size since they face exposure costs that arise when agents, submitting large orders, run the risk of
being undercut by aggressive traders.
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market share as fillers6 in MTS Italy of the whole group of specialists is very high, more
than 90%, indicating that the liquidity provided by market makers, that are not specialists, is
negligible.
The Italian Treasury clearly explains in its decrees (e.g., Selection and evaluation of
Specialists in Government Bonds Decree) which privileges are provided for banks that act
as specialist in its government bond market. The Ministry guarantees to the whole group
of specialists exclusive access to reserved reopenings of government bond auctions7, to the
selection of lead managers of syndicated issuances, of dealers for bilateral buyback opera-
tions and for derivative transactions. In order to verify the compliance of specialists on their
duties, the Italian Treasury monitors continuously their activities on primary and secondary
markets. At the end of each year, based on the overall evaluation, the Italian Treasury cal-
culates the final ranking and publishes the first five specialists on the Italian Public Debt
website.
In its evaluation criteria, the Italian Treasury defines general principles, specifies the re-
quirements which need to be fulfilled by each specialist (e.g., the allocation on an annual
basis of a share no less than 3% of the total volume issued by the Treasury) and lists the
specific criteria for monitoring specialists’ activities, with formulas and practical informa-
tions. The Ministry monitors that specialists efficiently and continuously participate in the
placement auctions, in the secondary markets, in the repo market and contribute to the man-
agement of public debt through advisory and research activity.
With respect the activity on the secondary market, the Italian Treasury defines that each
specialist has to contribute to the efficiency of the market and an orderly execution of trad-
ing8 and determines the criteria to evaluate specialists so as to establish the contribution to
the efficient functioning of the trading venues.
6As mentioned above, market makers set their quotes defining prices and quantities that they are willing to
trade. When a price taker (the aggressor) decides to hit the proposals in the quoting book, the counterparts of
the deals are market makers that act as fillers.
7Reserved reopenings give to the Specialists the right to buy predetermined additional quantities of the
issued bond at the price settled at the auction. The application deadline is fixed at 3.30 p.m. of the business day
following the auction. Thus it represents a free call option on the issued bond. We refer to Coluzzi C. (2011)
for an extensive discussion on the value of this option for specialists.
8Specialists Evaluation Criteria Decree Year 2018 , Article 3.
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Specialists evaluation criteria - year 2015
Looking at the 2015 criteria, the most important criteria on the primary market activity, in
terms of contribution for the ranking (33 points), is the Primary Quantitative Indicator. Each
specialist is assigned a score in proportion to the share in the primary market allocation. The
score begins to be assigned with the allocation of a share of at least 3% up to a maximum
level of 6%. The score assigned to each specialist is given by: (Qs-3%)*33/(6% - 3%), where
Qs is the specialist’s share in the primary market.
Looking at the criteria on the secondary market, the Treasury defines four indicators: the
quotation quality index (QQI), the traded volumes (TV), the number of bonds traded as filler
(NBTF) and the large in size contract (LSC).
The QQI is an indicator based on high frequency snapshots, made on each market day,
on the order book of each bond for each specialist. For each snapshot, the ranking of the
specialist in the order book of the bond with respect the best ranked specialist (both for the
bid and ask sides) is recorded. To calculate this indicator only proposals associated with
visible quantities equal to 5mm are considered. For each bond, the average ranking of the
specialist is calculated relative to the market day. To calculate the average ranking, each
position in the order book is weighted with increasing coefficients that are in proportion to
the position in the order book with respect to the best price, in order to reward more those
dealers that continuously show the best prices both for the bid and the ask sides. Thus QQI
measures the contribution of each specialist in narrowing the best bid-ask spread. The higher
is the contribution, the lower is QQI. At the end of the year, the specialist with the lowest
QQI is assigned 8 points. The other specialists are rescaled with respect to the best one.
The TV index measures the market share of trading activity of each specialist in MTS
Italy. The parameter is calculated with two subsequent weightings, the first takes into ac-
count the type of bond traded (BOT, CTZ, BTP, CCT), the second discriminates the volumes
traded as filler (weight equal to 1) or volume traded as aggressor (weight equal to 0.50). The
best specialist is assigned a score of 8 points.
NBTF measures the ability of each specialist to trade, as filler, the highest possible num-
ber of bonds on MTS. To the best Specialist are assigned 4 points and a score between 0 and
4 is proportionally assigned to the other specialists.
Lastly, LSC measures the contribution of each specialist to provide size to contracts
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traded as filler. All contracts larger than or equal to a threshold size are selected. The
threshold size, for each class of BTPs, is defined by averaging the size of contracts traded
during the observation period within that class. Then the Treasury calculates the share of
each Specialist as filler. The specialist with the highest indicator is given a score of 2 points.
Other indicators refer to the activity in the repo market, in the buyback or exchanges
transactions and in evaluating the organizational structure. The full list of criteria, coeffi-
cients of QQI and weights of TV are presented in Appendix .5. The total maximum score is
100 points and specialists compete for the first five positions, in order to be published in the
final ranking9
Changes in evaluation criteria - year 2016
Every year, the Italian Treasury may modify monitoring and ranking criteria. As ex-
plained in the introduction, this paper employs the changes between 2015 and 2016 on cri-
teria of the secondary market in order to verify whether and how market liquidity is affected
by the ranking rules. As a matter of fact, the changes in the criteria for 2016 ranking modi-
fied some important features only in the segment of BTPs with residual maturity longer than
10 years, providing a quasi natural experiment to be employed for statistical purpose.
The Treasury has changed several times monitoring rules, but these changes are different
from those occurred in the past: in most cases, rules were modified homogeneously among
bond segments (i.e., introducing new criteria applied to the whole group of bonds); actually
the changes of 2016 determined both temporal and units discontinuities. Therefore, the
variation between 2015 and 2016 is suitable to detect the causal effect of monitoring rules
on liquidity conditions.
Before explaining in details the new rules, the timeline of the events is presented. On
20 November 2015, the Italian Treasury invited specialists to communicate their proposals
for potential changes to be introduced in the 2016. On 9 December, the Treasury, collected
specialists’ comments, discussed with them its definitive proposal on how to modify the
monitoring rules for 2016. On 15 December, the Treasury formally confirmed the set of
9Note that, although the rules about mandatory exclusion from the list of specialists are clearly listed in the
MEF’s decrees, in the last decade no case of exclusion has occurred. Conversely, cases of banks that voluntarily
decide to suspend their activity as specialist occurred several times. In this sense, there is not a competition
to comply the minimum compulsory conditions set by the Italian Treasury, actually if banks compete for the
ranking, they do that to be published in the five top positions.
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changes for the new year. Lastly, on 4 January (the first trading day of the year), the new
regulation has entered into force.
The changes with respect to 2015 were mainly designed to push market makers to pro-
vide higher liquidity in the group of BTPs with residual maturity longer than 10 years. With
respect the quoting and trading activities on MTS, the Italian Treasury modified in two ways
the calculation of the four indicators of secondary market. Firstly, the minimum size re-
quired for the evaluation of QQI on nominal BTP with maturity longer than 10 years was
removed and became 2mm, the minimum required size defined by MTS rules. Secondly,
in order to offset the potential negative impact of this change on the depth of the quoting
book, the Treasury doubled the weight for this group of BTPs in calculating QQI, NBTF
and LSC indicators and increased the weights of these BTPs in calculating the trading vol-
ume share of each specialist in the secondary markets (TV index)10. In this way, specialists
face a trade-off in choosing their quoted depth: if they reduce to 2mm their proposals, then
they benefit from lower quoting risks but they also reduce their expected scores in the final
ranking.
With the new monitoring rules (the list of other changes is provided in the Appendix .6.),
the Italian Treasury aimed at incentivizing market makers to narrow their bid-ask spread in
the longer maturity BTPs group, allowing them to reduce their quoted quantities. However,
modifying also the weights on TV, NBTF and LSC indices, each specialist should set its
quoted prices and depths in order to maximize her expected returns from market making
activity and her expected score for the final ranking.
Prediction n. 1
In the light of the previous discussion, we can summarize the following testable empirical
prediction.
Prediction 1: Ranking system, acting on market makers’ quoting decisions, affects posi-
tively the conditions of market liquidity.
Monitoring rules and ranking system may affect quoting preferences of market mak-
ers. In a pure specialists market, as the previous chapter has explained, the quoting book
aggregates only specialists’ proposals. Since ranking system increases competition among
10The new weights are shown in Appendix .6
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specialists, the final effect is a positive impact on aggregated liquidity conditions. In the em-
pirical application, we use the changes between 2015 and 2016 to assess whether a variation
in the monitoring criteria affects the microstructural liquidity offered by specialists. Since
the dataset does not provide information at the individual market maker level, the focus is
on the structure of the quoting books. However, the book is just the aggregation of the pro-
posals provided by market makers; employing suitable liquidity measures, one may infer on
the aggregated market makers’ quoting decisions.
4.3.3 Appraisal of the activity of Primary Dealers in the Eurozone coun-
tries
Lastly, this section provides a brief discussion about evaluation criteria of Primary Deal-
ers (henceforth PD) employed by the Debt Management Offices (henceforth DMO) of other
Eurozone countries11. In particular, in this section, the differences with the Italian case are
highlighted. Let’s recall that MTS Italy is the only eligible trading platform and PDs are
publicly ranked at the end of each year. The combination of these two characteristics makes
MTS Italy the most suitable case to study the impact of incentives linked to a public ranking
regime in the market makers’ quoting choices.
Austria uses a broad range of criteria to measure PDs’ performance on primary and sec-
ondary markets, turnover statistics with real money investors and other qualitative factors.
Looking at the secondary market activity, Austria does not prescribe specific platform eli-
gibility criteria and does not have a firm quoting obligation. Austria leaves the selection of
a platform to its PDs, that have to submit daily data on their quoting and trading activities
that are matched with data provided on voluntary basis by all major platforms. The final
ranking’s top ten dealers are made public in the DMO’s website in December.
Belgium appraises the activity of the PDs in the primary and secondary markets accord-
ing to various quantitative and qualitative. Since April 2014, Belgium have selected three
trading platforms (MTS Belgium, Eurex, Icap BrokerTec) on which PDs can comply with
their quoting obligation. The system guarantees an high level of flexibility: each PD can
select daily at its discretion the platform on which it complies with its quoting obligation;
11For an extensive discussion on all European national public debt frameworks, I refer to the European
Primary Dealers Handbook, publicly available on AFME website.
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moreover, the selected platform may be different for different securities. The appraisal is
communicated to each Primary Dealer individually.
Finland’s evaluation system is based on an internal scorecard model that takes into ac-
count various areas of services. Looking at the market making obligations, the Finnish
Treasury selects four eligible platforms (BGC, Eurex, MTS, BrokerTec) on which PDs are
forced to provide two-way proposals for all securities with minimum quantity and maximum
spread obligations. The scorecard rankings are not public.
France measures the PDs’ performance through an overall assessment on primary, sec-
ondary, repo and strips markets. The selected trading platforms on which PDs are evaluated
are MTS France and ICAP/Brokertec. The main criteria on the evaluation of the secondary
market activity is the market share wighted for different segments (maturity and the nature
of security). Quarterly, the Agence France Tresor informs each PD of its position on the
primary and secondary markets.
Germany does not have any PD system and corresponding ranking regime. However,
there are still rules that apply to the Bund Issues Auction Group, a group of investment
banks to whom the direct participation in the auctions is guaranteed. Starting from 2015, the
members of the Bund Issues Auction Group provide to the Finance Agency on a voluntary
basis the trading activity in the secondary market.
In the Irish case, Primary Dealers are required to quote two-side proposals for benchmark
bonds on any recognized electronic platform such as MTS, BGC Partners and BrokerTec.
Monthly, each PD declares on which platform it decides to quote in line with its obligations
and then the National Treasury Management Agency monitors its activity in the selected
venue. The ranking of PDs, based on an all-encompassing basis, is not made public.
The Dutch State Treasury Agency (DSTA) has selected four platforms (ICAP, MTS, Eu-
rex Bonds, BGC Brokers) in order to outline a multi-platform environment on which each
PD may select a single venue to fulfill its quotation obligations. The assessment criteria
for appraising the PD activity are based on the market share in the primary and secondary
selected markets, the fulfillment of their quotation obligations and the support in the promo-
tion and development of products related to dutch public securities. Three times a year, the
DSTA publishes the top five positions of PDs ranking.
Also in the Portuguese case, a multi-platform environment has been established. Portugal
has set a compliance ratio of at least 80% for PDs’ quoting obligation on MTS for each entire
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calendar month and other quoting obligations weighted by daily volatility in designated
platforms (BGC eSpeed, MTS, BrokerTec). No information about public ranking are found.
Lastly, Spain identifies SENAF (that does not impose any quoting obligations) and MTS
Spain (that imposes obligations to market makers not registered as PDs) as two authorized
electronic trading platforms. Spanish Government requires PDs to quote in one platform
at least 5 hours the benchmark bonds and a strip basket. Each PD can quote part of the
securities on one platform and part on the other. Annually, the Spanish Treasury publicly
ranks the five most active primary dealers.
In the light of this discussion, one can conclude the Italian case is the most suitable
framework to analyze how these ranking systems may affect market makers’ choices: quot-
ing obligations are applied to a single eligible trading platform (MTS Italy) and annually the
first five positions of the ranking are published. The former feature helps the analysis lim-
iting confounding effects and any potential endogeneity problems, since each market maker
might have unobservable preferences about the trading venue12 on which comply its quoting
obligations. On the other side, the Italian ranking regime, characterized by a clear assess-
ment, may boost competition among specialists and it provides high implicit benefits (e.g.,
reputation) due to its public nature.
4.4 The causal effect of changes in monitoring rules on mar-
ket liquidity
This section discusses econometric strategies to estimate the effect of monitoring rules
and ranking systems on liquidity conditions of the quoting book (Prediction 1). The analysis
employs the changes in evaluation criteria between 2015 and 2016. In practice, an analysis
on individual level cannot be performed but, since the order book is the direct aggregation
of the proposals of specialists, the paper estimates the causal effect of the new market rules
on a set of liquidity measures of the quoting book. The changes in specialists’ evaluating
criteria entered into force from 4th January 2016 and affected some market making features
and obligations in the segments of BTPs with residual maturity longer than 10 years. The
impact of the regulatory switch on liquidity measures is investigated using a standard panel
12Regulated markets and multilateral trading systems.
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regression model with individual and time fixed effects.
4.4.1 Data and methodology
The analysis considers the period that runs from 1st September 2015 to 29th April 2016
and selects bonds that, in line with the regulatory variation, were closed to the threshold
of 10 years as residual maturity. These bonds are those included in two classes of BTPs
defined by the Treasury for TV index around the 10-year maturity: seven bonds with resid-
ual maturity between seven to ten years (the control group that has not been affected by
rules’ change)13 and eight bonds with residual maturity between ten to fifteen years (the
treatment group)14. This specific classification is defined by the Italian Treasury to evaluate
the specialist’s activity in the primary and the secondary markets, with the aim to aggregate
different bonds in more homogeneous classes (see Table 71 in Appendix .4.2). Boehmer et
al. (2015) suggest that, analyzing regulatory experiments, the fundamental assumption that
the control group is unaffected may not hold in financial markets, due to potential existence
of spillover effects. However, in this framework no indirect and spillover effects should ex-
ist, since minimum obligations in the control group are unchanged and no rational behavior
could explain different quoting preferences in these bonds.
The period that has been considered is suitable for the analysis for several reasons. First,
as explained in section 4.3.2, the changes in monitoring rules between 2015 - 2016, affecting
a restricted number of bonds, are appropriate to highlight the role of ranking system in influ-
encing market makers’ behaviors. During this period, the other relevant regulatory features
remained unchanged. Note that, even if other regulatory changes or structural variations
occurred in that period, these should impact differently the two segments of BTPs since the
empirical analysis is conducted to find any significant difference between these two groups.
Second, since BTPs with maturity longer than 7 years and smaller than 15 years are se-
lected, the paper discusses and controls whether any market factors could lead to divergence
between these two groups. Looking at the spread between the yield of the BTP 10 years
13In more details, the control group is composed of bonds with residual maturity at 4th January 2016
lower but close to 10 years. Isin codes: IT000366655, IT0004953417, IT0005001547, IT0005045270,
IT0004513641, IT0005090318, IT0005127086.
14The treatment group is composed of bonds with the residual maturity greater but close to 10 years.
Isin codes: IT0004644735, IT0001086567, IT0001174611, IT0004889033, IT0001278511, IT0005024234,
IT000144378, IT0005094088.
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benchmark versus the yield of the BTP 15 years benchmark, it could help to understand how
operators managed these two segments. The average spread of this period is 43.840 bps, the
maximum value is 53.753 bps and the minimum value is 37.141 bps. If one looks to the
annualized volatility (a financial indicator of risk and uncertainty) of this spread, computed
on rolling window of 160 days (8 months), its centered value in Sep 15 - Apr 16 period is
52.823%, the maximum is 71.734% and the minimum is 51.614%. Comparing with those
values computed on 2010-2017 period (respectively equal to 41.235 bps, 79.443 bps, -8.762
bps, 204.511%, 692.77%, 48.086%) confirms that the period employed in the analysis is
characterized by low level of instability and uncertainty.
Moreover, since market makers intermediate the allocation of the Italian bonds among
investors, some facts about the demand and supply should be previously discussed, in order
to analyze whether structural variation in inventories’ control cost occurred. First, the Italian
Treasury follows a fully transparent calendar about auctions. Quarterly, the MEF publishes
its Quarterly Issuance Program which announces new securities and reopenings of out-
standing bonds that will be issued in the subsequent quarter. About longer BTPs, monthly
the Italian Treasury supplies BTPs with 15y, 20y or 30y maturities at mid-month auction and
10y BTPs at the end of the month. In September 2015 - April 2016 period, 8 auctions both
on 10y BTPs and on longer BTPs were conducted. Comparing the issued amounts through
regular auctions during September 2015 - April 2016 and the average amounts of the same
period during last five years (2013 - 2017), no substantial difference in the supply side can
be identified. In the period 2015-2016, the issued amounts on 10y BTPs was 21.750 mil-
lions (mm) and on 15y BTPs was 5.956mm. In the same periods over the last five years, the
average issued amounts on 10y BTPs has been 21.825mm and on 15y BTPs was 6.114mm15.
Lastly, from the demand side, this period benefits from the homogeneous buying activity
of ECB through its PSP program: the QE on sovereign bonds has started in March 2015
and it has been modified only at the end of the period (on March 10th, 2016, the Governing
Council of ECB took the decision to reduce its reference interest rates and to increase its
monthly purchases of European sovereign bonds and other corporate bonds from 60ebillions
to 80ebillions starting from April 2016).
From a market perspective, it seems to be a good period to be analyzed with limited risks
that contingent or long-run factors caused divergence in the inventories of market makers
15Table 75 in Appendix .4.2 presents the details of the Italian Treasury’s issuance activity.
80
of 10 years BTPs versus 15 years BTPs. However, next paragraphs explain in more details
how the analysis controls in the empirical setting for auctions and global trading activity of
investors.
The following model is estimated:
Yit = α0+βchangeit + γX ′it +dt +ai+ εit , (4.1)
where changeit is a dummy variable that assumes value one when observation is about
a bond i that has maturity longer than 10 years in the 2016 year (treatment period). These
observations are those referred to bonds that have been affected by the new set of market
rules, implying the coefficient β represents the estimated effect of the regulatory switch on
the outcome variables. Then, dt represents time fixed effects and ai is bond fixed effects.
The model is estimated on three different outcome variables in order to verify different
dimensions in the quoting response of market makers. In particular, the analysis estimates
the causal effect on:
1. Bid-Ask Spread in percentage on the mid quote (BAit): normalizing the absolute bid-
ask spread with respect mid price allows to compare bid-ask spreads of different BTPs.
2. Total quoted quantity (Qit): the average between the total depth quoted on the ask and
on the buy sides.
3. Price impact of 20mm (PIit): the difference between the mid price and the realizable
execution price of a deal of 20mm (both on the bid and ask sides).
These outcome variables are selected among the most informative liquidity measures
about the quoting activity of market makers on MTS Italy (Coluzzi et al., 2008) and these
have been discussed in depth in the section 3.2.1. By employing these three measures,
one can jointly infer about the choices of specialists about the level of tightness and the
quoted size. In Appendix .8 descriptive statistics of each outcome variable for each bond are
presented.
In order to conduct the analysis, monthly averages are employed16. The dataset is orig-
inally composed by the snapshots of the quoting book of each bond with a frequency of 5
16I have also employed weekly observations. The results confirm those with monthly data.
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minutes from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm for each trading day. For each snapshot, liquidity measures
are computed and then are averaged in order to get monthly observations.
The covariates employed in the model are: idiosyncratic volatility, computed as the
monthly average of daily min-max quoting prices range; specialness, computed as the monthly
average of daily differences between the realized repo yield and general collateral repo yields
on the TomNext segment; auction, a dummy variable that assumes value one if an auction of
the bond occurs in that month. As previously discussed in the section of the literature review,
these control variables are selected in order to check for different factors that a priori may
affect liquidity conditions of bonds. Volatility is the key component of the risk in providing
immediacy in execution service. Specialness replicates the inventory (opportunity) cost to
hold negative (positive) net position. Auction variable refers to the supply activity of the
Italian Treasury.
4.4.2 Results
The estimates of the causal effect of the regulatory change on the three liquidity measures
are presented in Table 4.1.
(1)
BA Q PI
β -0.015 0.785 -3.982
Robust SE 0.003 1.715 0.694
p-value 0.001 0.654 0.001
Covariates yes yes yes
Obs 120 120 120
R2 0.697 0.841 0.692
Table 4.1: Panel estimates. The table shows the estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel
regressions defined in model n. 4.1 with bond and time fixed effects with each observation
defining a bond-month. The causal effect of the change in monitoring rules between 2015
and 2016 is estimated on three different liquidity measures of the quoting book: best bid-
ask spread (BA), average bid and ask depths (Q) and price impact of a deal of 20mm (PI).
Under each coefficient, robust standard errors (clustering at the level of individual bonds)
and p-value are presented.
The estimates confirm my first predictions about the effect of the changes in monitoring
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rules on liquidity measures. I find a significant and negative impact on the bid-ask spread
and no significant effect on the whole quoted quantities. The negative impact on the best
bid-ask spread is 0.17% , equal to 17 price ticks on a bond with actual value of 100e. Price
impact is significantly and negatively affected by rules’ change: new rules reduce the cost
of execution of a 20mm deal of 3.98 price ticks.
These results highlight that the liquidity measures are affected by the set of monitoring
rules defined by the Italian Treasury. In the next sections, I provide some robustness checks
in order to reinforce these results. Secondly, the combination of a narrower bid-ask spread
and an unchanged total depth seems to be inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of
Kavajecz (1998)17. In section 4.5 I put forward a possible explanation that combines the
theoretical microstructure models and the role of public ranking system in pushing the com-
petition among market makers.
4.4.3 Robustness checks
In this section, robustness checks are provided in order to test the hypothesis of selection
bias time invariant before the treatment, to exclude a delayed effect of the new rules, potential
seasonal effects and to assess the role of market makers that are not specialists.
Selection bias time invariant in the pre-treatment period
As a first robustness check, the hypothesis that the selection bias is constant over time
in the pre-treatment period has been tested. Three diff-in-diff models are estimated consid-
ering the three couples of months in the pre-treatment period (September 2015 – October
2015, October 2015 - November 2015, November 2015 - December 2015). Estimating the
following model:
Yit = α0+α1Di+ γX ′it +α2Tt +βDiTt + εit , (4.2)
where Di assumes value one if the bond i has residual maturity greater than 10 years and
Tt is a time dummy variable, one should expect not to find any statistical significance of β
coefficient, if the selection bias is constant in pre-treatment period.
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results. As expected, the selection bias problem seems
17He found that prices and depths are used as substitutes: a narrow bid-ask spread induces small depth
quotes whereas large depth quotes induce a wide bid-ask spread.
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Sep 15 - Oct 15 Oct 15 - Nov 15 Nov 15 - Dec 15
BA Q PI BA Q PI BA Q PI
β -0.007 0.590 -1.899 0.007 2.426 1.724 0.014 1.460 4.202
SE 0.010 5.085 2.129 0.009 3.708 2.063 0.013 3.353 3.040
p-value 0.481 0.908 0.381 0.458 0.518 0.411 0.297 0.667 0.178
Obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.573 0.706 0.381 0.604 0.809 0.411 0.605 0.839 0.707
Table 4.2: Selection bias time invariant in pre-treatment period. The table shows the
estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n. 4.2 in the section
4.4.3. The selection bias is estimated on three different liquidity measures of the quoting
book: best bid-ask spread (BA), average bid and ask depths (Q) and price impact of a deal
of 20mm (PI). Under each coefficient, standard errors (without any adjustments, in order to
get less conservative estimates of potential risk of selection bias time variant) and p-value
are presented.
not to affect the estimates of the basic models, since β coefficients are not significant in
any couple of months in the pre-treatment period. This result confirms the goodness of the
design of the basic empirical setup, since in the pre-treatment period no significant difference
between the two groups of BTPs is found.
Slow-acting effect
Secondly, the hypothesis that the regulatory change affects immediately market makers
quoting choices without any delayed effect has been tested. Also in this case, three diff-in-
diff models, considering the three couples of months in the post-treatment period (January
2016 – February 2016, February 2016 - March 2016, March 2016 - April 2016), are esti-
mated. The models are the same of the previous robustness check and also in this case one
should expect not to find any statistical significance of β coefficient.
Table 4.3 shows the results of the estimation of β coefficients. The absence of significant
coefficients in the three estimated models suggests that specialists immediately react to the
entry into force of new rules in January and no slow-acting effect is revealed.
The role of market makers not specialists
On MTS Italy, investors are divided into two groups: market makers and market takers.
As mentioned above, among market makers a group of selected dealers act as specialists,
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Jan 16 - Feb 16 Feb 16 - Mar 16 Mar 16 - Apr 16
BA Q PI BA Q PI BA Q PI
β -0.003 -1.402 -0.869 -0.003 0.749 -0.549 -0.002 0.369 -0.699
SE 0.008 4.299 1.864 0.007 5.076 1.510 0.006 5.585 1.419
p-value 0.697 0.747 0.645 0.664 0.884 0.719 0.696 0.948 0.626
Obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.498 0.762 0.659 0.465 0.676 0.698 0.444 0.617 0.677
Table 4.3: Slow acting effect. The table shows the estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel
regressions defined in model n. 4.2 in the section 4.4.3. The slow acting effect is estimated
on three different liquidity measures of the quoting book: best bid-ask spread (BA), average
bid and ask depths (Q) and price impact of a deal of 20mm (PI). Under each coefficient,
standard errors (without any adjustments, in order to get less conservative estimates of slow
acting effect) and p-value are presented.
facing quoting obligations that are set by the Italian Treasury. However, also a group of
operators that are market makers but are not specialists exists. This presence may affect the
analysis conducted in the previous section. The assumption of the basic model, that will
be tested in this section, is that this group of operators, not affected by any rules’ change,
maintains unchanged its quoting behavior across the two groups of BTPs. Since the dataset
does not allow to directly identify proposals of market makers and specialists, we introduce
the analysis with some descriptive statistics and then we provide a formal test about this
potential disturbance.
Firstly, some descriptive statistics on quoting books and trading activity could help to
identify the dimension of this disturbance. Looking at the trading side, the market share
of volumes traded as fillers18 of these operators is 7,23% on all the segments of Italian
government bonds (BOT, CTZ, CCT, BPT) and 8,44% if the sample of the fifteen bonds
is considered19. Looking at the quoting activity, using the entire database of the 16296
observations (the snapshots of the books at 5 minute frequency in 168 trading days) on
the fifteen bonds, the average number of proposals is 20.16, very close to the number of
specialists. If the assumption about the constant presence in the quoting book of proposals
posted by the specialists is true, this average indicates a negligible contribution of market
18Market maker quotes her proposals (a combination of prices and quantities) that can be filled by investors.
If investors are looking to sell (buy) a security, market makers purchase (sell) that security. Market maker is in
this respect the filler and the investor is the aggressor.
19Information provided directly to the author by MTS.
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makers not specialists in the quoting activity. If one looks at the maximum number of quotes
contemporaneously present in a snapshot, it is 28 for two bonds20 and the average across the
fifteen bonds is 26.46. Note that the difference between the maximum number of quotes and
the number of specialists it is not necessarily only representative of the proposals of market
makers not specialists. A second reason that may implicate an higher number of proposals
is the possibility for specialists to post in the quoting book a second quote for each side of
the market (Mormando, 2017).
In order to formally assess whether market makers not specialists have modified their
quoting behavior, distorting our previous estimates of the causal effect between the new reg-
ulation and liquidity measures, we introduce two more liquidity measures. These measures
are related to the trading volumes, linked to the quoting decisions, of the market makers not
specialist. In more details, the volumes traded as fillers of the entire group of market makers
not specialists and the correspondent proportion calculated on the total trading activity are
used as outcome variables. Even if these are trading measures, these are strictly related to
the quoting activity, the focus of the paper. As a matter of fact, the trading activity as filler
(not as aggressor) is directly linked to quoting behavior: the probability that a proposal of a
market maker will be hit by orders flows is function of the position of this proposal in the
quoting book. Narrower the bid-ask spread, higher the probability to deal as filler.
To assess the role of this group of operators, the previous model 4.1 is estimated. From
these regressions, one should expect not to find any statistical significance of β coefficient,
since this group of market makers has not been affected by any regulatory modification.
As expected, β coefficient is not found significant in both specifications. It means that the
group of simple market makers do not change their quoting behavior on BTPs with different
maturities along the period considered. The result strengthens the conclusion that the causal
effect estimated in section 4.4.2 is related to quoting behavior of specialists, that are affected
by new monitoring and public ranking rules.
20The ISIN code of these two bonds are IT0005094088 and IT0005001547. The table in appendix .9 presents
the details about descriptive statistics of the number of proposals in the quoting book for each bond in the
sample.
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(2)
Vol MM Perc MM
β -12.128 -0.026
SE 8.639 0.018
p-value 0.182 0.175
Covariates yes yes
Obs 120 120
R2 0.415 0.308
Table 4.4: Panel estimates on outcome variables: VolMM and PercMM. The table shows
the estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n. 4.1 in the sec-
tion 4.4.3. The causal effect of regulatory changes is estimated on two different liquidity
measures of the trading activity of market makers that are not in the group of specialists:
volumes traded as filler (Vol MM) and the fraction of these volumes on the total trading
volumes (Perc MM). Under each coefficient, robust standard errors (clustering at the level
of individual bonds) and p-value are presented.
Is there any seasonal bias?
In previous sections, a crucial underlying assumption is that no relevant seasonal ef-
fect exists between the two groups of BTPs during the pre-treatment period (September-
December) and the post-treatment period (January-April). In order to test whether this effect
may invalidate the estimated causal effects of previous sections, the same analysis is con-
ducted on the same period of one year later, from September 2016 to April 2017. Between
these two years, the MEF did not modify in any relevant way the criteria on quoting and
trading activity of specialists on MTS. The more significant change is the reduction of the
maximum score assigned to the best specialist in the QQ Index, from 9 to 8 points. However
this change, differently from the case of 2015-2016 period, has affected the entire group of
BTPs. A second relevant change is linked to the decision of creating new benchmarks for the
maturities of 20 years and 50 years during 2016. The MEF issued for the first time on April
the new 20 years BTP benchmark and on October the new matusalem 50 years BTP. In 2017
criteria, the MEF has integrated the weights for the primary and secondary markets’ criteria
in order to take into consideration the contribution of these two new segments. However,
the previous analysis is not affected by the potential disturbance of these segments since the
selected group of BTPs under treatment is composed by bonds with residual maturity lower
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than 15 years, bonds with a maturity sufficiently far from 20 years.
2016-2017 period is suitable for the purpose to test whether any relevant seasonal effect
exists also because the structure of the Italian Treasury supply and market demand seems
to be unaffected by relevant shocks in the difference between the two segments. As shown
in Table 75 in the Appendix .4.2, the issued amounts of 10y and 15y BTPs is close to the
average of the last 5 years and to the amounts of the same period of 2015-2016. From the
demand side, on 8 December 2016 Governing Council of the ECB decided that from April
2017, the net asset purchases were intended to continue at a reduced monthly pace of e60
billion until the end of December 2017. This change, that covers only marginally the period
analyzed, did not provide any relevant information about differences on net purchase activity
between the two groups of BTPs.
Looking at the test, this section presents the estimates of regression model 4.1, consider-
ing the 1st September 2016 - 28th April 2017 period and selecting bonds that during these
8 months were included in the two classes of BTPs around the 10y maturities: eights bonds
with residual maturity between seven to ten years21 and seven bonds with residual matu-
rity between ten to fifteen years22. In the estimated model, the treatment dummy (changeit)
coincides with a dummy that is equal 1 for observations of 2017 period for bonds with resid-
ual maturity longer than 10 years. The models are estimated using the three basic outcome
variables (bid ask spread, quoted quantity and price impact). The expectations are to find no
relevant causal effect of the dummy, since no relevant change in monitoring criteria occurred.
The Table 4.5 shows the results of the estimated models. In the three specifications,
the null hypotheses of no significance of the dummy have not been rejected. These results
corroborate the validity of the estimated causal effect of monitoring rules’ changes on the
specialists quoting behavior, suggesting that the basic estimates of table 4.1 are not distorted
by any seasonal disturbance.
21Isin codes: IT0005001547, IT0005045270, IT0004513641, IT0005090318, IT0005127086,
IT0004644735, IT0005170839, IT0001086567, IT0005210650.
22Isin codes: IT0001174611, IT0004889033, IT0001278511, IT0005024234, IT000144378,
IT0005094088, IT0003256820.
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(1)
BA Q PI
β 0.002 2.381 0.255
Robust SE 0.002 3.230 0.505
p-value 0.474 0.473 0.622
Covariates yes yes yes
Obs 120 120 120
R2 0.855 0.599 0.826
Table 4.5: Panel estimates on September 2016 - April 2017 period. The table shows the
estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n. 4.1 in the section
4.4.1 with bond and time fixed effects with each observation defining a bond-month. The
hypothetical seasonal effect between September-December 2016 period and January-April
2017 period is estimated on three different liquidity measures of the quoting book: best bid-
ask spread (BA), average bid and ask depths (Q) and price impact of a deal of 20mm (PI).
Under each coefficient, robust standard errors (clustering at the level of individual bonds)
and p-values are presented.
4.5 The role of public rankings as signaling
The previous section has found that a relevant link exists between the set of monitoring
rules, laid down by the Italian Treasury, and the quoting decisions of market makers. This
result suggests that empirical research on MTS Italy should always take into consideration
how these rules may interact with the research topic and whether any changes occur during
the analyzed period.
The results presented in the previous section do not seem to be consistent with the theo-
retic predictions of Kavajecz (1998). In fact, I find a combination of a narrower best bid-ask
spread and an unchanged total depth, whereas Kavajecz found that prices and depths are used
as substitutes. However, a basic difference between Kavajecz framework and this paper is
that Kavajecz studies the behavior of a generic single market makers whereas this analysis
is conducted on the higher perspective of the quoting book, that in the case of MTS Italy is
the strict aggregation of proposals of a selected group of market makers.
In this section I put forward a possible explanation that combines and reconciles the
theoretic microstructure models and the role of public ranking system in pushing the com-
petition among market makers. This role is not strictly related to its compulsory nature but it
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is linked to the strong signaling power for the investors community. In the next paragraphs I
present an hint of theoretical implication of the signaling role of public ranking system and
I propose an empirical application in order to formally test my prediction.
4.5.1 The role of public rankings in the microstructure models
Market microstructure models23 assume that, in a competitive environment, the individ-
ual market maker sets her quotes in order to get at least an expected zero profit level. In these
models, the market maker gains from the markup of the bid and ask prices on the asset’s mid
fair price, whereas the costs are mainly related to fixed components, order processing costs,
inventories control costs and asymmetric information costs. However, market making activ-
ities are carried out by desks of global investment banks or financial intermediaries. These
operators, in order to decide whether to provide liquidity on a specific asset, take into con-
sideration not only the expected direct costs and benefits, but also implicit and indirect ones.
In the case of the market making on the Italian sovereign bonds, specialists benefit quite
homogeneously from their privileges explicitly cited by the MEF in its “Specialist Decree”:
exclusive access to reserved reopenings and to the selection of lead managers of syndicated
issuances or in any other extraordinary transactions. However, the opportunity of being in
the top positions of the public ranking system offers other potential benefits for specialists.
The signaling power of public ranking
Being in the top positions of the public ranking system offers to market operators several
sources of potential returns from this positive signaling.
First, specialists, contributing in the efficiency of the secondary market, improve their
reputation with the national Debt Management Office. This could lead to an higher proba-
bility to be selected as lead managers of syndicated issuances or as counterpart in bilateral
transactions. From the specialist’s perspective, these deals offer a good return in terms of
trading revenues and commission fees. Secondly, since Ministry plays also a role as national
regulator, some banks could consider positively the opportunity to strengthen the relation-
ship with the Ministry, signaling their compliance in providing high liquidity levels in the
market of Italian sovereign bonds.
23We refer to De Jong and Rindi (2009) for an exhaustive literature review.
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Third, being in the top positions of the public ranking provides a signal on the specialist’
skills and compliance in offering good execution service for buy-side or sell-side clients24.
Thus they can use the segment of government bonds, characterized by high competition and
low profitability, to increase fidelity of their customers in execution services in asset classes
with low competition and high margins. Lastly, investment banks define bonuses for the
trading desk or for individual traders linked, not only to the profit and loss performance, but
also to the final ranking position.
Consequently and in summary, the public ranking offers a signaling for investment banks
with the Debt Management Office, the community of buy-side and sell-side investors, and
for traders within their organization.
The model
Using Kavejecz (1998) notation, specialist’s optimization problem is to set her pro-
posal schedule on the bond i in order to maximize profits: the specialist j posts bid and
ask prices bi j, ai j and the quoted bid and ask quantities βi j, αi j. Her expected return
will be Ei j[pi(bi j,βi j,ai j,αi j)], facing direct and indirect costs as asymmetric information,
fixed trading costs, inventory risk. In previous literature, no role for incentives deriving
from the public ranking system exists. The simplest way to consider this potential bene-
fit is to add a positive economic component in the profit maximization problem. Suppose
hi j(γ j,bi j,βi j,ai j,αi j) is the function that describes the expected return to offer liquidity on
a specific asset reaching a top position in the final ranking. Quoted prices and quantities,
bi j,βi j,ai j,αi j, directly affect the individual ranking score: narrower bid-ask spread and
higher quoted depth return, ceteris paribus, higher expected final score in the ranking. The
γ j parameter represents the individual ability to transform the final position in the public
ranking in economic revenues, that are related to higher reputation among the community of
financial investors, marketing activity, direct explicit privileges or cross-subsidies deriving
from the execution services provided to her clients in other asset classes. This parameter is
individual specific since the portfolio of clients of each investment bank, the propensity to
conduct aggressively marketing activities and the interest in final ranking position could be
different among market makers. The final expected return becomes Ei j[pii j()+hi j()].
24The buy-side clients is the community of financial investors, proprietary desk of banks, real money, pen-
sion funds and other kind of investors. The sell-side are typically Debt Management Office of other Countries.
91
In the light of the above, I propose a reconciliation of the signaling of public ranking
with theoretical market models.
Taking the perspective of a generic specialist and following Kavajecz (1998), after the
introduction of the new set of monitoring rules of 2016, market maker may jointly narrow
her quoted bid-ask spread and reduce the quoted depths. By doing that, table 4.6 summarizes
the expected impact on the scores of the criteria of secondary market of a narrow bid-ask
spread and lower quoted quantities. Higher the scores, higher position in the final ranking is
expected by the specialist.
Variable Variation QQI TV NBTF LSC
Qb or Qb ↓ = − = −
Bid-Ask Spread ↓ + + + +
Total + +/− + +/−
Table 4.6: Relation between quoting variables and scores of evaluating criteria. Taking
the perspective of an individual market maker, the table shows how a reduction of quoted
depth or a tighter bid-ask spread, ceteris paribus, affect the expected scores got from the
four evaluation criteria on the secondary market.
When a market maker reduces her quoted depth, ceteris paribus, she reduces the ex-
pected market share in the secondary market (TV) and the contribution in increasing the
traded contracts size (LSC). At the same time, the quoted quantities do not affect QQI and
NBTF indicators. Conversely, narrowing the bid-ask spread, market maker increases scores
in all indexes: quoting more aggressively leads market maker to lower her QQI (but higher
score for the ranking) and to increase volumes traded as filler, leading to higher scores in
TV, NBTF, LSC indicators.
For traditional models, only the removal of minimum quantity of 5mm in the segment
of BTPs with residual maturity longer than 10 years might affect specialists’ behavior (only
this change modifies the set of mandatory obligations for market makers, whereas the other
changes affect the implicit incentives in competing for the ranking). In fact, in these models
there is no role for ranking: competition among specialists should have already led to a
market equilibrium characterized by a zero expected profit for them. Relaxing the rule of
the minimum quantity, market makers may solve their optimization problem, setting their
optimal quantities (that can be lowered up to 2mm, the new minimum size) and prices (the
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bid ask spread may be reduced if they reduce their quoted quantities25).
Introducing potential benefits from the signaling of public ranking, the effects of the
changes in monitoring rules on quoted bid-ask spread and depths could be different. Taking
the perspective of a single market maker, she sets prices and quantities taking into account
also the expected revenues of hi j, linked to the final score in the ranking. The market maker
may choose to reduce proposals’ size in order to compete in tightening the bid-ask spread
and to get an higher score in QQI and NBTF indicators. More precisely, looking at the Table
4.6, decreasing depths and tightening spread in response to the new rules, the total effect
on QQI and NBTF criteria is strictly positive, while the effect on TV and LSC indices is
uncertain. Thus market makers, in order to limit the negative impact of their quoting choices
on TV and LSC indexes, are incentivized to reduce less their quantities with respect the case
without the signaling from the public ranking.
In line with Kavajecz (1998) predictions, higher the propensity of a specialist to compete
in narrowing the bid-ask spread, lower the quoted sizes will be. A market maker that does
not compete in tightening the market, and consequently reduces her expected scores in QQI
and NBTF indexes, should reduce her quantities less than a more competitive market maker
(in terms of bid-ask spread) in order to limit the negative impact on TV and LSC indicators.
Note that it is not of interest to formally determine the optimal strategy of each market maker
in setting her quotes and quantities, the purpose of the paper is just to argue the importance
of taking into account the role of the signaling power of the public ranking in evaluating
market microstructure when monitoring and ranking systems exist.
Variable Traditional models Ranking model
Total quoted depth ↓ = / ↓
Best Bid-Ask Spread = / ↓ ↓
Table 4.7: Changes in ranking system and microstructure models. Taking the quoting
book perspective, the table shows the effect of the variations of monitoring rules over two
liquidity measures (total quoted depth and best bid-ask spread) whether ranking system is
assumed to be considered or not by specialists in their quoting choices.
25Kavajecz, 1998.
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Prediction n.2
Taking the higher perspective of the quoting book, that aggregates the proposals of the
group of specialists, the effect on liquidity measures (total depth and best bid-ask spread) of
the new rules under ranking and no-ranking models are summarized in Table 4.7. If ranking
does not affect market makers’ choices, no effect on best bid-ask spread and a reduction of
quoted depth, close to difference between the two minimum quantities in the two regimes
(3mm) multiplied by the number of specialists, will be found. If the positive incentives of
the signaling of the public ranking are considered, a combination of high level of tightness
and a smaller reduction of quoted depth should be found. This paper hypothesizes that
the public ranking, through its implicit incentives and expected returns from being in the
top positions of the final ranking, links monitoring rules with specialists’ quoting behavior.
Since these returns are heterogeneous among specialists due to the different expected reward
of the signaling power of the public ranking, these benefits are individual based and vary
across the market makers.
In the light of the previous discussion, I can summarize the second testable empirical
prediction.
Prediction 2: Public ranking heterogeneously affects specialists.
The return from high ranking position is uncertainty and heterogeneous since each op-
erator is differently exposed to the potential benefits of the ranking regime (e.g., higher
reputation among the community of financial investors and with other sovereign DMOs, di-
rect explicit privileges or cross-subsidies deriving from the execution services provided to
customers in other asset classes).
In the following sections, the empirical application tests this prediction.
4.5.2 The empirical application
In this section, I test the second prediction and I investigate whether specialists react
differently to the changes of the ranking rules. The results from the starting model suggest
that few market makers have decreased their bid-ask spread, and probably have reduced also
their proposals’ size, in order to compete for market orders flows and for getting higher
scores for the quoting indexes. However, the total effect on the quoted depth is not signifi-
cant, suggesting that market makers have defined different strategies.
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In order to test the second prediction, the previous model 4.1 is estimated on three new
liquidity measures as outcome variables:
1. Variance of quoted prices weighting for correspondent depths in the book (VARit),
2. Volume-weighted bid-ask spread in percentage on the mid quote (VWBAit),
3. Average quoted quantity per proposal in the two top positions of the order book
(A2Bit),
Figure 4.1 shows two examples of quoting book in line with the results got from the
previous section and it helps to understand which contribution in the empirical test might
offer the introduction of these three liquidity measures. For each quoting book and for each
side of the market, the quoted prices (P), the correspondent quantities (Q) and the number of
proposals (N) are shown. The example of the quoting book of 2016 year assumes that only
two operators have modified their quoting strategies from 2015: the most competitive market
maker has reduced the quoted quantities and has narrowed the bid ask spread, whereas the
less competitive increases the quoted depths in order to offset the lower expected score got
from QQ index (since its proposals have moved from the third level to the fourth). The
second book shows a narrower best bid ask spread (9 price ticks vs 15 price ticks), an
unchanged quoted depth of e100 millions and a reduction of the price impact of a deal of
e20 millions (7 price ticks vs 7.5 price ticks).
2015 2016
Figure 4.1: An example of quoting books. The figure on the left shows an example of
quoting book with rules of 2015, the figure on the right shows an example of how the quoting
book may be modified after the changes in market rules of 2016.
I introduce the variance of bid (ask) prices in order to verify whether a greater prices’
dispersion has occurred. Looking at the two examples, the concentration of prices in the
first book is greater than the second, since the most competitive operator is now able to
narrow the bid and ask prices, reducing the quoted quantities. The volume weighted bid
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ask spread is introduced since it is a measure of the global bid ask spread of the book.
In this case, I expect to find a negative relation with the new monitoring rules, but with a
lower impact with respect to the best bid ask spread since the response of market makers are
heterogeneous, with a stronger reaction of those operators that actively compete for being
in the higher prices. Lastly, the average quoted quantity per proposal on the two top prices
is employed to test if only the most competitive operators has chosen to set their proposal
schedule employing the opportunity, offered by the new set of rules, to reduce the quoted
quantities in order to compete in narrowing the bid-ask spread. The result on the quoting
book is that depth at the top levels apparently rarefies, actually it is new quoted volumes in
higher competitive prices that were unable to be quoted with old rules.
(1)
VAR VWBA A2B
β 0.006 -0.012 -0.830
Robust se 0.003 0.003 0.151
p-value 0.057 0.002 0.001
Covariates yes yes yes
Obs 120 120 120
R2 0.324 0.675 0.739
Table 4.8: Panel estimates on outcome variables: VAR, VWBA, A2B. The table shows
the estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n. 4.1 in the section
4.4.1 with bond and time fixed effects with each observation defining a bond-month. The
causal effect of the change in monitoring rules between 2015 and 2016 is estimated on three
different liquidity measures of the quoting book: variance of prices (VAR), volume weighted
bid ask spread (VWBA), average size of proposals in the best two prices (A2B). Under each
coefficient, robust standard errors (clustering at the level of individual bonds) and p-value
are presented.
Table 4.8 shows the results of the estimated regressions. As expected, a significant and
positive impact is found between the regulatory changes and the variance of prices in the
order book. Conversely, a negative and significant causal effects are found between new
rules and the average depth per proposals in the top prices. As expected, this reduction
is due to the choice of the most competitive traders to quote proposals with lower depths.
Lastly, a negative and significant impact is found on the volume weighted bid ask spread.
This effect is lower than the effect on the best bid-ask spread measure: the rules’ change has
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caused a tightening on the best spread of 0.15% (15 price ticks on a bond with actual value
of 100e) whereas the tightening on the volume weighted global spread is found to be around
0.12% (12 price ticks). Combining these results with those found in the basic model, one
can conclude that new monitoring rules have increased the competition among specialists
in tightening the quoting book, signaling their compliance in the liquidity provision. At the
same time, no negative sign of depth depletion in the global liquidity measures is found.
The conclusion on the heterogeneity of the impact across specialists could be enhanced
by other evidences and comments got from our dataset and public rankings published in the
Public Debt website. As a matter of fact, one possible alternative explanation for the results
got from this section is that market makers homogeneously alternate, during a trading day,
more and less aggressive quoting strategies in order to compete for trading flows and ranking.
Actually we argue that the new rules heterogeneously impact different market makers
for the following reasons. Firstly, the rankings, published in the Public Debt website, show
a strong persistence of few specialists in the top positions. In 2015, 2016 and 2017 rank-
ings, the first four specialists are the same, also with the same rank (in Appendix 78 we
show the rankings over the last decade): MPS Capital Services, JP Morgan, Banca Imi and
Unicredit. So, there has not been a real turnover among specialists on the top positions in
2015-2016 period and the heterogeneity in the quoting preferences is a natural and inherent
characteristic among operators.
Secondly, to provide a quantitative demonstration of our argument, we employ the two
time series of the QQ index of the best and the median specialists in the two segment of BTPs
considered in the analysis. QQI measures the contribution of each specialist in narrowing the
market bid-ask spread and it is the exact representation, on a continuous basis, of its quoting
strategy. To calculate the QQI of a generic specialist on a single bond, each position in the
order book is weighted with decreasing coefficients that are in proportion to the position
in the order book with respect to the best price, in order to reward more those dealers that
continuously show the best prices both for the bid and the ask sides26. The higher is the
contribution in tightening the bid-ask spread, the lower is the QQI index. If a specialist
quotes in the best positions both bid and ask prices, its QQI assumes value zero. If he
quotes in the second positions both bid and ask proposals, its QQI assumes value 10 (5+5),
according to values shown in Table 70 in Appendix .5.
26Weights are shown in Table 70, Appendix .5
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Figure 4.2: QQI evolution. In the left chart, selecting the group of BTP with maturity longer
than 10 year, the evolution of the difference of QQI of the best and the median specialist is
shown. Formally QQIMedian,BT P>10y−QQIBest,BT P>10y. In the right chart, the evolution of
the difference of QQI of the best and the median specialist on treated BTP and on control
BTP is shown. Formally (QQIMedian,BT P<10y−QQIBest,BT P<10y)− (QQIMedian,BT P>10y−
QQIBest,BT P>10y).
Selecting BTPs with maturities longer than 10 years, the chart on the left of Figure 4.2
shows the difference between QQI of the median specialist in the ranking and the QQI of
the best specialist during the September 2015 - April 2016 period27. As mentioned above,
the best specialist has a lower QQI with respect the other participants. This difference is
positive. The figure shows a jump in correspondence of the new year. If we assume that
the quoting behavior of the median specialist (that could represent the generic representa-
tive specialist) remains unchanged, this jump highlights that the new monitoring rules have
differently impacted the behavior of the best and the median specialist.
The chart on the right of Figure 4.2 shows the diff-in-diff impact, considering as control
variable the difference between the best and the median specialist on the segment of BTPs
with maturity lower than 10 years28. From this figure, one can conclude that, from 2016,
this difference has become negative. It means that, after the entry into force of the new
monitoring rules, the behavior of the best specialist in the BT P > 10y has strongly changed
with respect the median operator, decreasing more than other specialists its QQI. The new
rules have allowed the best specialist to strongly differentiate its quoting behavior from the
quoting preference of the median specialist.
These quantitative and qualitative arguments lead to consider more likely an heteroge-
27Formally, QQIMedian,BT P>10y−QQIBest,BT P>10y.
28Formally, (QQIMedian,BT P<10y−QQIBest,BT P<10y)− (QQIMedian,BT P>10y−QQIBest,BT P>10y).
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neous impact of the new rules on the whole group of specialist. However, further research,
with a different dataset on individual quotes, could specifically address this research ques-
tion.
4.5.3 Robustness checks
In this paragraph I propose the same robustness checks conducted on the model for test-
ing Prediction n.1: I test the hypothesis of selection bias time invariant before the treatment,
the hypothesis of a delayed effect of the entry into force of the new rules and potential
seasonal effects that can affect the period September-April.
Starting from the first two tests, tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the results got from the tests
about the presence of a selection bias time invariant in the pre-treatment period and a delayed
impact of the new rules during the treatment period. The model of these tests is formalized in
equation 4.2. As expected, both robustness checks confirm the absence of significant coeffi-
cients across the whole group of regressions, suggesting that the specialists has immediately
reacted to the entry into force of new rules without anticipating effects and selection bias
disturbance in the pre-treatment period.
Sep 15 - Oct 15 Oct 15 - Nov 15 Nov 15 - Dec 15
VAR VWBA A2B VAR VWBA A2B VAR VWBA A2B
β 0.009 -0.009 -0.063 -0.005 0.003 0.169 0.005 0.018 -0.224
SE 0.007 0.019 0.146 0.008 0.017 0.140 0.007 0.022 0.145
p-value 0.197 0.644 0.671 0.496 0.847 0.238 0.804 0.418 0.135
Obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.849 0.515 0.402 0.784 0.847 0.354 0.803 0.534 0.327
Table 4.9: Selection bias time invariant in pre-treatment period. The table shows the
estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n. 4.2 in the section
4.4.3. The selection bias is estimated on three different liquidity measures of the quoting
book: variance of quoted prices (VAR), volume weighted bid-ask spread (WVBA) and av-
erage depth per proposals at the best two prices (A2B). Under each coefficient, standard
errors (without any adjustments, in order to get less conservative estimates of potential risk
of selection bias time variant) and p-value are presented.
Lastly, I verify whether any seasonal bias exists in the period from September to April.
As in the case of robustness checks of Prediction 1, I replicate the same analysis of section
4.5.2 considering the September 2016 - April 2017 period.
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Jan 16 - Feb 16 Feb 16 - Mar 16 Mar 16 - Apr 16
VAR VWBA A2B VAR VWBA A2B VAR VWBA A2B
β -0.021 -0.010 0.528 -0.006 -0.005 0.197 -0.008 -0.006 -0.026
SE 0.007 0.018 0.203 0.006 0.015 0.142 0.006 0.015 0.145
p-value 0.005 0.577 0.016 0.297 0.733 0.179 0.194 0.676 0.858
Obs 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.910 0.511 0.875 0.918 0.481 0.911 0.892 0.445 0.884
Table 4.10: Slow acting effect. The table shows the estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel
regressions defined in model n. 4.2 in the section 4.4.3. The slow acting effect is estimated
on three different liquidity measures of the quoting book: variance of quoted prices (VAR),
volume weighted bid-ask spread (WVBA) and average depth per proposals at the best two
prices (A2B). Under each coefficient, standard errors (without any adjustments, in order to
get less conservative estimates of slow acting effect) and p-value are presented.
(1)
VAR VWBA A2B
β -0.006 0.003 0.075
Robust SE 0.004 0.002 0.091
p-value 0.175 0.304 0.423
Covariates yes yes yes
Obs 120 120 120
R2 0.406 0.829 0.621
Table 4.11: Panel estimates on September 2016 - April 2017 period. The table shows the
estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n. 4.1 in the section
4.4.1 with bond and time fixed effects with each observation defining a bond-month. The
hypothetical seasonal effect between September-December 2016 period and January-April
2017 period is estimated on three different liquidity measures of the quoting book: vari-
ance of quoted prices (VAR), volume weighted bid-ask spread (WVBA) and average depth
per proposals at the best two prices (A2B). Under each coefficient, robust standard errors
(clustering at the level of individual bonds) and p-values are presented.
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The results, presented in table 4.11, confirm the absence of any significant seasonal
bias during the eight months of the analysis. In fact,in the three specifications, the null
hypothesis of irrelevance of the dummy have not been rejected. These results corroborate
the conclusions got in the previous section.
4.6 Symmetry between bid and ask sides
This section investigates whether different causal effects on the bid and ask sides could be
found if the analysis is conducted separately. The previous liquidity measures on quoted vol-
umes, on price impact and on variability of prices are computed as averages of the measures
of bid and ask sides. In this section, regression results from models of equation 4.1, using as
outcome variables the liquidity measures (VAR, Q, PI and A2B) computed separately for the
two market sides, are shown. Several hypotheses could lead to different behavior of market
makers on the bid and ask sides. Literature highlights that one of the main reason could be
high inventories control costs (Ho and Stoll, 1983), that could affect, in the intraday activity,
the quoting preferences of market makers. In previous estimated models, the Specialness
variable, that measures the (opportunity) cost to own a negative (positive) net position on a
given BTPs, should control for this crucial source of direct cost for specialists (Corradin and
Maddaloni, 2017).
Table 4.12 shows the results of the estimated models on the causal effect of new market
rules and the effect of the specialness variable on liquidity measures. First, these results are
consistent with the general results got from the aggregated liquidity measures. Variances
both for bid and ask sides are significantly and positively related to the new rules’ set. A
relevant and negative effect is found on A2B in both market sides, with a little stronger effect
on the ask side, and on price impact measures. Lastly, no effect is detected on the total quoted
quantities, consistent with the results got from the basic specification. The specialness is not
found to be a significant variable in these eights specifications. Note that the absence of any
relation on the total quantity is consistent with previous literature (Buti and Rindi, 2012):
even in the case market makers own a large imbalance on a bond’s inventory, they have the
incentive to quote proposals with undisclosed size near to the minimum level, limiting the
difference between depths on the two sides of the market and minimizing their exposure
costs.
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(2)
VAR VAR Q Q A2B A2B PI PI
Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask
β 0.006 0.006 0.623 0.947 -0.812 -0.848 -3.973 -3.990
Robust SE 0.003 0.003 1.762 1.737 0.146 0.169 0.678 0.713
p-value 0.060 0.063 0.728 0.594 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Specialness 0.012 0.017 3.756 2.934 0.264 -1.204 7.431 8.707
Robust SE 0.055 0.052 16.408 14.030 0.752 1.356 5.753 6.151
p-value 0.837 0.741 0.822 0.837 0.730 0.389 0.217 0.178
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
R2 0.463 0.484 0.835 0.839 0.730 0.682 0.700 0.681
Table 4.12: Panel estimates on bid and ask outcome variables: VAR, Q, A2B, PI. The
table shows the estimates of β coefficient of OLS panel regressions defined in model n.
4.1 in the section 4.4.1 with bond and time fixed effects with each observation defining a
bond-month. The causal effect of the change in monitoring rules between 2015 and 2016 is
estimated on four different liquidity measures, separately for bid and ask sides: variance of
bid and ask prices (VAR), average bid and ask depths (Q), average size of proposals in the
best two prices (A2B) and price impact of a deal of 20mm (PI). The impact on these outcome
variables of specialness, defined in section n. 4.4.1, is also shown. Under each coefficient,
robust standard errors (clustering at the level of individual bonds) and p-value are presented.
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4.7 Threshold date analysis
Lastly, an analysis with higher frequency data is conducted in order to verify whether
specialists have adapted their quoting behavior aligned to the first trading day of the new
year. This check verifies the speed of reaction of operators to the new obligations and, if a
positive output is found, this evidence could reinforce the argument that the effects on the
liquidity conditions in the BTPs with longer maturity are strongly related to the monitoring
rules change, since it has been the only relevant event that occurred between the two years.
Formally, the daily averages of the liquidity measures for the control and treatment
groups are computed separately. Then, the Bai and Perron test (Bai and Perron 1998, 2003)
is employed in order to verify whether and when a structural change occurred on the differ-
entiated series between measures of the two groups. The underlying assumption of this test
is that the level of liquidity fluctuates around a stable mean in absence of structural changes,
hypothesis coherent with the results of the previous robustness check. If new market making
rules shift the long-run mean towards a different level, this test detects the dates when the
changes have occurred.
In this robustness check, only measures that have been significantly affected by moni-
toring rules’ change are selected: BA, PI, VAR, VWBA, A2B. In the following figures the
results of the test applied to the five liquidity measures are shown. Each graph shows the
time series of the aggregate liquidity measure for the treatment group (black line), control
group (green line) and the correspondent differentiated serie (blu line in the second box).
The red line in the second box represents the output of Bai and Perron test. The horizontal
segment is the estimated mean for each sub-period. The break dates, binding for a maximum
one breakpoint, are estimated by the Bai and Perron approach with 5 percent significance
level and are also listed in Table 4.13 with the correspondent WD-max statistics of the test.
This robustness check confirms the main results of the previous analyses. Bai and Perron
test detects a perfect alignment between the structural breaks in market making activity and
the new monitoring rules for the level of tightness of the market (BA measure), the price
impact measure and the average proposals’ size in top positions of the book. The signs and
values of the variations are coherent with the results of the previous sections. With respect
the VWBA measure, the test detects a negative effect 16 trading days later the introduction
of the new regulation. Since this liquidity measure aggregates the behavior of the whole
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Liquidity WD-max Critical values
Measure statistic Date 10% 5% 1%
BA 19.4813 04 January 2016 8.02 9.63 13.58
VWBA 15.1614 26 January 2016 8.02 9.63 13.58
PI 19.8343 04 January 2016 8.02 9.63 13.58
VAR 18.2913 14 December 2015 8.02 9.63 13.58
A2B 252.8207 04 January 2016 8.02 9.63 13.58
Table 4.13: Bai and Perron test. The table shows the outcome of Bai and Perron (1998)
test applied to daily averages of five different liquidity measures. The null hypothesis is no
structural break exists, the alternative is bound to one structural break. The WDmax statistics
and the correspondent structural date are shown.
group of specialists, this result reinforces the idea that the responsiveness of market makers
to monitoring rules’ change could be heterogeneous among operators in terms of intensity
and speed of reaction.
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Figure 4.3: Bai and Perron test results. For each liquidity measure, the test with 5 percent
significance level is applied to daily series computed as the difference between the average
liquidity measure of bonds of control group and the average liquidity measure of bonds
of treatment group. Test allows for heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the residuals and
different moment matrices of the regressors across segments.
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4.8 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the role of monitoring rules and specialists’ ranking system
on liquidity conditions of Italian government bonds. The contribution is twofold. To the best
of our knowledge, this is one of the very first studies to statistically assess the impact of the
public ranking on specialists’ quoting preferences. Secondly, I argue and demonstrate that
the positive effect of the monitoring rules and public ranking system on the market liquidity
conditions is not due to the compulsory requirements of monitoring rules, but it is strictly
related to the strong signaling power for the investors community of the public ranking.
The changes in monitoring rules, occurred between 2015 to 2016, has been employed as
an instrument to detect the role of ranking system as a positive externality that may boost
competition among specialists. Looking at the variation in the mandatory quoting obli-
gations, the minimum size of e5 millions, that has to be quoted by market makers, was
removed for a restricted group of BTPs (those with residual maturity longer than 10 years).
These changes, that have entered into force on January 4th 2016, have determined both tem-
poral and individual (in terms of bonds) discontinuities and thus have been suitable for a
diff-in-diff econometric application.
In the first part of the study, I explain in details the features of MTS Italy and the expected
positive effects of the specialists’ ranking regime, set by the Italian Treasury, in order to
improve liquidity in its wholesale market.
Second, I employ the changes in monitoring rules in order to quantify the global effect
of public ranking on the quoting activity and on the related liquidity measures. Then, in the
second part of the paper, I find signs of an heterogeneous response to the new market rules
across market makers. I argue that I find this result since the benefits from being in the top
positions of the public ranking system are closely related to the individual characteristics
of each market maker. Given the same set of compulsory requirements, the response to a
change in monitoring rules may be different across specialists. The individual response is
strictly linked to the potential benefits of signaling its willingness to offer a good liquidity
provision service.
Looking at the results, I find that changes in the monitoring criteria have a significant
impact on the best bid-ask spread, that decreased in response to new market rules, improving
the tightness of the quoting book. At the same time, the volume weighted bid-ask spread
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decreased but the impact was smaller than in the case of best bid-ask spread. No significant
effect on the total quoted depth in the book is found. Looking at the variance of prices,
new rules affected proposals distribution in the top levels of the book. More precisely, the
variance of prices significantly increased, whereas price impact and average quoted size in
top positions decreased in response to new rules. These evidences suggest that the new
market rules have heterogeneously affected the decisions of market makers: few specialists
have reduced their quoted sizes in order to compete in narrowing the best bid-ask spread,
the others have not modified their quoting behavior. The total impact on the quoting book is
an higher level of tightness and no relevant variation on the level of the global depth. New
monitoring rules have globally improved liquidity conditions in treated BTPs.
These results have some important implications for several policy debates. First, I high-
light that ranking regime affects specialists’ behavior. This result implies that, in a pure
specialists market, public ranking system may boost competitiveness among market mak-
ers in providing an high level of liquidity. A strong heterogeneity exists on the structure
and rules of government bonds’ markets of other European Countries. However, the Italian
case is the most suitable framework to analyze how these ranking systems can affect market
makers’ choices since its quoting obligations are applied to a single eligible trading platform
(MTS Italy) and annually the first five positions of the ranking are published. The results
of this analysis can be generalized to other markets and to other sovereign issuers. Second,
since an heterogeneous impact among different players is found, a decrease in uncertainty
about potential privileges and benefits could help the principal (in this case, the Italian Trea-
sury) to obtain a more homogeneous response among market participants. Further research
could formally assess the specialists’ optimization problem and could identify the determi-
nants of market makers’ quoting choices taking into account the impact of ranking system,
disentangling the impact of explicit and implicit incentives.
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Appendix A. Definitions and abbreviations
Aggressor: the party in a trade that initiates the deal. The aggressor works with the
market maker, who posts the bid and quotes and takes a passive role in the execution of the
deal.
Ask price: it represents the minimum price that the investors has to pay to buy the
security. From the market makers’ perspective, the ask price is the minimum price at which
they are willing to offer the security to the investors.
Bid price: it represents the maximum price that the investors receive if they sell the
security. From the market makers’ perspective, the bid price is the maximum price that they
are willing to pay to buy the security from the investors.
Block trade/order: it is an order or trade submitted by the investors for the sale or
purchase of a large quantity of security.
Carry trade: a trading strategy that involves borrowing at a low interest rate and invest-
ing in an asset that provides a higher rate of return. Typically, the borrowing cost is linked
to risk-free rate and to inflation expectations.
CDS: Credit Default Swap. CDS are contracts whereby one party guarantees to a bond
holder the principal repayment as well as the interest payments in case the issuer of the bond
(the reference entity) defaults or experiences another credit event. In exchange for such
protection, the CDS buyer ensures a constant payment over time, the CDS spread.
Depth: liquidity dimension that indicates the quantity available for trade on each side of
the book.
DMO: Debt Management Office.
EC: European Commission.
Filler: the party in a trade that satisfies the execution of a deal initiated by the aggressor.
Typically, the market maker is the filler in a deal.
i
Inside quote: it represents the best bid or ask prices of the quoting book. The inside
quote is the prices at which market order will be executed.
Market maker: the dealer who is active on trading venues, on a continuous basis, and
willing to negotiate as a direct counterparty in buying and selling of financial instruments
at prices set by the same. Once an order is received from a buyer (seller), market maker
immediately sells (buys) the security at its ask (bid) prices.
Market order: an investor makes a market order that guarantees the immediacy of exe-
cution at current market price.
On-the-run (bond): it is the most recently issued BTP of a particular maturity. The
opposite is off-the-run, which refers to a bond that has been issued before the most recent
issue and are still outstanding.
Quoting book: the market place where the quotes of market makers are aggregated and
are organized follow the market rules.
Repo: a repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of short-term borrowing for dealers in
government securities. For the party selling the security and agreeing to repurchase it in the
future, is a repo. For the party on the other end of the transaction, it is a reverse repurchase
agreement. Repo market allows investors to implicitly finance its buying and market makers
to short-sell the bond in the cash market.
Reserved reopenings of government bond auctions: reserved reopenings give to the
Specialists the right to buy predetermined additional quantities of the issued bond at the
price settled at the auction. The application deadline is fixed at 3.30 p.m. of the business day
following the auction. Thus it represents a free call option on the issued bond.
Naked CDS: the purchase of CDS by a buyer that is not actually exposed to the credit
risk of the corresponding reference entity. This type of contract is called naked CDS in
the sense that it is devoid of the real need to cover an effective credit risk exposure of the
protection buyer.
Specialist: bank or investment company, selected by Italian Treasury among those that
operates as market makers in the Italian government bonds, that faces other duties on primary
and repo markets.
Resiliency: liquidity dimension that indicates how much prices move in response to a
trade.
SCDS: Sovereign Credit Default Swap.
ii
Short selling: short selling is the sale, carried out in respect to one or more third-parties,
of securities not owned directly by the seller. The short seller, not being in possession of the
bond, must borrow it from a broker and, within a certain deadline, he buys back to return it.
Usually, interests shall be paid annually to the broker in relation to the duration of the short
sale. Short seller benefits if the stock price has a bearish trend. In fact, if after the sale of
the asset at the price P1, the price drops to P2 (< P1), the bearish, being able to buy back the
asset at a price P2 to return it to the broker, has a gain equal to the difference between P1
and P2 and the interest paid. For the short seller, this is the direct effect, but there is another
indirect effect for him. In fact, the signal that is sent to the market through a massive sale of
a security could represent a negative expectation on asset price. If other investors decide to
follow the bearish strategy, it can lead to a downward spiral that amplifies the negative trend
of the securities. Therefore, the importance of limiting the contagion effect on government
bonds is a determinant aspect to restore stability in the markets.
Stub quote: order placed well off the fair market price.
Tick size: it is the minimum price movement of a trading instrument.
Tightness: liquidity dimension that indicates how far transaction prices diverge from
mid market prices.
Trading vanues: regulated markets and multilateral trading systems.
iii

Appendix B. Chapter 2
.1 Panel analysis
.1.1 Variables manipulation.
Variables Original frequency Method of frequency conversion
Bond Spread Daily Period average
SCDS Spread Daily Period average
Bond Liquidity Daily Period average
Euribor 3 month Daily Period average
International risk aversion Daily Period average
Idiosyncratic volatility Daily Period average
EVZ Index Daily Period average
Counterparty risk Daily Period average
Debt-to-GDP ratio Quarterly Linear interpolation
GDP Growth Quarterly Linear interpolation
Inflation expectations Daily Period average
CDS Liquidity Daily Period average
CDS net amount to CDS gross amount ratio Weekly Period average
Repo specialness Daily Period average
Table 14: List of variables used in panel regression analysis and their manipulation.
v
.1.2 Descriptive statistics and charts of Country-specific variables.
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 1.772 0.459 4.227 1.154 0.926 1.323 2.491
Spain 1.835 -0.078 5.021 1.530 0.783 1.671 2.691
Germany -0.325 -0.697 -0.151 0.016 -0.363 -0.285 -0.236
France 0.206 -0.236 0.828 0.052 0.059 0.154 0.334
Portugal 3.816 0.127 11.167 8.933 1.456 3.154 5.382
Netherlands -0.013 -0.292 0.382 0.017 -0.092 -0.022 0.068
Austria 0.173 -0.274 0.771 0.052 0.066 0.120 0.245
Belgium 0.545 -0.124 2.242 0.201 0.255 0.470 0.686
Finland -0.046 -0.327 0.381 0.019 -0.097 -0.052 -0.017
Ireland 2.713 0.178 8.995 4.359 1.262 1.857 4.574
Table 15: Descriptive statistics of bond spread
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 2.140 0.693 5.438 1.605 1.194 1.722 2.670
Spain 2.151 0.641 5.927 1.810 0.936 2.058 2.827
Germany 0.421 0.145 1.036 0.058 0.228 0.360 0.497
France 0.807 0.221 2.155 0.265 0.461 0.695 0.865
Portugal 4.103 0.520 12.174 11.336 1.549 3.211 5.191
Netherlands 0.532 0.184 1.229 0.084 0.323 0.454 0.593
Austria 0.787 0.222 2.066 0.276 0.354 0.667 0.992
Belgium 1.084 0.344 3.289 0.624 0.474 0.725 1.443
Finland 0.367 0.176 0.844 0.034 0.237 0.288 0.404
Ireland 2.937 0.470 9.297 5.840 1.256 1.824 5.512
Table 16: Descriptive statistics of CDS spread
vi
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 0.340 0.089 1.081 0.031 0.231 0.352 0.394
Spain 0.482 0.126 1.562 0.116 0.229 0.357 0.676
Germany 0.188 0.074 1.432 0.033 0.113 0.141 0.188
France 0.313 0.109 1.457 0.058 0.138 0.181 0.451
Portugal 2.180 0.291 9.096 4.622 0.660 1.187 2.938
Netherlands 0.410 0.098 2.115 0.090 0.263 0.327 0.425
Austria 0.846 0.103 3.443 0.406 0.390 0.702 1.172
Belgium 0.509 0.136 1.845 0.148 0.221 0.388 0.633
Finland 0.533 0.142 2.898 0.242 0.228 0.345 0.616
Ireland 1.632 0.077 4.747 2.550 0.143 1.146 3.022
Table 17: Descriptive statistics of bond liquidity measure
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 121.103 101.867 137.628 79.284 115.250 118.900 128.950
Spain 73.071 38.300 100.690 369.489 56.567 72.367 91.900
Germany 75.793 65.033 80.700 14.170 73.700 76.233 78.950
France 86.504 67.633 99.213 61.886 81.650 87.783 92.400
Portugal 110.173 70.933 134.984 440.606 90.517 114.517 130.083
Netherlands 62.615 50.900 70.416 23.602 58.833 62.050 67.617
Austria 80.828 67.800 86.300 15.471 81.000 82.050 82.800
Belgium 104.340 91.633 110.900 17.772 101.833 104.417 108.100
Finland 49.146 31.400 62.400 62.958 45.550 48.433 55.600
Ireland 96.689 40.633 125.300 634.595 75.900 107.033 117.633
Table 18: Descriptive statistics of debt to gdp ratio
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy -0.270 -3.017 0.731 0.631 -0.623 -0.066 0.315
Spain -0.139 -1.600 1.000 0.333 -0.533 -0.100 0.283
Germany 0.212 -4.500 2.000 1.152 0.117 0.350 0.750
France 0.114 -1.600 1.200 0.300 -0.017 0.133 0.500
Portugal -0.225 -2.300 1.000 0.610 -0.750 0.000 0.400
Netherlands 0.012 -3.300 1.200 0.547 -0.200 0.133 0.467
Austria 0.127 -1.600 1.100 0.334 -0.017 0.200 0.300
Belgium 0.173 -2.100 1.000 0.327 0.033 0.300 0.400
Finland -0.190 -6.900 2.800 1.968 -0.400 0.000 0.383
Ireland 0.376 -4.100 4.700 2.128 -0.483 0.367 1.433
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of gdp growth rate
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Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 8.426 0.752 21.766 21.975 5.089 7.432 11.838
Spain 6.357 -2.381 28.607 28.021 2.734 5.670 8.015
Germany 3.426 -4.185 11.529 7.417 1.708 3.396 4.812
France 4.234 0.492 12.551 5.485 2.492 3.631 5.296
Portugal 2.756 -19.004 17.565 40.895 -0.461 3.884 6.350
Netherlands 1.573 -1.244 11.571 4.324 0.559 1.081 1.978
Austria 6.251 -2.136 24.737 21.702 3.037 5.610 8.310
Belgium 0.979 -8.585 6.222 6.912 -0.256 1.038 2.646
Finland 3.295 -2.904 13.892 11.833 0.760 2.680 5.636
Ireland 3.434 -7.276 16.968 18.596 0.808 2.637 5.306
Table 20: Descriptive statistics of idiosyncratic volatility index
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 3.500 1.487 9.705 3.667 2.071 2.696 4.436
Spain 4.062 1.817 12.294 5.834 2.256 3.146 5.350
Germany 9.946 3.654 29.949 27.619 5.872 8.786 12.704
France 6.425 2.393 23.099 19.397 3.552 4.672 8.753
Portugal 5.517 1.747 12.966 6.980 3.514 5.086 6.788
Netherlands 11.807 4.660 29.826 35.253 7.345 10.078 14.259
Austria 8.803 3.632 22.474 22.715 4.979 6.904 11.760
Belgium 6.777 1.931 15.583 7.373 4.461 6.455 8.605
Finland 13.904 5.333 24.115 17.644 10.626 14.576 16.891
Ireland 6.639 2.447 17.399 12.773 3.579 5.936 8.453
Table 21: Descriptive statistics of CDS liquidity
Country Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Italy 0.076 0.041 0.121 0.001 0.051 0.066 0.107
Spain 0.097 0.047 0.217 0.002 0.055 0.089 0.132
Germany 0.152 0.080 0.262 0.003 0.096 0.167 0.191
France 0.145 0.062 0.258 0.003 0.081 0.162 0.197
Portugal 0.090 0.031 0.200 0.002 0.045 0.077 0.130
Netherlands 0.144 0.075 0.331 0.004 0.093 0.123 0.166
Austria 0.129 0.065 0.302 0.004 0.074 0.100 0.181
Belgium 0.124 0.047 0.300 0.005 0.061 0.087 0.194
Finland 0.158 0.090 0.391 0.004 0.116 0.136 0.167
Ireland 0.096 0.025 0.265 0.004 0.046 0.080 0.127
Table 22: Descriptive statistics of CDS net amount to CDS gross amount
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Variable P-value Phillips-Perron test
Bond spread 0.032
SCDS 0.433
Basis 0.013
Bond liquidity 0.000
CDS liquidity 0.048
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.001
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.002
GDP growth 0.016
CDS net amount to CDS gross amount ratio 0.000
Repo specialness 0.000
Table 23: Testing for unit root in the set of variables
The table shows the outputs of the Fisher type test (Phillips-Perron) for the presence of unit
root. The null hyphotesis of the test is that all the panels contain unit roots.
.1.3 Descriptive statistics and charts of common variables.
Variable Mean Min Max Variance P25 P50 P75
Euribor 3m 0.7581 -0.0140 4.0290 0.5122 0.2155 0.6715 1.0675
Evz index 11.7664 5.0650 23.9420 15.9851 8.8645 11.4195 13.7050
Global risk aversion -4.5377 -11.8140 3.5740 7.1099 -6.3665 -4.2690 -2.9330
Counterparty risk 1.407 0.603 2.859 0.387 0.955 1.243 1.861
Inflation expectations 3.2194 0.8360 4.6780 1.0062 2.5985 3.1330 4.2385
Table 24: Descriptive statistics of common variables across countries
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.1.4 Analysis on correct specification of panel analysis
Model Specification Subsample P-value
Bond Per+Core 0.000
CDS Per+Core 0.000
Basis Per+Core 0.053
Bond Per 0.001
2.1 Bond Core 0.000
CDS Per 0.000
CDS Core 0.000
Basis Per 0.051
Basis Core 0.000
Bond Per+Core 0.000
2.4 CDS Per+Core 0.000
Basis Per+Core 0.051
Bond Per+Core 0.001
2.5 CDS Per+Core 0.000
Basis Per+Core 0.047
Table 25: Fixed or random effects. Hausman test.
The table shows the output of Hausman test for the model estimated with equations 2.1, 2.4
and 2.5. The null hypothesis is that the random effect is the appropriate specification.
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Model Specification Subsample P-value
Bond Per+Core 0.001
CDS Per+Core 0.000
Basis Per+Core 0.003
Bond Per 0.000
2.1 Bond Core 0.066
CDS Per 0.091
CDS Core 0.053
Basis Per 0.000
Basis Core 0.000
Bond Per+Core 0.002
2.4 CDS Per+Core 0.001
Basis Per+Core 0.000
Bond Per+Core 0.000
2.5 CDS Per+Core 0.040
Basis Per+Core 0.001
Table 26: Time fixed effects. Wald test.
The table shows the output of Wald test for the model estimated with equations 2.1, 2.4 and
2.5. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients for all time-dummies are jointly equal to
zero.
Model Specification Subsample P-value LLC test P-value Phillips-Perron test
Bond Per+Core 0.000 0.000
CDS Per+Core 0.111 0.078
Basis Per+Core 0.002 0.000
Bond Per 0.001 0.000
2.1 Bond Core 0.107 0.012
CDS Per 0.538 0.371
CDS Core 0.310 0.131
Basis Per 0.000 0.000
Basis Core 0.000 0.000
Bond Per+Core 0.001 0.002
2.4 CDS Per+Core 0.110 0.076
Basis Per+Core 0.002 0.001
Bond Per+Core 0.000 0.000
2.5 CDS Per+Core 0.002 0.000
Basis Per+Core 0.000 0.000
Table 27: Testing for autocorrelation residuals.
The table shows the outputs of two autocorrelation tests on the estimated residuals: the
Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test and Fisher type test (Phillips-Perron). Both tests have the null
hyphotesis that is all the panels contain unit roots.
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Figure 4: Graphic representation of Country-specific time series
xii
Figure 5: Graphic representation of common across sample time series
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.2 Price discovery analysis
.2.1 Dickey Fuller test for stationarity analysis of time series in levels
and in first differences.
LAGS IT SP GER FR POR NET AU BEL FIN IRL CR. VALUE
22 -0.958 -0.673 -1.691 -1.477 -0.428 -1.312 -1.588 -0.993 -1.270 -0.703 -2.832
21 -1.019 -0.72 -1.668 -1.538 -0.42 -1.312 -1.583 -1.076 -1.281 -0.719 -2.833
20 -0.99 -0.702 -1.668 -1.508 -0.411 -1.267 -1.507 -1.104 -1.246 -0.670 -2.834
19 -0.944 -0.701 -1.643 -1.378 -0.443 -1.292 -1.381 -1.087 -1.177 -0.590 -2.835
18 -1.015 -0.713 -1.633 -1.333 -0.461 -1.315 -1.335 -1.139 -1.116 -0.666 -2.835
17 -1.068 -0.693 -1.71 -1.342 -0.543 -1.366 -1.433 -1.144 -1.153 -0.718 -2.836
16 -1.075 -0.685 -1.73 -1.27 -0.545 -1.444 -1.476 -1.093 -1.190 -0.674 -2.837
15 -1.074 -0.683 -1.78 -1.139 -0.599 -1.461 -1.452 -1.039 -1.225 -0.682 -2.838
14 -1.122 -0.702 -1.92 -1.24 -0.628 -1.568 -1.552 -1.105 -1.355 -0.714 -2.839
13 -1.162 -0.784 -1.818 -1.425 -0.654 -1.606 -1.700 -1.195 -1.398 -0.687 -2.84
12 -1.097 -0.762 -1.772 -1.488 -0.699 -1.686 -1.748 -1.264 -1.469 -0.652 -2.84
11 -1.026 -0.735 -1.79 -1.591 -0.848 -1.855 -1.802 -1.361 -1.567 -0.687 -2.841
10 -0.907 -0.701 -1.862 -1.593 -0.935 -1.905 -1.797 -1.276 -1.582 -0.747 -2.842
9 -0.956 -0.742 -1.828 -1.66 -0.885 -1.857 -1.783 -1.327 -1.547 -0.706 -2.843
8 -1.023 -0.796 -1.784 -1.565 -0.983 -1.815 -1.620 -1.328 -1.481 -0.804 -2.844
7 -1.068 -0.839 -1.914 -1.511 -0.98 -1.746 -1.528 -1.408 -1.510 -0.804 -2.844
6 -1.113 -0.889 -2.044 -1.683 -0.952 -1.778 -1.590 -1.422 -1.475 -0.879 -2.845
5 -1.125 -0.964 -2.088 -1.836 -0.888 -1.834 -1.694 -1.478 -1.543 -0.922 -2.846
4 -1.202 -1.025 -2.098 -1.926 -0.844 -1.863 -1.787 -1.635 -1.553 -0.921 -2.847
3 -1.238 -1.165 -2.159 -1.83 -1.111 -1.853 -1.862 -1.659 -1.558 -0.910 -2.847
2 -1.302 -1.308 -2.377 -2.023 -1.077 -2.026 -2.084 -1.844 -1.707 -0.933 -2.848
1 -1.501 -1.415 -2.562 -2.082 -1.061 -2.117 -2.115 -1.893 -1.760 -0.895 -2.849
Table 28: Stationarity analysis. Dickey Fuller Test. Variable: bond spread, levels.
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LAGS IT SP GER FR POR NET AU BEL FIN IRL CR. VALUE
22 -1.145 -0.937 -1.669 -1.258 -0.777 -1.625 -1.475 -1.276 -1.848 -0.730 -2.832
21 -1.09 -0.942 -1.633 -1.168 -0.745 -1.541 -1.486 -1.127 -1.718 -0.700 -2.833
20 -1.094 -0.931 -1.605 -1.204 -0.792 -1.557 -1.500 -1.169 -1.743 -0.726 -2.834
19 -1.065 -0.897 -1.517 -1.064 -0.759 -1.511 -1.538 -1.129 -1.783 -0.764 -2.835
18 -1.061 -0.914 -1.577 -1.074 -0.932 -1.492 -1.582 -1.181 -1.856 -0.825 -2.835
17 -1.077 -0.906 -1.616 -1.055 -0.892 -1.451 -1.556 -1.170 -1.869 -0.860 -2.836
16 -1.011 -0.867 -1.567 -1.001 -0.828 -1.356 -1.533 -1.160 -1.828 -0.807 -2.837
15 -1.037 -0.829 -1.482 -0.986 -0.877 -1.312 -1.567 -1.108 -1.821 -0.792 -2.838
14 -1.08 -0.875 -1.42 -0.954 -0.866 -1.266 -1.535 -1.063 -1.711 -0.802 -2.839
13 -1.177 -0.894 -1.527 -1.006 -0.893 -1.228 -1.570 -1.082 -1.698 -0.824 -2.84
12 -1.183 -0.925 -1.499 -1.053 -0.915 -1.277 -1.714 -1.135 -1.693 -0.824 -2.84
11 -1.17 -0.856 -1.489 -1.036 -0.92 -1.188 -1.817 -1.085 -1.634 -0.738 -2.841
10 -1.175 -0.917 -1.485 -0.999 -0.997 -1.159 -1.750 -1.075 -1.653 -0.816 -2.842
9 -1.183 -0.937 -1.432 -1.031 -1.009 -1.174 -1.672 -1.103 -1.633 -0.915 -2.843
8 -1.19 -0.939 -1.433 -1.047 -1.046 -1.25 -1.629 -1.082 -1.630 -0.949 -2.844
7 -1.258 -0.961 -1.379 -1.041 -1.067 -1.249 -1.641 -1.123 -1.637 -1.008 -2.844
6 -1.284 -0.972 -1.324 -1.048 -1.037 -1.26 -1.612 -1.057 -1.667 -1.044 -2.845
5 -1.274 -1.018 -1.29 -1.073 -0.998 -1.259 -1.640 -1.090 -1.625 -1.145 -2.846
4 -1.332 -1.025 -1.329 -1.115 -0.927 -1.277 -1.601 -1.141 -1.670 -1.084 -2.847
3 -1.36 -1.175 -1.331 -1.146 -1.003 -1.366 -1.562 -1.187 -1.710 -1.071 -2.847
2 -1.471 -1.301 -1.446 -1.307 -1.174 -1.412 -1.577 -1.359 -1.712 -1.090 -2.848
1 -1.619 -1.449 -1.373 -1.283 -1.161 -1.39 -1.522 -1.397 -1.812 -1.076 -2.849
Table 29: Stationarity analysis. Dickey Fuller Test. Variable: CDS spread, levels.
LAGS IT SP GER FR POR NET AU BEL FIN IRL CR. VALUE
22 -2.715 -3.063 -2.36 -1.921 -4.862 -2.112 -2.005 -2.328 -2.051 -3.595 -2.832
21 -2.738 -3.103 -2.295 -1.908 -5.126 -2.054 -1.997 -2.333 -2.017 -3.792 -2.833
20 -2.763 -3.151 -2.205 -1.901 -5.497 -2.002 -1.978 -2.345 -1.980 -3.895 -2.834
19 -2.916 -3.332 -2.148 -1.886 -5.941 -1.953 -1.963 -2.404 -1.940 -4.216 -2.835
18 -3.126 -3.504 -2.09 -1.883 -6.223 -1.937 -1.981 -2.527 -1.913 -4.733 -2.835
17 -3.165 -3.665 -2.042 -1.895 -6.621 -1.924 -2.015 -2.588 -1.899 -4.708 -2.836
16 -3.233 -3.932 -2.026 -1.916 -6.687 -1.921 -2.024 -2.713 -1.903 -4.764 -2.837
15 -3.39 -4.214 -2.002 -1.978 -7.216 -1.926 -2.055 -2.953 -1.919 -5.221 -2.838
14 -3.583 -4.53 -1.984 -2.117 -7.485 -1.942 -2.125 -3.270 -1.943 -5.516 -2.839
13 -3.702 -4.836 -1.982 -2.174 -7.946 -1.953 -2.151 -3.430 -1.948 -5.734 -2.84
12 -3.851 -4.958 -1.959 -2.177 -8.493 -1.99 -2.154 -3.558 -1.981 -6.289 -2.84
11 -4.262 -5.465 -1.969 -2.263 -8.981 -2.026 -2.209 -3.738 -2.014 -7.017 -2.841
10 -4.814 -6.132 -2.009 -2.337 -8.723 -2.03 -2.275 -3.880 -2.044 -7.444 -2.842
9 -5.758 -7.051 -2.059 -2.521 -8.843 -2.095 -2.402 -4.510 -2.135 -7.741 -2.843
8 -6.302 -7.79 -2.154 -2.676 -9.983 -2.221 -2.564 -4.928 -2.279 -8.851 -2.844
7 -6.875 -8.624 -2.34 -3.088 -10.149 -2.41 -2.974 -5.628 -2.527 -9.048 -2.844
6 -7.693 -9.749 -2.484 -3.637 -11.157 -2.705 -3.508 -6.237 -2.758 -10.088 -2.845
5 -8.743 -11.164 -2.694 -3.997 -12.668 -3.046 -4.028 -7.324 -3.200 -10.664 -2.846
4 -10.396 -12.871 -3.065 -4.489 -15.132 -3.488 -4.651 -8.640 -3.652 -11.632 -2.847
3 -12.266 -15.422 -3.768 -5.317 -18.608 -4.24 -5.620 -9.884 -4.493 -13.329 -2.847
2 -15.499 -18.11 -5.039 -7.35 -18.344 -5.724 -7.269 -12.621 -6.035 -15.817 -2.848
1 -20.87 -22.168 -7.212 -9.967 -23.029 -7.971 -9.411 -15.683 -8.408 -18.982 -2.849
Table 30: Stationarity analysis. Dickey Fuller Test. Variable: bond spread, first differences.
xv
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22 -8.713 -8.658 -8.071 -7.809 -9.885 -7.348 -9.302 -7.751 -8.114 -9.492 -2.832
21 -9.146 -8.914 -7.922 -7.937 -9.979 -7.565 -9.353 -7.894 -8.026 -10.109 -2.833
20 -9.744 -9.11 -8.221 -8.569 -10.581 -8.049 -9.558 -8.966 -8.809 -10.736 -2.834
19 -9.995 -9.435 -8.505 -8.551 -10.501 -8.117 -9.757 -8.917 -8.922 -10.828 -2.835
18 -10.513 -9.965 -9.127 -9.608 -11.177 -8.483 -9.819 -9.421 -8.965 -10.809 -2.835
17 -10.893 -10.15 -9.029 -9.803 -10.024 -8.748 -9.858 -9.325 -8.854 -10.564 -2.836
16 -11.157 -10.553 -9.032 -10.22 -10.68 -9.155 -10.329 -9.664 -9.025 -10.569 -2.837
15 -12.159 -11.272 -9.502 -10.956 -11.667 -9.936 -10.836 -10.029 -9.470 -11.484 -2.838
14 -12.457 -12.098 -10.247 -11.48 -11.657 -10.51 -11.011 -10.779 -9.793 -12.132 -2.839
13 -12.648 -12.205 -10.967 -12.238 -12.264 -11.177 -11.674 -11.587 -10.763 -12.559 -2.84
12 -12.376 -12.604 -10.637 -12.294 -12.544 -11.899 -11.915 -11.907 -11.264 -12.893 -2.84
11 -12.907 -12.924 -11.179 -12.42 -12.913 -11.979 -11.406 -11.949 -11.782 -13.560 -2.841
10 -13.699 -14.427 -11.669 -13.168 -13.534 -13.315 -11.194 -13.011 -12.810 -15.649 -2.842
9 -14.456 -14.627 -12.185 -14.288 -13.403 -14.35 -12.095 -13.849 -13.357 -15.582 -2.843
8 -15.313 -15.392 -13.183 -14.824 -14.018 -15.091 -13.263 -14.374 -14.364 -15.232 -2.844
7 -16.374 -16.576 -13.879 -15.665 -14.442 -15.255 -14.417 -15.638 -15.422 -15.581 -2.844
6 -16.91 -17.766 -15.27 -16.98 -15.126 -16.385 -15.277 -16.326 -16.607 -16.229 -2.845
5 -18.133 -19.487 -17.067 -18.483 -16.654 -17.659 -16.776 -18.878 -17.849 -17.043 -2.846
4 -20.279 -21.202 -19.2 -20.17 -18.806 -19.493 -18.005 -20.587 -20.484 -17.092 -2.847
3 -22.171 -24.498 -20.93 -22.199 -22.528 -21.687 -20.588 -22.608 -22.830 -19.774 -2.847
2 -25.564 -26.206 -24.116 -25.485 -24.763 -23.489 -24.486 -25.767 -26.566 -22.739 -2.848
1 -29.269 -29.789 -26.656 -27.585 -25.864 -27.243 -29.927 -27.538 -34.699 -26.587 -2.849
Table 31: Stationarity analysis. Dickey Fuller Test. Variable: CDS spread, first differences.
.3 Panel Var Analysis
.3.1 Eigenvalues analysis
Model Eigenvalue Real Imaginary Modulus
Entire 1 0.956 0 0.956
period 2 0.729 0 0.729
Pre 1 0.974 0 0.974
Ban 2 0.789 0 0.789
Post 1 0.865 0 0.865
Ban 2 0.177 0 0.177
Table 32: Eigenvalues condition of panel var models.
The table shows the output of the test on the stability condition of panel var estimates of
equation 2.3. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients for all time-dummies are jointly
equal to zero.
.3.2 IRFs
xvi
Figure 6: Impulse Response Fuction - Panel Var
Figure 7: Impulse Response Fuction - Panel Var. Before entry into force ban on naked CDS
xvii
Figure 8: Impulse Response Fuction - Panel Var. After entry into force ban on naked CDS
xviii
Appendix C. Chapter 3
.4 Structural breaks analysi
.4.1 Dataset manipulation.
Dataset Description Original frequency Filter Transformation to daily ts
Quoting Snapshots of the MTS quoting book Five minute 1. Exclusion of quotes far more Daily averages
between 9.00am and 5.00pm than 200 tick prices from the best price.
of the BTP 10 year benchmark 2. Thompson’s Tau method.
Trading Full list of the deals on MTS - - Daily cumulative
of each trading day on the - trading volumes
BTP 10 year benchmark
Table 33: Dataset manipulation
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.4.2 Bai and Perron test
Best bid-ask spread (BBA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Difference between best ask price and best bid price.
Figure 9: Bai and Perron test - Best bid-ask spread (bps)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 8 Jun-06 Oct-06 Jul-07 Mar-08 Jul-11 Jan-12 Oct-12 Nov-16
I Per 8 Apr-06 Jul-06 Oct-06 Jul-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jun-09
II Per 4 Jul-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12
III Per 3 Jul-16 Nov-16 Jan-17
Table 34: Bai and Perron test - Best bid-ask spread
xx
Total quoted depth on bid side (VTB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Sum of the volumes quoted on the bid side.
Figure 10: Bai and Perron test - Total quoted depth on bid side (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 7 Jun-06 Nov-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Jul-11 Jan-12 Dec-14
I Per 8 Jun-06 Nov-06 Feb-07 Jun-07 Jun-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-09
II Per 3 Jun-10 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 2 Nov-14 Apr-16
Table 35: Bai and Perron test - Total quoted depth on bid side
xxi
Total quoted depth on ask side (VTA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Sum of the volumes quoted on the ask side.
Figure 11: Bai and Perron test - Total quoted depth on ask side (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Nov-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Sep-08 Jul-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Dec-14 Apr-16
I Per 7 Nov-06 Feb-07 Jun-07 Apr-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-09
II Per 3 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 2 Nov-14 Apr-16
Table 36: Bai and Perron test - Total quoted depth on ask side
xxii
3 best bid quoted depth / Total bid depth (V3TB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the volumes quoted on the three best bid prices to the total depth on
the bid side.
Figure 12: Bai and Perron test - 3 best bid quoted depth / Total bid depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 7 Jul-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Sep-15
I Per 6 Jul-07 Mar-08 May-08 Sep-08 Jun-09 Nov-09
II Per 5 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Dec-11 Jul-12
III Per 6 Mar-13 Jan-13 Jul-13 Oct-14 Sep-15 Feb-17
Table 37: Bai and Perron test - 3 best bid quoted depth / Total bid depth
xxiii
3 best ask quoted depth / Total ask depth (V3TA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the volumes quoted on the three best ask prices to the total depth on
the ask side.
Figure 13: Bai and Perron test - 3 best ask quoted depth / Total ask depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-09 Nov-09 May-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 8 Jun-06 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Jun-09 Sep-09 Nov-09
II Per 0
III Per 7 Feb-13 May-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Sep-15 Mar-17
Table 38: Bai and Perron test - 3 best ask quoted depth / Total ask depth
xxiv
Total bid depth / Theoretical total depth (VTTB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the total volumes quoted on the bid side to theoretical total depth.
Theoretical total depth is defined as the sum of the number of specialists multiplied by 5mm
(the minimum size, defined by Italian Treasury) and the number of the other market makers
multiplied by 2mm (the minimum size, defined by MTS market rules).
Figure 14: Bai and Perron test - Total bid depth / Theoretical total depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Nov-06 Jul-07 May-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jun-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Nov-14
I Per 8 Jun-06 Nov-06 Feb-07 Jul-07 Jun-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jun-09
II Per 3 Jun-10 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 2 Nov-14 Apr-15 Jul-15
Table 39: Bai and Perron test - Total bid depth / Theoretical total depth
xxv
Total ask depth / Theoretical total depth (VTTA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the total volumes quoted on the ask side to theoretical total depth.
Theoretical total depth is defined as the sum of the number of specialists multiplied by 5mm
(the minimum size, defined by Italian Treasury) and the number of the other market makers
multiplied by 2mm (the minimum size, defined by MTS market rules).
Figure 15: Bai and Perron test - Total ask depth / Theoretical total depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Nov-06 Mar-07 Jul-07 Apr-08 Sep-08 Jul-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Nov-14
I Per 8 Jan-06 Feb-07 May-07 Jul-07 Apr-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-09
II Per 3 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 4 Nov-14 Apr-15 Jul-15 Apr-16
Table 40: Bai and Perron test - Total ask depth / Theoretical total depth
xxvi
3 best bid quoted depth / Theoretical total depth (V3TOB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the volumes quoted on the three best bid prices to theoretical total
depth. Theoretical total depth is defined as the sum of the number of specialists multiplied
by 5mm (the minimum size, defined by Italian Treasury) and the number of the other market
makers multiplied by 2mm (the minimum size, defined by MTS market rules).
Figure 16: Bai and Perron test - 3 best bid quoted depth / Theoretical total depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-11 Mar-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 9 Jun-06 Nov-06 Mar-07 May-07 Jul-07 Feb-08 May-08 Sep-08 Mar-09
II Per 6 Jul-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12
III Per 5 Mar-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15
Table 41: Bai and Perron test - 3 best bid quoted depth / Theoretical total depth
xxvii
3 best ask quoted depth / Theoretical total depth (V3TOA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the volumes quoted on the three best ask prices to theoretical total
depth. Theoretical total depth is defined as the sum of the number of specialists multiplied
by 5mm (the minimum size, defined by Italian Treasury) and the number of the other market
makers multiplied by 2mm (the minimum size, defined by MTS market rules).
Figure 17: Bai and Perron test - 3 best ask quoted depth / Theoretical total depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Jul-11 May-13 Oct-14 Apr-15 Aug-15
I Per 9 Nov-06 Mar-07 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Feb-09 Jun-09 Nov-09
II Per 4 Jun-10 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12
III Per 5 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15
Table 42: Bai and Perron test - 3 best ask quoted depth / Theoretical total depth
xxviii
Total number of proposals on bid side (NTB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Total number of proposals quoted on the bid side.
Figure 18: Bai and Perron test - Total number of proposals on bid side
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 7 Jul-07 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Sep-12 Mar-15
I Per 4 Jul-07 Sep-08 Jan-09 Mar-09
II Per 4 Jul-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Sep-12
III Per 4 Mar-14 Aug-14 Nov-14 Mar-15
Table 43: Bai and Perron test - Total number of proposals on bid side
xxix
Total number of proposals on ask side (NTA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Total number of proposals quoted on the ask side.
Figure 19: Bai and Perron test - Total number of proposals on ask side
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 6 Jul-07 Sep-12 Mar-14 Aug-14 Dec-14 Apr-15
I Per 1 Jul-07
II Per 4 Jul-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Sep-12
III Per 4 Mar-14 Aug-14 Dec-14 Apr-15
Table 44: Bai and Perron test - Total number of proposals on ask side
xxx
Number of proposals in the 3 best bid (N3B)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Total number of proposals quoted on the three best bid prices.
Figure 20: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best bid
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 8 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Apr-09 Oct-12 Aug-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 7 Mar-06 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 May-09
II Per 5 Jul-10 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12 Sep-12
III Per 5 Aug-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15 Mar-17
Table 45: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best bid
xxxi
Number of proposals in the 3 best ask (N3A)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Total number of proposals quoted on the three best ask prices.
Figure 21: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best ask
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Apr-09 Sep-12 Mar-13 Jul-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 6 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Apr-09
II Per 6 Jun-10 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Sep-12
III Per 6 Jul-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Apr-15 Jul-15 Aug-15
Table 46: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best ask
xxxii
Number of proposals in the 3 best bid / Total number of bid proposals (N3TB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of number of proposals quoted on the three best bid prices to total
number of proposals on the bid side.
Figure 22: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best bid / Total number of bid
proposals (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jul-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Jun-09 Mar-12 Mar-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 5 Jul-07 Mar-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Jul-09
II Per 5 Aug-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Nov-11 Mar-12
III Per 5 Mar-13 Jun-13 Aug-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
Table 47: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best bid / Total number of bid
proposals
xxxiii
Number of proposals in the 3 best ask / Total number of ask proposals (N3TA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of number of proposals quoted on the three best ask prices to total
number of proposals on the ask side.
Figure 23: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best ask / Total number of ask
proposals (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Jun-06 Jul-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Apr-09 Apr-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 8 Jun-06 Jul-07 Mar-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Jun-09 Sep-09 Nov-09
II Per 1 Sep-10
III Per 5 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15
Table 48: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best ask / Total number of ask
proposals
xxxiv
Total number of bid proposals / Theoretical total number of proposals (NTTB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of number of proposals quoted on the bid side to theoretical number
of proposals. Theoretical number of proposals is the sum of specialists and other market
makers.
Figure 24: Bai and Perron test - Total number of bid proposals / Theoretical total number of
proposals (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 Sep-12 Mar-14 Nov-14 Apr-15 Dec-15
I Per 3 Sep-08 Jan-09 Mar-09
II Per 4 Jul-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Sep-12
III Per 9 Mar-14 Nov-14 Apr-15 Dec-15 Apr-16 Jun-16 Sep-16 Oct-16 Jan-17
Table 49: Bai and Perron test - Total number of bid proposals / Theoretical total number of
proposals
xxxv
Total number of ask proposals / Theoretical total number of proposals (NTTA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of number of proposals quoted on the ask side to theoretical number
of proposals. Theoretical number of proposals is the sum of specialists and other market
makers.
Figure 25: Bai and Perron test - Total number of ask proposals / Theoretical total number of
proposals (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Sep-08 Mar-09 Jul-11 Sep-12 Mar-14 Aug-14 Nov-14 Dec-15 Apr-16
I Per 3 Sep-08 Jan-09 Mar-09
II Per 4 Jul-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Sep-12
III Per 9 Mar-14 Aug-14 Nov-14 Apr-15 Dec-15 Apr-16 Jan-17
Table 50: Bai and Perron test - Total number of ask proposals / Theoretical total number of
proposals
xxxvi
Number of proposals in the 3 best bid / Theoretical total number of proposals (N3TOB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of number of proposals quoted on the three best bid prices to theoreti-
cal number of proposals. Theoretical number of proposals is the sum of specialists and other
market makers.
Figure 26: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best bid / Theoretical total
number of proposals (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Mar-07 Jul-07 Feb-08 Sep-08 Apr-09 Oct-12 Aug-13 Oct-14 Aug-15
I Per 8 Mar-06 Mar-07 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 May-09
II Per 5 Jul-10 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12 Sep-12
III Per 4 Aug-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Aug-15
Table 51: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best bid / Theoretical total
number of proposals
xxxvii
Number of proposals in the 3 best ask / Theoretical total number of proposals (N3TOA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of number of proposals quoted on the three best ask prices to theoreti-
cal number of proposals. Theoretical number of proposals is the sum of specialists and other
market makers.
Figure 27: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best ask / Theoretical total
number of proposals (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Feb-08 Sep-08 Apr-09 Sep-12 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-14 Apr-15 Aug-15
I Per 7 Mar-07 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Sep-08 Feb-09 Apr-09
II Per 6 Jun-10 Jul-11 Aug-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Sep-12
III Per 6 Jul-13 Oct-14 Dec-14 Apr-15 Jul-15 Aug-15
Table 52: Bai and Perron test - Number of proposals on the 3 best ask / Theoretical total
number of proposals
xxxviii
Volume outliers on bid side (VOB)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Total volumes on the bid side identified as outliers through the method de-
scriped in the introduction.
Figure 28: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on bid side (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Sep-08 Jan-09 Jun-09 Jul-11 Apr-12 Jan-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15
I Per 4 Sep-08 Jan-09 Jun-09 Mar-10
II Per 2 Jul-11 Apr-12
III Per 5 Jul-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15 Mar-17
Table 53: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on bid side
xxxix
Volume outliers on ask side (VOA)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Total volumes on the ask side identified as outliers through the method de-
scriped in the introduction.
Figure 29: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on ask side (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 2 Sep-08 Jan-09
I Per 2 Oct-08 Jan-09
II Per 2 Jul-11 Apr-12
III Per 8 Jul-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15 May-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17
Table 54: Bai and Perron test - Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on ask side
xl
Volume outliers on bid side / Theoretical total depth (VOBTE)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the total volumes on the bid side identified as outliers to the theo-
retical total depth.
Figure 30: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on bid side / Theoretical total depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 9 Sep-08 Jan-09 Jun-09 Jul-11 Apr-12 Jan-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15
I Per 4 Sep-08 Jan-09 Jun-09 Mar-10
II Per 2 Jul-11 Apr-12
III Per 5 Jul-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15 Mar-17
Table 55: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on bid side / Theoretical total depth
xli
Volume outliers on ask side / Theoretical total depth (VOATE)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the total volumes on the ask side identified as outliers to the theo-
retical total depth.
Figure 31: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on ask side / Theoretical total depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 2 Sep-08 Feb-09
I Per 2 Oct-08 Jan-09
II Per 2 Jul-11 Apr-12
III Per 9 Jul-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15 Oct-15 May-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17
Table 56: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on ask side / Theoretical total depth
xlii
Volume outliers on bid side / Total bid depth (VOBTO)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the total volumes on the bid side identified as outliers to the total
depth on the bid side.
Figure 32: Bai and Perron test -Volume outliers on bid side / Total bid depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 2 Sep-08 Jan-09
I Per 3 Sep-08 Jan-09 Mar-09
II Per 2 Jul-11 Apr-12
III Per 5 Jul-13 Sep-13 Oct-14 Jul-15 Mar-17
Table 57: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on bid side / Total bid depth
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Volume outliers on ask side / Total ask depth (VOATO)
Dimension: Quoting.
Definition: Ratio of the total volumes on the ask side identified as outliers to the total
depth on the ask side.
Figure 33: Bai and Perron test -Volume outliers on ask side / Total ask depth (%)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 2 Sep-08 Feb-09
I Per 2 Oct-08 Jan-09 Mar-09
II Per 2 Jul-11 Apr-12
III Per 0
Table 58: Bai and Perron test - Volume outliers on ask side / Total ask depth
xliv
Total buying volumes (VB)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total buying volumes.
Figure 34: Bai and Perron test - Total buying volumes (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 5 Feb-08 Jul-09 Aug-11 Nov-13 May-15
I Per 3 Apr-06 Feb-08 Jan-09
II Per 1 Aug-11
III Per 2 May-15 Feb-17
Table 59: Bai and Perron test - Total buying volumes
xlv
Total selling volumes (VS)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total selling volumes.
Figure 35: Bai and Perron test - Total selling volumes (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 6 Mar-08 Jan-09 Dec-09 Aug-11 Nov-13 Mar-15
I Per 2 Mar-08 Jan-09
II Per 1 Aug-11
III Per 3 Mar-15 Sep-16 Nov-16
Table 60: Bai and Perron test - Total selling volumes
xlvi
Trades > 15mm - Total volumes (BVT)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total trading volumes of block trades greater than 15mm.
Figure 36: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total volumes (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 7 Feb-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12 Apr-15 Oct-15
I Per 2 Feb-08 Jul-09
II Per 3 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 3 Apr-15 Oct-15 Nov-16
Table 61: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total volumes
xlvii
Trades > 15mm - Total buying (BVB)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total buying volumes of block trades greater than 15mm.
Figure 37: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total buying (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 5 Feb-08 Jul-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 May-15
I Per 2 Feb-08 Jul-09
II Per 3 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 2 May-15 Feb-17
Table 62: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total buying
xlviii
Trades > 15mm - Total selling (BVS)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total selling volumes of block trades greater than 15mm.
Figure 38: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total selling (mm)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 5 Feb-08 Jun-09 Jul-10 Aug-11 Oct-12
I Per 3 Feb-08 Jun-09
II Per 1 Aug-11
III Per 2 Mar-15 Oct-15
Table 63: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total selling
xlix
Trades > 15mm - Total number of deals (BNT)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total number of block trades greater than 15mm.
Figure 39: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total number of deals
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 8 Feb-08 Jul-09 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12 Nov-12 May-15 Oct-15
I Per 2 Feb-08 Jul-09
II Per 3 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 3 May-15 Oct-15 Nov-16
Table 64: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total number of deals
l
Trades > 15mm - Total number of buying (BNB)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total number of block buying trades greater than 15mm.
Figure 40: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total number of buying
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 5 Feb-08 Jul-09 Jul-11 Jan-12 May-15
I Per 3 Sep-06 Feb-08 Jul-09
II Per 2 Jul-11 Jan-12
III Per 2 May-15 Feb-17
Table 65: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total number of buying
li
Trades > 15mm - Total number of selling (BNS)
Dimension: Trading.
Definition: Total number of block selling trades greater than 15mm.
Figure 41: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total number of selling
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 7 Feb-08 Jun-09 Sep-10 Aug-11 Oct-12 Mar-15 Oct-15
I Per 2 Feb-08 Jun-09
II Per 2 Oct-10 Aug-11
III Per 2 Mar-15 Oct-15
Table 66: Bai and Perron test - Trades > 15mm - Total number of selling
lii
Price impact on best bid (PIB)
Dimension: Resiliency.
Definition: Impact of selling trades greater of 15mm on the best bid prices after 15
minutes the deal execution.
Figure 42: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on best bid (price ticks)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 8 Feb-08 Aug-08 Apr-09 Sep-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Dec-12 Mar-15
I Per 7 Jul-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 May-09 Nov-09
II Per 8 Feb-11 May-11 Aug-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Jun-12 Sep-12
III Per 9 Apr-13 Jul-13 Mar-14 Jul-14 Oct-14 Mar-15 Aug-15 Dec-15 Aug-16
Table 67: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on best bid
liii
Price impact on best ask (PIA)
Dimension: Resiliency.
Definition: Impact of buying trades greater of 15mm on the best ask prices after 15
minutes the deal execution.
Figure 43: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on best ask (price ticks)
Period Num. breaks Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 Date 7 Date 8 Date 9
Entire 7 Jan-08 Sep-08 Jul-11 Oct-12 Aug-13 Jan-14 Oct-15
I Per 9 Aug-06 Jun-07 Aug-07 Nov-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Aug-08 Oct-08 Mar-09
II Per 9 Jun-10 Jan-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-11 Feb-12 Apr-12 Sep-12 Nov-12
III Per 9 May-13 Aug-13 Jan-14 Oct-15 Feb-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Sep-16
Table 68: Bai and Perron test - Price impact on best ask
liv
Appendix D. Chapter 4
.5 Specialists’ evaluation criteria. Year 2015
Table 69: Evaluation Criteria of Specialists in Government
bonds. Year 2015
Parameter Description Max score
Primary
Market
Primary
Market
Quota
Each Specialist is assigned a score, between 0 and
33, in proportion to the share allocated obtained in
the reference period. The score begins to be assigned
with the allocation of a share above the minimum re-
quired to maintain the Specialist qualification (3%)
up to a maximum level of 6%. The score for the pri-
mary quantitative parameter is assigned according to
the following formula: (Specialist’s market share –
3%)/(6% - 3%)*33. The specialist’s market share in
the reference period is calculated weighting the allo-
cated amounts of each type of bond with weights that
take into account the financial characteristics of the
same bonds as well as the status of the bonds placed
on auction (bonds currently being issued – on-the-run
– or no longer being issued – off-the-run) according
to the table 71
33.00
lv
Parameter Description Max score
Primary
Market
Qualitative
evaluation
– AAI
AAI measures the contribution of each Specialist’s
auction strategy in determining the difference be-
tween the bond auction price and the prices reported
on the secondary market. AAI measures the degree
of aggresivity of the auction participation strategy of
each Specialist, in other words, the combined effect of
the difference between bid prices and market prices
(overbidding) associated with bid quantities that ra-
tion the amount available to the remaining partici-
pants (overdemanding). The score is attributed ac-
cording to the average value of the AAI, calculated on
each auction of on-the-run BTPs, BTPI, CCT, CTZ,
obtained by each Specialist and is assigned accord-
ing to the following scheme: a) if 0 < AAI < 0.2, 12
points; b) 0.2 < AAI < 1.2, 0-12 points in propor-
tion to the AAI value; c) AAI > 1.2, 0 points. For
each auction the value of the AAI may be adjusted
by the Treasury in order to take into consideration the
specific contribution of the Specialists to the auction
result, the requests of the bond at auction by final in-
vestors and, more generally, the overall outcome of
the auction with respect to the performance on the
secondary market of the same bond in the period pre-
ceding the auction cut-off time.
12.00
lvi
Parameter Description Max score
Primary
Market
Qualitative
evaluation
– Bidding
Continuity
This criteria evaluates the regularity of participa-
tion of Specialists in all the auctions of Government
bonds. The indicator measures the number of times
in which the Specialist, in auctions, did not bid for a
quota of at least 4The indicator is made so as to pro-
portionally penalize (by up to a maximum of 4 points)
those Specialists that more frequently did not respect
the minimum level of participation in the auctions.
0.00
lvii
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Quality
quotation
index
QQI is an indicator based on high frequency snap-
shots (that mimic continuous monitoring), made on
each market day, on the order book of each bond,
for each Specialist. For each snapshot, the ranking
of the Specialist in the order book of the bond with
respect to the best ranked Specialist, both for the bid
and ask sides, is recorded. To calculate the indica-
tor, those snapshots, both on the bid and ask sides,
that reveal buy and/or sale price proposals associated
with (visible) quantities that are equal to at least 5 mil-
lion euros, will be considered, with the exception of
the BTPCi segment where all proposals are evaluated.
For each bond, the average ranking of the Specialist is
calculated, relative to the market day. To calculate the
average ranking, each position in the order book (in
terms of ranking with respect to the best Specialist) is
weighted with decreasing coefficients that are in pro-
portion to the position in the order book with respect
to the best price, in order to reward more those dealers
that continuously show the best prices both for the bid
and the ask sides. The absence of the Specialist from
the order book determines a worsening of the aver-
age rank and thus of the performance measured by
the QQI, having taken into account, in any case, the
safeguard mechanism, if the Specialist is “technically
suspended” having just settled a contract.
8.00
lviii
Parameter Description Max score
Lower QQI values, which indicate an average over-
all positioning closer to the best prices, denote a bet-
ter performance. The daily rankings relative to each
bond are then aggregated (simple average) by these
classes of bonds: BOT/CTZ/BTP <18months, BTP
<3 years, BTP <5 years, BTP <10 years, BTP>10
years, BTPI, CCT. For each class of bonds, each Spe-
cialist is assigned a class score in proportion to the
QQI indicator value. This class score is calculated in
reference to the index value obtained by the best Spe-
cialist for the given bond class. Each Specialist, fi-
nally, is assigned an overall score equal to the sum of
the class points, rescaled respect to a maximum of 8
points assigned to the Specialist with the highest sum
of class points.
lix
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Cash –
Volumes
traded –
Market
Share
Given the number of open market days during the ref-
erence period, the “Cash traded volumes” parameter
is calculated with two subsequent weightings. The
first takes into account the type of bonds traded whose
volumes are weighted according to the weights pre-
sented in the table 71, without distinguishing between
off-the-run and on-the-run. Afterwards, the volumes
traded by the operator, thus weighted, are propor-
tioned to the total volume of cash traded in the trad-
ing venues selected, taking into account if the trade
was as filler or aggressor. Volumes traded as fillers
are weighted 1 while those traded as aggressors are
weighted 0.50. The best Specialist is assigned a score
of 8 points. All the other Specialists are proportion-
ally assigned a score between 0 and 8. Those Special-
ists with a market share less than that of the average
of market makers that are neither Specialists nor Can-
didate Specialists are assigned a score equal to 0.
8.00
lx
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Cash –
Bond
Traded as
Filler
The parameter measures the ability of each Special-
ist to trade, as filler, the highest possible number of
bonds on the selected trading venue, taking into ac-
count the financial characteristics of the bonds. For
the calculation of the parameter, bonds traded as filler,
from each Specialist, are analyzed for different seg-
ments (by type/class of maturity), as in QQI indicator.
For each segment a ranking is carried out and a stan-
dardized maximum score is assigned to the best and
in proportion to the others. The sum of the scores ob-
tained in each segment by each Specialist represents
the reference indicator of the parameter. To the best
Specialist 4 points are assigned. A score between 0
and 4 is proportionally assigned to the other Special-
ists.
4.00
lxi
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Cash –
Large in
size trades
The parameter measures the contribution of each Spe-
cialist to provide size to contracts traded as filler, on
the selected trading venue, taking into account the
characteristics of the bonds. For the calculation of the
parameter, bonds are analyzed for different segments
(by type/class of maturity), as in QQI indicator. For
each segment all contracts larger than or equal to a
threshold size are selected. The threshold size, for
each segment, is defined by averaging the size of con-
tracts traded during the observation period, to which a
buffer is added calculated as a percentage of the aver-
age. Having selected the contracts for each segment,
then Treasury calculates the share of each Specialist
as filler. For each segment the Specialists are then
ranked giving a maximum standardized score to the
better and in proportion to the others. The sum of
the scores obtained on all segments by each Special-
ist represents the reference indicator of the parameter.
The Specialist with the highest indicator is given a
score of 2 points. All other Specialists is assigned a
score proportional between 0 and 2.
2.00
lxii
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Repo –
Market
Share
Given the number of open market days during the ref-
erence period, the parameter is calculated, both for the
General Collateral segment and for the Special Repo
segment, as a percentage of volumes traded trough
ordinary contracts or Request-for-quote type of con-
tracts, weighted for the duration of the contract, of the
overall total of the segment. In weighting for the du-
ration, contracts with a duration above 90 days will
be considered as 90-day contracts. The best Special-
ist, on each segment, is assigned a maximum score of
3 points. A score between 0 and 3 is proportionally
assigned to the other Specialists with a market share
above that of the average of market makers that are
neither Specialists nor Candidate Specialists. Those
Specialists with a market share less than that of the
average of market makers that are neither Specialists
nor Candidate Specialists are assigned a score equal
to 0.
6.00
lxiii
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Contribution
to the ef-
ficiency of
the market
(Bank of
Italy)
The bonds quoted are divided for each open market
day into 7 classes according to their segment and their
degree of liquidity. For each class the following pa-
rameters, indicative of each primary dealer’s contribu-
tion to overall market efficiency, are considered: aver-
age spread weighted for page exposition time; volume
of applications received; number of bonds quoted;
number of bonds traded; sum of the quoted quanti-
ties weighted for page exposition time. To permit
the comparison of non-homogeneous quantities, in-
somuch as they refer to bonds with different finan-
cial characteristics and degrees of liquidity, processes
of standardization of data used for analysis are car-
ried out. The daily parameters, calculated for each
dealer within the context of each class of liquidity, are
subsequently aggregated on a period basis in order to
complete a comparative evaluation of the behavior of
all the main dealers in the market. A comprehensive
ranking is thus drawn up, which constitutes the basis
for the Treasury’s attribution of points. 6 points are
assigned to the best Specialist. A score between 0 and
6 is proportionally assigned to the other Specialist.
6.00
lxiv
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Cash –
Volumes
traded on
Electronic
System
This parameter, calculated each quarter, assesses the
Specialist’s trading activity on electronic trading sys-
tems. This indicator, whose calculation takes into ac-
count information included in the European harmo-
nized report format (HRF), is calculated as the per-
centage of volumes traded by the operator of the to-
tal of electronic trading systems, analyzed for differ-
ent segments (by type/class of maturity), as shown in
table 71, without distinction between on-the-run and
off-the-run. Trading volumes on strips, whether they
take place in electronic or non-electronic markets, are
measured with a weight equal to that of the segment
BTP 15 years. The best Specialist is assigned a score
of 4 points. A score between 0 and 4 is proportionally
assigned to the other Specialists.
4.00
Secondary
Market
Distributional
capacity in
the Cash
Market –
HRF
The parameter evaluates the overall ability of the Spe-
cialist to distribute the complete range of instruments
issued by the Treasury. The indicator is calculated
each quarter on the basis of information in the HRF,
that provides details of trading activity for: bond type
and residual maturity, geographical area and type of
counterparty, trading system. 2 points are assigned to
the Specialist with the best performance. A score be-
tween 0 and 2 is proportionally assigned to the other
Specialists.
2.00
lxv
Parameter Description Max score
Secondary
Market
Distributional
capacity in
the Repo
Market –
HRF
This is a synthetic indicator that measures the quality
of the trading activity of Government bonds outside
wholesale regulated markets, on the repo segment,
with regards to the diversification of bond types, of
counterparties and of systems used. The parameter is
calculated each quarter on the basis of data commu-
nicated by the Specialist according to the format de-
fined by the Treasury together with the Bank of Italy.
2 points are assigned to the Specialist with the best
performance. A score between 0 and 2 is proportion-
ally assigned to the other Specialists.
2.00
Organizational
structure
The evaluation of the Organizational Structure given
by the Treasury is made yearly and assigns up to 8
points. The parameter takes into account the overall
assessment given by the Treasury on the Specialist’s
activity, with reference to aspects concerning the reli-
ability of the organizational structure and the advisory
and research ability on themes related to the manage-
ment of public debt. In assigning points, the contri-
bution to the efficient functioning of the primary and
secondary markets, which is not directly measurable
with the indicators mentioned in the preceding arti-
cles, is also assessed.
8.00
lxvi
Parameter Description Max score
Exchange
and
Buy-
Back
The participation of each Specialist in buyback and
exchange operations is assessed up to a maximum of
5 points. The maximum score that can be assigned,
in any case not below 3 points, will be set by the
Treasury on the basis of the number and overall value
of operations conducted during the year. The perfor-
mance of each Specialist will be evaluated in propor-
tion to the best operator. Specialists that within the
deadlines set for the settlement of exchange or buy-
back transactions fail to deliver, even partially, the
share of bonds sold in the transaction, will be penal-
ized. This penalty will result in a deduction from the
score that the Specialists will be assigned on the pa-
rameter at year end, equal to 10% of the maximum
score potentially assigned at year end (0.3 - 0.5) for
each fail, up to a maximum of points achieved by the
Specialist.
3.00 - 5.00
Total score 98.00 -
100.00
lxvii
Table 70: Coefficients for QQI index. Year 2015.
Ranking in Coefficient
the order book
1 0
2 5
3 8
4 9
5 10
... ...
Absent 28
lxviii
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.6 Changes in evaluation criteria. Year 2016
Table 72: Changes to the Evaluation Criteria of Specialists
in Government bonds. Year 2016
Parameter Description
Primary Market
Quota
I) A positive score (>0 ) is obtained if the primary market share is be-
tween 3,5% - 6,5% (instead of the 2015 range of 3% - 6%)
II) The maximum score assigned is reduced by one point moving from 33
to 32 points
III) In calculating the quantitative indicator on the primary market - pri-
mary market share, the weights assigned to the nominal and inflation se-
curities on maturities longer than 10 years are increased. The weight of
CCTs/CCTeus is almost aligned to their maturity at issuance. The weight
of nominal 3 and 5 year BTPs and of CTZs is slightly reduced. Table 74
presents the new coefficients.
Primary Mar-
ket Qualitative
Evaluation – AAI
I) The “threshold‘ share (the quota above which a Specialist is considered
”aggressive”) for the purposes of calculation of AAI, when the prices
of the bid offered at auction are higher than the reference price of the
secondary market, is increased to 5.30%
II) The maximum score assigned is reduced by two points, moving from
12 to 10 points
Primary Mar-
ket Bidding
Continuity
I) The minimum share of participation at each auction, in order not to be
penalized with a reduction in points, is increased from 4% to 5%
II) The maximum penalization is unchanged to -4 points
lxx
Parameter Description
Secondary Mar-
ket - QQI
I) The weight of quoting activity on nominal BTPs with a maturity longer
than 10 years is increased with respect to the other segments. The weight
assigned to this category is doubled while the others are left unchanged
II) The minimum size required (previously 5 millions) for the evaluation
of quotation activity on nominal BTPs with a maturity longer than 10
years is removed
III) The coefficients for weighting the positions in the order book are
modified to increase the distance between the second and subsequent
rankings, by assigning to the third position a coefficient equal to 8 (against
the current 6). Subsequent positions after the third are ranked consistently
with the ordinary pace of 1 (9,10,11 etc..) . The weighting of the first two
positions remains unchanged (0 and 5)
IV) The maximum score assigned is increased by one point from 8 to 9
points
Secondary Mar-
ket - Volumes
traded
I) The weight of several segments is changed, increasing that of nominal
and inflation segments longer than 10 years while reducing that of CTZs,
nominal 3 and 5 year BTPs as well as CCTs (as reported on the table 74 )
II) The maximum score assigned is unchanged
Secondary Mar-
ket - Number of
bonds traded as
filler
I) The weight of trading activity on nominal BTPs longer than 10 years is
increased with respect to the other segments. The weight assigned to this
category is doubled while the others are left unchanged
II) The maximum score assigned is unchanged
Secondary Mar-
ket - Large in size
contract
I) The size of the contracts threshold beyond which is considered a posi-
tive contribution to the market depth is determined by the average of the
size of the contracts made in the period of observation
II) The weight of trading activity nominal BTPs longer than 10 years is
increased with respect to the other segments. The weight assigned to this
category is doubled while the others are left unchanged
III) The maximum score assigned is unchanged
lxxi
Parameter Description
Secondary Mar-
ket - Volumes
traded in other
electronic plat-
forms
I) The weight of several segments is changed, increasing that of nomi-
nal and inflation ones longer than 10 years while reducing that of CTZs,
nominal 3 and 5 year BTPs as well as CCTs (as reported on the table 74 )
II) For the calculation of the parameter, trading activity executed with
final investors (BtC) is furtherly rewarded
III) The maximum score assigned is increased by two points moving from
4 to 6 points
Secondary Mar-
ket - Volumes in
MTS Repo
I) The total maximum score – unchanged at 6 points - is distributed dif-
ferently among the General Collateral segment and the Special Repo one:
up to 2 points for the best Specialist in the GC segment and up to 4 points
to the best Specialist in the SR segment. Currently the scores for the two
segments were equivalent (3 and 3)
Secondary Mar-
ket - Repo
Volumes traded
outside MTS
Repo
I) Calculation of the parameter and the maximum score assigned to the
best Specialist are unchanged
Table 73: Weights for QQI index. Year 2015 and 2016.
2015 2016
Bonds 10y 15y 30y 10y 15y 30y
On the run 7.50 12.00 17.00 7.50 14.00 20.00
Off the run 3.75 6.00 8.50 3.75 7.00 10.00
lxxii
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lxxiii
1. The overall evaluation of the primary market is reduced from 45 to 42 points. The
overall evaluation of the secondary market is conversely increased from 42 points to
45 points
2. The score assigned to the primary market share changes from 33 to 32 points while the
score assigned to the qualitative assessment of the bidding behavior in auction changes
from 12 to 10 points
3. On the secondary market, volumes traded according to the HRF data (outside MTS
platform) are evaluated with 2 points more, while the QQI parameter is increased by
1point
.7 Italian Treasury issuance activity (2013 - 2017).
Table 75: Treasury issued amounts in BTPs 10y and 15y segments in September-April period
during last five years.
Sep 13 - Apr 14 Sep 14 - Apr 15 Sep 15 - Apr 16 Sep 16 - Apr 17 Average
BTP 10y 22.050 (mm) 23.250 (mm) 21.750 (mm) 20.250 (mm) 21.825 (mm)
BTP 15y 6.000 (mm) 8.000 (mm) 5.956 (mm) 4.386 (mm) 6.114 (mm)
lxxiv
.8 Descriptive statistics of outcome variables
lxxv
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.9 Descriptive statistics of the number of proposals for each
bond in the sample.
ISIN Obs. Mean Median Max Var Skew Kurtosis
IT0005127086 16296 21.02 21.50 27.00 8.815 -1.986 10.791
IT0005090318 16296 19.57 20.00 25.00 7.306 -1.802 10.322
IT0004513641 16296 20.22 20.50 28.00 9.835 -1.451 8.561
IT0005045270 16296 20.48 21.00 26.00 7.945 -2.018 11.755
IT0005001547 16296 21.06 21.00 28.00 11.466 -1.065 7.201
IT0004953417 16296 19.87 20.00 27.00 9.502 -1.206 7.914
IT0000366655 16296 19.61 20.00 25.00 7.620 -2.056 11.404
IT0004644735 16296 20.29 20.50 27.00 9.166 -1.593 9.380
IT0001086567 16296 20.31 21.00 26.00 7.432 -2.548 14.069
IT0001174611 16296 19.93 20.00 26.00 8.032 -2.282 13.023
IT0004889033 16296 20.51 21.00 25.00 8.351 -2.523 13.527
IT0001278511 16296 20.27 20.50 26.00 10.807 -1.605 8.654
IT0005024234 16296 20.94 21.50 27.00 9.080 -2.461 13.119
IT0001444378 16296 19.55 20.00 26.00 9.484 -1.759 9.905
IT0005094088 16296 18.88 18.50 28.00 12.635 -0.783 5.546
Table 77: Descriptive statistics of the number of proposals for the fifteen bonds of the
sample. For each bond in the sample, the table presents descriptive statistics of the number
of proposals in the quoting book. The dataset is composed by the snapshots of the quoting
book of each bond with a frequency of 5 minutes from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm, in the period that
runs from September 1, 2015 to April 28, 2016.
lxxxi
.10 Public rankings of Specialists on Italian Government
Bond (2007-2017).
Year 1 2 3 4 5
2017 MPS CS Unicredit Banca Imi JP Morgan Barclays
2016 MPS CS JP Morgan Banca Imi Unicredit Bnp Paribas
2015 MPS CS JP Morgan Banca Imi Unicredit Citi
2014 MPS CS Unicredit JP Morgan Citi Barclays
2013 Citi Unicredit HSBC JP Morgan Banca Imi
2012 Barclays Banca Imi JP Morgan Credit Agricole Unicredit
2011 Barclays Banca Imi Unicredit JP Morgan Deutsche Bank
2010 Barclays Deutsche Bank Citi Soc Gen RBS
2009 Barclays Soc Gen Credit Agricole Deutsche Bank Bnp Paribas
2008 Soc Gen Bnp Paribas Unicredit Banca Imi JP Morgan
2007 Banca Imi Barclays Soc Gen JP Morgan Bnp Paribas
Table 78: Rankings 2017 - 2007. Five top specialists.
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